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This dissertation addresses threemulti-dimensional problems in single-resource
revenuemanagement. Many problems in revenuemanagement involvemanag-
ing a single resource but their dynamic programming formulation still requires
using a multi-dimensional vector as the state variable. For instance, single-
flight-leg revenue management is an extensively studied problem where air-
lines use the same seat resource to accommodate different classes of customers.
In these problems, due to the multi-dimensional state space, the exact formula-
tion is either intractable, or the resulting optimal policy is inconvenient to im-
plement operationally. We develop approximations for the exact formulations,
which generate tractable and operationally attractive policies.
The first problem we study is a strategic decision problem about whether or
not to discontinue a product sold under warranty, whose failure probabilities
are unknown initially and are learnt as sales take place and failure information
is accumulated. Since there are multiple types of failures that the product can
fail from, we formulate the problem as a multi-dimensional optimal stopping
problem with Bayesian learning. Two approximations based on dynamic pro-
gramming decomposition and deterministic approximation are developed, and
insights about the value of learning are extracted from asymptotic analysis.
Next we study a dual-channel pricing and capacity allocation problem for
hotel revenue management. While one channel is the spot market in which we
can adopt dynamic pricing, the other is a conference market with a fixed price
offered for conference participants. Remaining rooms in the conference market
will be released to the spot market if not booked by a deadline. Tactical deci-
sions on number of rooms to reserve and fixed price to offer for the conference
market need to be made at the beginning of the selling horizon. For the oper-
ational pricing problem in the spot market, because the two markets will join
together in a future time, we need a two-dimensional dynamic program which
tracks the remaining capacities in both markets to make optimal pricing deci-
sions in the spot market. We develop a single-dimensional approximation to the
exact two-dimensional formulation, which generates a robust and operationally
attractive policy. For the tactical problem of finding the optimal capacity allo-
cation between spot and conference markets and choosing the fixed price to
charge in the conference market, we construct an asymptotically optimal policy
through a deterministic formulation.
Finally, we consider a revenue management problem where we sell a prod-
uct to multiple markets with heterogeneous price sensitivities. We can allocate
the capacity to different markets and charge different prices in different markets
(separate pricing), in which case we gain pricing flexibility, or we can merge all
markets together and serve them with a common price (joint pricing), in which
case we obtain capacity flexibility. We study the tradeoff between pricing and
capacity flexibilities and establish conditions under which one is more impor-
tant than the other. For a hybrid model where separate pricing is adopted early
in the selling horizon and joint pricing is used towards the end, we develop a
single-dimensional approximation which gives rise to a policy with remarkably
good performance especially for problem instances with tight capacity, large
number of markets, or drastically different price sensitivities.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Revenue management deals with strategic and tactical demand-management
decisions in order to increase revenue when we sell scarce resources to cus-
tomers in an uncertain environment. Starting from 1950’s, it has found wide
applications in various areas such as passenger airlines, hotel chains, car rental
companies, sports and entertainment industry and retail industry (see Talluri
and Van Ryzin, 2005).
If we are managingmultiple interdependent resources at the same time, then
we have a multi-resource revenue management problem. An extensively stud-
ied such problem is the network revenue management problem in airline in-
dustry, where the resources are seats on different flight legs in an airline net-
work. Such problems are usually modeled as a multi-dimensional dynamic
program, whose state variable keeps track of remaining capacities of different
resources and thus suffers from the so-called “curse of dimensionality”. When
we are managing a single resource, we have a single-recourse revenue manage-
ment problem. A typical such problem is the dynamic pricing of a perishable
product studied by Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994). While the single-resource
problems are in general easier than their multi-resource counterparts, there
are single-resource revenue management problems which have to be modeled
by multi-dimensional dynamic programs, hence share similar difficulties with
multi-resource problems. We study three such problems in this dissertation.
In many cases, the exact dynamic programming formulations for multi-
dimensional single-resource problems are intractable to solve; in other cases,
even if the dynamic programming formulation can be solved exactly, the opti-
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mal policy from the exact formulation could be inconvenient to implement. The
common theme of the dissertation is to develop tractable approximations to the
exact formulations, which give rise to operationally attractive policies.
This dissertation is structured into four chapters beyond this introduction.
Chapter 2 studies a strategic decision problem to decide whether or not to dis-
continue a product that is sold under warranty and is subject to failure due to
multiple causes. Chapter 3 studies a dual-channel pricing and capacity alloca-
tion problem for a hotel when a block of rooms have to be reserved for a special
event such as a conference. Chapter 4 studies a problem where we can allocate
the total capacity into different markets and charge separate prices at different
markets, or serve all the customers in a single market with a common price. In
the former case, we achieve pricing flexibility at the cost of capacity flexibility;
whereas in the latter case, we achieve capacity flexibility at the cost of pricing
flexibility. Chapter 5 presents concluding remarks and suggestions for future
research. A more detailed overview follows.
In Chapter 2, we consider the problem faced by a company selling a product
with warranty, under partial information about the reliability of the product.
The product can fail from multiple failure types, each of which is associated
with an inherently different repair cost. If the product fails within the warranty
duration, then the company is responsible to pay the repair costs. The company
does not know the probabilities associated with different failure types, but it
learns the failure probabilities as sales occur and failure information is accumu-
lated. If the failure probabilities turn out to be too high and it becomes costly
to fulfill the warranty coverage, then the company may decide to stop selling
the product, or replace it with a more reliable alternative. The objective is to
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decide if and when to stop. The multiple failure types make this problem a high
dimensional decision problem.
By formulating the problem as an optimal stopping problem with Bayesian
learning, we establish structural properties of the optimal policy. The state vari-
able of the dynamic program is a vector representing our estimates for the prob-
abilities of different failure types, and the high-dimensional state space makes
it intractable to compute the optimal policy. We propose two approximation
methods. The first method is based on decomposing the problem by failure
types, and it provides upper bounds on the value functions. The secondmethod
provides lower bounds on the value functions, and it is based on a deterministic
approximation. By using asymptotic analysis, we extract insights on when it is
important to actively learn the failure probabilities. Computational experiments
are carried out to evaluate the performance of the proposed policies.
In Chapter 3, we study the pricing and capacity allocation problem in hotel
revenue management when a block of rooms have to be reserved for a special
event such as a conference. In this setting, the conference organizer requests
to reserve a block of rooms for conference participants at a fixed price, and the
reservation expires if the reserved rooms are not fully booked by a deadline
before the date of conference. This adds a conference market channel parallel to
the spot market. The price at the conference market is agreed upon and fixed,
whereas dynamic pricing can be employed in the spot market. In addition to
finding the optimal pricing policy in the spot market, at a tactical level, the hotel
manager needs to decide the number of rooms to reserve and the fixed price to
offer for conference participants.
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For the operational level pricing problem in the spot market, while the ex-
act formulation is a reasonably tractable two-dimensional dynamic program,
the optimal policy is not attractive because we need to keep track of sales in
both the spot market and conference market to make pricing decisions in the
spot market. We construct an asymptotically tight single dimensional approxi-
mation for the exact formulation. In the single dimensional approximation, we
only keep track of the sales in the spot market and model the remaining capac-
ity in the conference market by a static random variable. The policy from the
single dimensional approximation is not only appealing from an operational
perspective, its performance is also robust to load factor and tactical level de-
cision inputs. For the tactical level decision problem, based on a deterministic
formulation of a relaxed problem, we develop a heuristic to make decisions on
conference market pricing and capacity allocation between the spot and confer-
ence markets simultaneously. For the overall problem, the policy by combing
the tactical level heuristic and the operational level approximation is asymptot-
ically optimal, and it also provides remarkably good performance in numerical
experiments.
In Chapter 4, we extend the problem in Chapter 3 to multiple markets and
more general setting. We sell a product to different markets with heterogeneous
price sensitivities. A strategic decision is whether we should allocate the capac-
ity to different markets and charge different prices in different markets (sepa-
rate pricing), or we should merge all the markets together and serve them with
a common price (joint pricing). If the former is chosen, we gain pricing flexibil-
ity while lose capacity flexibility by committing certain number of inventories
to each market. If the latter is chosen, we lose pricing flexibility since a common
price needs to be offered, however, we have capacity flexibility since there is no
4
market separation andwe can use any remaining capacity to satisfy the demand
from any markets. We characterize the region where the benefit of pricing flex-
ibility outweighs the benefits of capacity flexibility. The characterization also
motivates a hybrid model where we adopt separate pricing at the early stage
and switch to joint pricing towards the end of the selling horizon. Such hybrid
settings occur when a number of hotel rooms are sold simultaneously in a spot
market and a conferencemarket, and the spot market and conferencemarket are
kept separate until a predetermined deadline. In the hybrid model, we need to
keep track of the remaining inventories in every markets and the state variable
in the dynamic programming formulation ends up being a multi-dimensional
vector, which destroys the tractability of themodel. We develop heuristics based
on a single-dimensional approximation for each market.
Computational experiments compare the performance of the policy from
the single-dimensional approximation with policies that charge fixed prices ob-
tained from a deterministic approximation. Our single-dimensional approxi-
mation provides significant improvements especially when the capacity is tight,
the number of markets is large, or the price sensitivities of customers in different
markets differ from each other substantially.
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CHAPTER 2
BALANCING REVENUES AND REPAIR COSTS UNDER PARTIAL
INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCT RELIABILITY
2.1 Introduction
We consider the problem faced by a company selling a product with warranty
to customers, while the reliability information of the product covered by the
warranty is only partially available to the company. The product can be a phys-
ical product or a warranty-type service agreement. Whenever a sale occurs, the
company receives a one-time or monthly payment from its customers. In re-
turn, it is responsible to cover the repair costs of the product during a certain
warranty duration. Typically, a product can fail due to multiple failure types,
each of which is associated with an inherently different repair cost and an un-
known failure probability. Initially, the company only has rough estimates of
these failure probabilities, usually from experience with similar products or a
short test marketing stage that involves a small number of units. If the true
failure probabilities turn out to be too high and it becomes costly to fulfill the
warranty coverage, then the companymaywant to stop selling such product, or
replace it with a more reliable alternative. As shown in the following examples,
problems of this flavor naturally arise in a variety of industries.
Example 1: Printer Technical Support Agreement. To minimize downtime of
a large printing equipment, customers, such as schools and business organiza-
tions, often buy a technical support agreement from either themanufacturer or a
certified service provider for their printers. Companies providing such services
include Xerox, MIDCOM Service Group and CPLUS Critical Hardware Sup-
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port. Customers pay either a one-time or monthly fee to the service provider,
and the service provider is responsible for on-site or depot repairs of the printer
during the agreed time period ranging from one to five years (see Xerox Corpo-
ration for a sample service agreement). The service provider usually maintains
a team of technicians and carries out the repair service itself. The printer can
break down due to fuser, motor, network failures and so on. The labor and part
costs associated with different failures can vary widely. If the failure probabil-
ities prove to be very high, then the company may choose to stop selling this
service or increase its fee for future contracts. Similar technical support services
for other types of equipments widely exist.
Example 2: Extended Vehicle Warranty. Most new vehicles come with a manu-
facturer warranty, which typically covers the repair of components for a limited
duration, for example, three years or 36,000 miles, whichever comes first. When
the initial manufacturer warranty expires, the customer has the option to buy an
extended vehicle warranty, mostly from a third party service provider such as
Warranty Direct and CARCHEX (see, for example, Top Extended Vehicle War-
ranty Providers). The warranty contract works essentially like an insurance.
The service provider charges a monthly fee to the customer for a certain war-
ranty duration ranging from several months to ten years, and if anything cov-
ered by the warranty breaks within this time period, then the service provider
pays the repair cost, including material and labor costs. Depending on the type
of warranty contract and the failed components, the repair costs can vary from
a few hundred dollars to several thousands. If the failure probabilities turn out
to be too high, then the service provider may choose to increase the payment
rate of such warranty service for future demands.
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Example 3: Cell Phone Warranty. Cell phone service providers routinely intro-
duce new cell phone models into the market. These companies make a certain
revenue with the sale of each cell phone, while each sold cell phone comes with
a warranty that covers failures for a certain duration. Generally, a cell phone can
fail due to failures in five to fifteen different categories, while the repair costs
for failures in different categories can vary substantially. For instance, accord-
ing to a nationwide repair service provider Mission Repair, the screen repair for
iPhone 4S costs $99, the home button repair costs $79, while the battery repair
costs $39. If the failure probabilities turn out to be too high and the warranty
coverage cost offsets a large portion of the sales revenue, then the company
may decide to stop selling a particular cell phone model, and turn its attention
to other possible alternatives.
The above motivating applications share common features. First, the prod-
uct covered by the warranty is fairly complex and it can fail in multiple fail-
ure types, while the repair costs associated with these failure types can vary
substantially. Second, the company selling the product has limited information
about the failure probabilities. Third, the company has the option to stop selling
current product, possibly with some follow up actions such as increasing the
payment rate, terminating the product, or switching to another more reliable
alternative. In case a stopping decision is made, the sold warranty contracts
usually need to be honored by the company. The fundamental tradeoff is that if
the company waits too long to get a better understanding of the reliability of the
product, then it may introduce a lot of units into the market and incur excessive
refurbishment costs due to them. On the other hand, if the company does not
spend enough time collecting data, then it may base its decisions on unreliable
estimates of the failure probabilities.
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In this chapter, motivated by the applications above, we analyze an optimal
stopping model that balances revenues and repair costs under partial informa-
tion about product reliability. We formulate the problem as a dynamic program
with a high-dimensional state variable that keeps track of our beliefs about the
probabilities of different failure types. As new failure information is accumu-
lated at each time period, we adjust our beliefs about the probabilities of differ-
ent failure types according to a Bayesian updating scheme. At each time period,
we decide whether to continue or stop selling the product. The objective is to
maximize the total expected profit, which is given by the difference between the
revenue from the sales and the total expected repair cost.
We give a characterization of the optimal policy by showing that the value
functions in our dynamic programming formulation are decreasing and con-
vex in our estimates of the failure probabilities (Proposition 2.4.2). By using
this result, we establish that the optimal policy is of boundary type (Propo-
sitions 2.4.3) and compare the optimal stopping boundaries at different time
periods (Proposition 2.4.4). To deal with the high-dimensional state variable,
we give two tractable approximation methods. The first method decomposes
the problem into a collection of one-dimensional dynamic programs, one for
each failure type. By combining the value functions obtained from each one-
dimensional dynamic program, we obtain upper bounds on the original value
functions (Proposition 2.5.1). The second approximation method is based on a
deterministic formulation that ignores the benefits from future learning. Com-
plementing the first method, we show that the second approximation method
provides lower bounds (Proposition 2.6.1). By using the second approxima-
tion method, we demonstrate that the value of learning the failure probabilities
is larger when the demand quantities in the different time periods are smaller
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(Proposition 2.6.2). Finally, we establish that the lower bounds from the second
approximation method are asymptotically tight as the demand in each time pe-
riod scales linearly with the same rate (Proposition 2.6.3). Our numerical exper-
iments compare the performances of the policies from the two approximation
methods with a heuristic policy that is based on aggregating all failure types
into a single failure. The policy from upper bound approximation provides im-
pressive improvement with reasonable computational effort, especially when
the number of possible failure types is large.
At a higher level, we formulate a joint adaptive learning and decision mak-
ing problem that can appear in a variety of industries. The focus of the chapter
is then to develop solutions for the model and analyze the learning dynamics.
With respect to methodological contributions, first, it turns out that our model
is a generalized one-armed bandit problem, where the expected reward of the
unknown arm depends on n unknown parameters. This is a useful generaliza-
tion of the one-armed bandit problem, which does not appear in the literature
as far as we know. Second, we characterize various properties of the learning
dynamics by using stochastic ordering and asymptotic analysis. Finally, we de-
velop computationally tractable approximation methods that can provide good
policies for use in practice.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. An overview of the related
literature is provided in Section 2.2. We derive a dynamic programming formu-
lation in Section 2.3, followed by the structural properties of the optimal policy
in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, we develop an upper bound approximation based
on a dynamic programming decomposition idea. Section 2.6 provides a lower
bound approximation based on a deterministic formulation, alongwith detailed
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analysis for the benefits of learning. Computational experiments comparing the
policies obtained by the two approximation methods and a heuristic based on
single-failure approximation appear in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 gives possible
extensions for our model. We conclude with directions for future research in
Section 2.9.
2.2 Literature Review
Our work in this chapter is related to several streams of literature. The first
stream of work involves operations management models that have embedded
optimal stopping or Bayesian learning features. Feng and Gallego (1995) con-
sider optimal timing of a single price change from an initial price to a fixed
lower or higher price. They show that the optimal policy is characterized by se-
quences of time thresholds that depend on the number of unsold units. Aviv
and Pazgal (2005) use partially observed Markov decision processes to ana-
lyze a dynamic pricing problem while learning an unknown demand param-
eter. They develop upper bounds on the expected revenue and propose heuris-
tics based on modifications of the available information structure. Bertsimas
and Mersereau (2007) give a model for adaptively learning the effectiveness of
ads in interactive marketing. The authors formulate the problem as a dynamic
program with a Bayesian learning mechanism and propose a decomposition
based approximation approach. Our decomposition idea resembles theirs. Caro
and Gallien (2007) study a stylized dynamic assortment problem by using the
multi-armed bandit framework. They develop a closed form dynamic index
policy and extend the policy to more realistic environments by incorporating
lead times, switching costs and substitution effects. Araman and Caldentey
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(2009) study a dynamic pricing problem under incomplete information for the
market size. They formulate the problem as a Poisson intensity control problem,
derive structural properties of the optimal policy and give tractable approxima-
tion methods. Farias and Van Roy (2010) study a dynamic pricing problem,
where the willingness to pay distribution of the customers is known, but the
customer arrival rate is unknown. The authors develop a heuristic to learn the
customer arrival rate dynamically and give a performance guarantee for their
heuristic. Harrison, Keskina, and Zeevi (2011) consider a pricing problemwhere
one of the two demand models is known to apply, but they do not know which
one is the one. They give asymptotic analysis for a family learning policies. Ar-
lotto, Chick, and Gans (2011) study the optimal hiring and retention problem
via an infinite armed bandit model. They characterize the optimal policy by a
Gittins index policy and develop tractable approximations to the Gittins index.
The second stream of related work involves decomposition methods for
multi-dimensional dynamic programs. Hawkins (2003) develops a Lagrangian
relaxation method for the so-called weakly coupled dynamic programs, where
the original problem can be decomposed into a collection of independent single-
dimensional subproblems except for a set of linking constraints on the action
space. Adelman and Mersereau (2008) compare the approximate linear pro-
gramming approach and the Lagrangian relaxation method for weakly coupled
dynamic programs. Topaloglu (2009) explores Lagrangian relaxation method
in the network revenue management setting to come up with tractable policies
for controlling airline ticket sales. A similar approach is adopted in Topaloglu
and Kunnumkal (2010) to compute time-dependent bid prices in network rev-
enuemanagement problems, whereas Erdelyi and Topaloglu (2010a) extend this
approach to handle joint capacity allocation and overbooking problems over an
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airline network. Brown, Smith, and Sun (2010) propose a dual approach to com-
pute bounds on value functions by relaxing the non-anticipativity constraint
and provide an analysis based on duality theory.
Finally, since our problem involves choosing between continuing and stop-
ping under incomplete information, it is related to the bandit literature. The
one-armed bandit problem considers sampling from two options, where the re-
ward from one option is known, but the expected reward from the other one
depends on an unknown parameter. The goal is to maximize the total expected
reward from sampling. Our model can be viewed as a generalized one-armed
bandit model where the expected reward from the unknown arm depends on
n different unknown parameters. Bradt, Johnson, and Karlin (1956) consider a
setting that allows finite number of sampling opportunities, and show that the
optimal policy is to stick with the known option until the end once we switch
to this option. The optimal policy for the infinite horizon one-armed bandit
problem is characterized as an index policy by Gittins (1979). Burnetas and
Katehakis (1998) generalize the results in Bradt et al. (1956) to single-parameter
exponential family, whereas Burnetas and Katehakis (2003) provide asymptotic
approximations when the number of time periods goes to infinity. Goldensh-
luger and Zeevi (2011, 2009) consider a minimax formulation of the one-armed
bandit problem, establish lower bound on the minimum regret under an arbi-
trary policy, and propose a policy that achieves a matching upper bound. When
there are multiple options to choose from, the problem is referred to as a multi-
armed bandit problem. Berry and Fristedt (1985) and Gittins (1989) give early
analysis of multi-armed bandit problems. Such problems tend to be signifi-
cantly more difficult than their one-armed counterparts, since one needs to keep
track of the beliefs about the rewards of multiple options.
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2.3 Problem Formulation
We sell a product over a finite selling horizon. The product can fail from multi-
ple failure types, and we sell the product with a warranty that covers the repairs
of failed units within a certain warranty duration. We incur a repair cost when
a unit fails within its warranty. The probabilities of different failure types are
unknown at the beginning of the selling horizon, but we obtain more accurate
estimates of the failure probabilities as failure information is accumulated over
time. If the failure probabilities turn out to be high and the repairs become too
costly, then we may decide to stop selling the product and avoid introducing
new units into circulation, while honoring the warranty coverage of existing
units (Instead of terminating a product, we can easily extend our model to al-
low switching to a standard more reliable alternative. See Section 2.8 for more
details). On the other hand, if the failure probabilities turn out to be low, then
we may continue selling the product until the end of selling horizon. The ob-
jective is to decide if and when to stop selling the product so as to maximize
the total expected profit, which is the difference between the total revenue from
sales and the total expected repair cost.
There are n failure types indexed by 1; : : : ; n, each of which is associatedwith
an unknown failure probability. We assume that the true failure probabilities do
not change overtime, but they are unknown to us. The selling horizon consists
of the time periods f0; 1; : : : ; g. At time period zero, we sell the product to ob-
tain an initial belief for the failure probabilities, and we do not make a decision
at the beginning of this time period. At the beginning of the other time periods,
we need to decide whether to stop or continue selling the product. Therefore,
we can view time period zero as a test marketing stage duringwhichwe form an
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initial belief about the failure probabilities. If we already have a prior belief for
the failure probabilities, then we can modify our model to skip time period zero
altogether and start directly at time period one with a prior belief. During each
time period, each unit may suffer from multiple failure types, but we assume
that the failures of different units and the failures of each unit from different
failure types are independent of each other. Section 2.8 discusses an alterna-
tive model where each unit can fail only from a single failure type, inducing
dependence across failure types.
We generate a revenue of r from each unit sold. A sold unit is covered by
warranty for K consecutive time periods. If a unit under warranty fails from
failure type i, then we incur a repair cost of ci. A repaired unit remains in war-
ranty only for the duration left in the original warranty contract. In other words,
the warranty for a particular unit does not start from scratch after each repair.
For simplicity, we ignore the possible lead time when a unit is being repaired.
This is a reasonable assumption in the application settings we consider because
companies usually have a number of spare products that they can use to imme-
diately replace a failed unit as the failed unit is being repaired, or a technician
is sent immediately when an on-site repair is requested. We assume that the
repaired units have the same unknown failure probabilities as the brand new
units. This assumption is reasonable when the failure types are mostly elec-
trical or the repair is carried out by replacing the broken parts with new ones,
which is again the case for the application settings that motivate our work.
We use Dt to denote the demand for the product at time period t, which is
assumed to be deterministic. The deterministic demand assumption allows us
to focus on the learning dynamics for the failure probabilities and to identify
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structural insights from our model. Extending our model to stochastic demand
is an important avenue for further investigation. Under this assumption the
number of units under warranty coverage in time period t, denoted by Wt, is
simply the total demand in the last K time periods, that is, Wt =
Pt
s=0 1(t  
s < K)Ds, where 1() is the indicator function. In this case, Wt corresponds to
the number of units that we can potentially receive as failed units for repairs
at time period t. We naturally expect to receive only a fraction of these units
as failed units because not all of them fail at the same time. Finally, if we let
Mt = W0 +W1 + : : : +Wt 1, thenMt is the total number of units that we could
have potentially received as failed units for repairs up until time period t. Since
the demand is a deterministic quantity, Wt and Mt are deterministic quantities
as well.
2.3.1 Learning Dynamics
The learning process is based on a Bayesian update of the failure probabilities.
At each time period, our prior belief about the probability of a particular failure
type has a beta distribution. After observing the number of failed units from a
particular failure type, we apply the Bayes rule to obtain an updated posterior
belief about the failure probability. Since each unit fails independently and the
beta distribution is a conjugate prior of the binomial distribution, our posterior
belief continues to have a beta distribution.
Let Pit denote our (random) prior belief at the beginning of time period t
for the probability of failure type i. We recall that Mt corresponds to the total
number of units that we could have potentially received as failed units up un-
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til time period t. Using it to denote the proportion of the Mt units that have
actually failed from failure type i, we assume that the random variable Pit has
a beta distribution with parameters (itMt; (1   it)Mt). The parameters itMt
and (1   it)Mt are the number of units that have failed and have not failed,
respectively, from failure type i up until time period t. The expected value of
Pit is itMt=[itMt + (1   it)Mt] = it, which agrees with the intuition that the
expected value of our prior belief for the probability of failure type i is equal to
the proportion of units that have failed from failure type i up until time period t.
Recall thatWt is the number of units that is still under warranty at time pe-
riod t. If we let the random variable Yit denote the number of units that we ac-
tually receive as failed units from failure type i at time period t, then our prior
belief implies that Yit has the binomial distribution with parameters (Wt; Pit),
where the second parameter Pit is itself a beta random variable with param-
eters (itMt; (1   it)Mt). Binomial random variables whose second parame-
ter has a beta distribution are commonly referred to as beta-binomial random
variables. In this case, since the beta distribution is a conjugate prior for the
binomial distribution, it is well known that our posterior belief at time period
t for the probability of failure type i has a beta distribution with parameters
(itMt+ Yit; (1  it)Mt+Wt  Yit). The two parameters of this distribution cor-
respond to the number of units that have failed and have not failed, respectively,
from failure type i up until time period t+1. Throughout the rest of the chapter,
we prefer writing the random variables Pit and Yit as Pit(it) and Yit(it), respec-
tively, to explicitly emphasize the fact that the distributions of these random
variables depend on it. By conditioning on Pit(it), we compute the expected
value of Yit(it) as EfYit(it)g = EfEfYit(it) jPit(it)gg = EfWt Pit(it)g = Wt it,
which corresponds to the expected number of units that we receive as failed
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units from failure type i at time period t. This computation shortly becomes
useful when constructing the cost function.
2.3.2 Dynamic Programming Formulation
Our prior belief at time period t for the probability of failure type i has a beta
distribution with parameters (itMt; (1  it)Mt). Noting thatMt is a determin-
istic quantity, we only need to know it in order to keep track of our prior belief
for the probability of failure type i. Therefore, we can use t = (1t; : : : ; nt)
as the state variable in our dynamic programming formulation. Since it corre-
sponds to the proportion of theMt units that we have actually received as failed
units from failure type i up until time period t, the dynamics of it is given by
i;t+1 =
itMt + Yit(it)
Mt+1
=
Mt
Mt+1
it +
h
1  Mt
Mt+1
iYit(it)
Wt
; (2.1)
where we use the fact that Mt+1   Mt = Wt. Using the vector Yt(t) =
(Y1t(1t); : : : ; Ynt(nt)) and defining the deterministic quantity t = Mt=Mt+1, we
write the dynamics of t in vector notation as t+1 = t t + 1 tWt Yt(t). The
quantity t 2 [0; 1] is called the shrinkage factor.
To develop the cost structure of our dynamic program, we begin by con-
sidering the case where we continue selling the product at time period t. In
this case, the number of units that fail from failure type i at time period t is
given by the random variable Yit(it). Since EfYit(it)g = Wt it, we incur an ex-
pected repair cost of Ct(t) =
Pn
i=1 ciWt it, if we continue selling the product.
If there are additional costs, such as goodwill or reputation costs, associated
with failure probabilities of the product, then these costs can be incorporated
into Ct(t) as well. On the other hand, if we decide to stop selling the prod-
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uct at time period t, then all future demands are lost, while the warranties of
the already sold units need to be honored. In this case, the number of units
that remain under warranty coverage at a future time period `  t is given byPt 1
s=0 1(`   s < K)Ds. Therefore, the number of units that we receive as failed
units from failure type i at the future time period ` is given by a beta-binomial
random variable with parameters
 Pt 1
s=0 1(` s < K)Ds; Pit(it)

, whose expec-
tation is given by
Pt 1
s=0 1(`  s < K)Ds it, where we use the same conditioning
argument that we use to compute the expectation of Yit(it). Adding over all of
the future time periods and all of the failure types, this implies that we incur an
expected repair cost of St(t) =
Pn
i=1
P1
`=t
Pt 1
s=0 ci 1(`  s < K)Ds it from time
period t onwards, given that we stop selling the product at time period t. The
implicit assumption in the last cost expression is that if a unit is covered by the
warranty beyond the selling horizon, then we are responsible from fulfilling the
repairs for this unit until its warranty coverage expires.
We can formulate the problem as a dynamic program by using t as the state
variable at time period t. If we continue selling the product at time period t,
then we generate a revenue of rDt and incur an expected repair cost of Ct(t),
whereas if we stop selling the product at time period t, then we incur an ex-
pected repair cost of St(t). Using the learning dynamics given in (2.1), the
value functions satisfy the optimality equation
#t(t) = max
n
rDt   Ct(t) + Ef#t+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g; St(t)
o
;
with the boundary condition #+1() =  S+1(). If the first term in the max op-
erator is larger than the second term, then it is optimal to continue; otherwise,
it is optimal to stop. The expectation operator involves the random variable
Yt(t). It turns out that we can simplify the optimality equation by using a re-
lationship between Ct() and St(). Adding St(t) to both sides of the optimality
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equation and letting Vt(t) = #t(t) + St(t), we obtain
Vt(t) = max
n
rDt   Ct(t) + St(t) + EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g
  EfSt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g; 0
o
;
with the boundary condition V+1() = 0. From the definition of St+1(), we
see that it is a linear function, hence we have EfSt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g =
St+1(Eft t + 1 tWt Yt(t)g) = St+1(t), where we use the fact that EfYit(it)g =
Wt it. Therefore, in the above optimality equation we can write the expression
Ct(t)  St(t) + EfSt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g as Ct(t)  St(t) + St+1(t). In ad-
dition, using the definitions of Ct() and St(), a simple algebraic manipulation
given in Appendix A.1 shows that Ct(t) St(t)+St+1(t) = K
Pn
i=1 ci itDt =
KcTtDt, where we use c = (c1; : : : ; cn). Thus, we can write the last optimality
equation as
Vt(t) = max
n
(r  KcTt)Dt + EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g; 0
o
: (2.2)
The optimality equation above has an intuitive explanation. According to our
belief at time period t, we expect a unit to fail from failure type i with probabil-
ity it and the expressionKcTt can be interpreted as the expected repair cost of
a unit over its whole warranty coverage. Therefore, the expression r KcTt in
the optimality equation above corresponds to the expected net profit contribu-
tion of a sold unit. The optimality equation in (2.2) indicates that for each unit
sold at time period t, the total expected repair cost over the whole warranty du-
ration can be charged immediately at time period t according to our belief at this
time period. Shifting the timing of costs appears in the literature frequently, but
it is surprising that we can shift the timing even when we learn certain problem
parameters.
The structure of the optimality equation in (2.2) is the same as that for the
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classical one-armed bandit problem, in the sense that the first term in the maxi-
mum can be thought as the expected reward of pulling the unknown arm. The
difference is that in classical one-armed bandit problem, the expected reward of
the unknown arm depends on a single unknown parameter, while in the above
optimality equation, the expected reward of the unknown arm depends on n
unknown parameters. From this prospective, our model can be viewed as a
generalization of the classical one-armed bandit problem. This observation mo-
tivates the single failure approximation strategy we use as a benchmark policy
in Section 2.7.
In the optimality equation in (2.2), it is optimal to continue selling the prod-
uct at time period twhenever the state t satisfies (r KcTt)Dt+EfVt+1(t t+
1 t
Wt
Yt(t))g > 0. Furthermore, the state at time period t satisfies the last in-
equality if and only if Vt(t) > 0. Therefore, the set of states at which it is opti-
mal to continue selling the product at time period t is given by Ct = ft 2 [0; 1]n :
Vt(t) > 0g. We obtain an optimal policy by continuing selling the product at
time period t if and only if the state t at this time period satisfies t 2 Ct.
From the optimality equation in (2.2), it is clear that if there is only one fail-
ure type, then the formulation becomes a single-dimensional dynamic program,
which is easy to solve. Furthermore, if two failure types have the same repair
cost, they can be combined as a single failure type. In particular, if the repair
costs of different failure types are all the same, then the formulation can be re-
duced to a single-dimensional dynamic program that uses
P
i it as the state
variable. The presence of multiple failure types and the heterogeneity of repair
costs are the primary reasons that the problem we study is difficult to solve.
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2.4 Structural Properties
In this section, we first show that the value functions are componentwise de-
creasing and convex in the state variable. By using this structural property,
we establish the monotonicity of the optimal decision in the state variable and
time periods. Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) give a detailed overview for
the concept of stochastic monotonicity and convexity. Following their terminol-
ogy, we say that a family of random variables fX() :  2 <g is stochastically
increasing if Ef(X())g is increasing in  for any increasing function () on
<. Similarly, a family of random variables fX() :  2 <g is stochastically
convex if Ef(X())g is convex in  for any convex function () on <. Follow-
ing an argument similar to those in the proofs of Theorems 8.A.15 and 8.A.17 in
Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007), we can show the following closure properties
for stochastically increasing and convex families.
Lemma 2.4.1 (Closure Properties). We have the following properties.
(1) Assume that the families of random variables fX() :  2 <g and fY () :  2 <g
are stochastically increasing and stochastically convex. Furthermore, assume thatX()
and Y () are independent of each other for all  2 <. Then, for any a; b 2 <+, the
family of random variables faX() + b Y () :  2 <g is stochastically increasing and
stochastically convex.
(2) Let fX() :  2 <g be a family of real-valued random variables. Assume that the
families of random variables fX() :  2 <g and fY () :  2 <g are stochastically
increasing and stochastically convex. Furthermore, assume that X() and Y () are
independent of each other for all  2 < and  2 <. Then, the family of random variables
fY (X()) :  2 <g is stochastically increasing and stochastically convex.
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If we use Binomial(n; q) to denote a binomial random variable with param-
eters (n; p), then Example 8.B.3 in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) establishes
that the family of random variables fBinomial(n; p) : p 2 [0; 1]g is stochastically
increasing and linear in the sample path sense, and hence stochastically increas-
ing and stochastically convex. Similarly, if we use Beta(m; (1 )m) to denote a
beta random variable with parameters (m; (1 )m), and define Beta(0;m)  0
and Beta(m; 0)  1, then Adell, Badia, and de la Cal (1993) show that the fam-
ily of beta random variables fBeta(m; (1   )m) :  2 [0; 1]g is stochastically
increasing and stochastically convex. By using these two results together with
Lemma 2.4.1, we show the following monotonicity and convexity result for the
value functions. We defer the details of the proof to Appendix A.2
Proposition 2.4.2 (Monotonicity and Convexity of the Value Functions). For t =
1; : : : ;  and i = 1; : : : ; n, the value function Vt(t) is componentwise decreasing and
convex in it.
Based on the monotonicity property, if Vt(t) > 0, then for any 0t where
0it  it; 8i = 1; : : : ; n, we have Vt(0t)  Vt(t) > 0. In this case, we immediately
obtain the following proposition, which gives a comparison between the deci-
sions made by the optimal policy for different values of the state variable. In the
statement of the next proposition, we recall that Ct = ft 2 [0; 1]n : V (t) > 0g
denotes the set of states for which it is optimal to continue selling the product.
Proposition 2.4.3 (Shape of the Continuation Region). For all t = 1; : : : ;  and
t;
0
t 2 [0; 1]n that satisfy 0it  it;8i = 1; : : : ; n, if t 2 Ct, then 0t 2 Ct.
The proposition makes intuitive sense. If the proportions of the units that
failed in the past from different failure types are lower, then our estimates of
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the failure probabilities are also lower and we are more likely to continue sell-
ing the product, all else being equal. The implication of this proposition is that
the optimal policy is a boundary type policy. In other words, there is an op-
timal stopping boundary at time period t and if the proportions of the units
that failed in the past from different failure types are above the optimal stop-
ping boundary, then it is optimal to stop selling the product. Otherwise it is
optimal to continue. The optimal stopping boundary at time period t is an
(n   1)-dimensional hypersurface determined by the values of t that satisfy
(r   KcTt)Dt + EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g = 0. For a problem instance with
two failure types, the solid line in Figure 2.1 shows the shape of the optimal
stopping boundary at a particular time period t. The horizontal and vertical
axes in this figure give our expected beliefs about the probabilities of the two
failure types, which we indicate by (1t; 2t). The solid line shows the values of
the expected beliefs about the probabilities of the two failure types such that we
would be indifferent between stopping and continuing to sell the product. To
the lower left side of the stopping boundary, the optimal decision is to continue
selling the product. The dashed and dotted lines show approximations to the
optimal stopping boundary that we obtain by using the methods developed in
Sections 2.5 and 2.6. We dwell on these stopping boundaries later in the chapter.
By making use of the monotonicity of the value functions, the following
proposition gives a comparison between the decisions made by the optimal pol-
icy at different time periods. The proof of this proposition appears in Appendix
A.2.
Proposition 2.4.4 (Absence of Failures Leads to Continuation). Assume that the
state at time period t is t and t 2 Ct. If no units fail at time period t, then it is still
optimal to continue selling the product at time period t+ 1.
24
Figure 2.1: Optimal stopping boundary and approximations to the opti-
mal stopping boundary at t = 4 for a problem instance with
the following parameters: N = 2;  = 5; K = 1; r = 1; c =
(1:5; 0:5); Dl = 5; l = 0; : : : ;  .
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Proposition 2.4.4 makes intuitive sense because the absence of failures at
time period t strengthens our belief that failures are rare. In this case, if it is
optimal to continue selling the product at time period t and we do not observe
any failures at this time period, then it is sensible to continue selling the product
at time period t+ 1.
The expectation in the optimality equation in (2.2) involves the ran-
dom variable Yit(it), which has a beta-binomial distribution with parameters
(Wt; Pit(it)), where the random Pit(it) itself is a beta random variable. Com-
puting expectations that involve such a beta-binomial random variable requires
calculating beta functions, which can be problematic in practice when the pa-
rameters of the beta functions are large. Teerapabolarn (2008) demonstrates
that a beta-binomial distribution can be approximated well by a binomial dis-
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tribution, especially when the expectation of the beta random variable is small.
This result brings up the possibility of replacing the beta-binomial random vari-
able Yit(it) in the optimality equation in (2.2) with a binomial random variable
Zit(it) with parameters (Wt; it), which is a binomial random variable with the
same expectation as Yit(it). With this substitution, we can simplify the compu-
tation of the expectation in (2.2). Furthermore, it is possible to show that this
approximation provides lower bounds on the original value functions. Details
are given in Appendix A.3. We use this approximation for our numerical exper-
iments in Section 2.7.
As we discuss at the end of Section 2.3, the difficulty of the problem is due
to the high-dimensional state space in the optimality equation in (2.2), making
it difficult to compute the value functions exactly when the number of failure
types exceeds two or three. In the next two sections, we develop computation-
ally tractable methods to construct approximations to the value functions. These
methods scale gracefully with the number of failure types.
2.5 Upper Bounds and Decomposition-Based Policy
In this section, we develop a tractable method for approximating the value func-
tions by decomposing the problem into a collection of one-dimensional dynamic
programs, each involving a single failure type. We observe that the expected re-
pair cost KcTtDt = K
Pn
i=1 ci itDt in the optimality equation in (2.2) decom-
poses by the failure types. Furthermore, the dynamics of t given in (2.1) implies
that our beliefs about the different failure probabilities evolve independently of
each other. These observations motivate writing the revenue expression in the
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optimality equation in (2.2) as rDt =
Pn
i=1 iDt, where we assume that the vec-
tor  = (1; : : : ; n) satisfies
Pn
i=1 i = r, but leave it unspecified otherwise for
the time being. In this case, for each i = 1; : : : ; n, we can solve the optimality
equation
V Uit (it j) = max
n
(i  Kci it)Dt + EfV Ui;t+1(t it + 1 tWt Yit(it) j)g; 0
o
;
(2.3)
with the boundary condition V Ui;+1( j) = 0. The optimality equation in (2.3)
finds the optimal policy for the case where the failures are only of type i and
the revenue that we generate from each sold unit is given by i. We use the sub-
script i in the value functions to emphasize that the optimality equation in (2.3)
focuses only on a single failure type i. The argument  in the value functions
emphasizes that the solution to the optimality equation depends on the choice
of the vector . As shown in the following proposition, the optimality equation
in (2.3) provides upper bounds on the original value functions. The superscript
U in the value functions emphasizes this upper bound property. We note that
the optimality equation in (2.3) can be solved in a tractable manner because its
state variable is a scalar.
Proposition 2.5.1 (Upper Bounds). For any vector  satisfying
Pn
i=1 i = r, we
have Vt(t) 
Pn
i=1 V
U
it (it j) for all t = 1; : : : ;  and t 2 [0; 1]n.
Proof. We show the result by using induction over the time periods. The result
trivially holds at time period +1. Assuming that the result holds at time period
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t+ 1, we have
nX
i=1
V Uit (it j)
=
nX
i=1
max
n
(i  Kci it)Dt + EfV Ui;t+1(t it + 1 tWt Yit(it) j)g; 0
o
 max
(
nX
i=1
(i  Kci it)Dt +
nX
i=1
EfV Ui;t+1(t it + 1 tWt Yit(it) j)g; 0
)
= max
n
(r  KcT t)Dt + Ef
Pn
i=1 V
U
i;t+1(t it +
1 t
Wt
Yit(it) j)g; 0
o
 max
n
(r  KcT t)Dt + EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g; 0
o
= Vt(t);
where the second equality uses the fact that
Pn
i=1 i = r, the second inequality
follows from the induction assumption and the fact that components of Yt(t)
are independent, and the last equality follows from the optimality equation in
(2.2).
From the proof of the proposition above, we observe that sufficient condi-
tions for the upper bound property to hold are the following. First, the immedi-
ate profit function should be of the form a constant plus a separable function of
the state. In our problem setting, this profit is of the form r Dt KDt
Pn
i=1 ci it.
Second and perhaps more importantly, our beliefs about the probabilities of the
different failure types should evolve independently of each other. No matter
what learning model we use, as long as these two conditions are satisfied, the
decomposition method provides upper bounds on the original value functions.
Furthermore, this same decomposition method can be used in other high di-
mensional stopping problems as long as the continuation profit is of the form a
constant plus a separable function of the state, and the different components of
the state variable evolve independently of each other.
It is natural to ask how we can use Proposition 2.5.1 to choose a value for
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 and how we can use the optimality equation in (2.3) to decide whether we
should continue or stop selling the product at a particular time period. By
Proposition 2.5.1, the optimal objective value of the problem
V Ut (t) = min

(
nX
i=1
V Uit (it j) :
nX
i=1
i = r
)
(2.4)
provides the tightest possible upper bound on Vt(t). In this case, we can mimic
the optimal policy by defining the set of states CUt = ft 2 [0; 1]n : V Ut (t) > 0g
and continuing selling the product at time period t if and only if the state t at
this time period satisfies t 2 CUt . We refer to this policy as the decomposition
based policy. Since we have V Ut (t)  Vt(t), we obtain CUt  Ct. Therefore,
the decomposition based policy is more likely to continue selling the product
when compared with the optimal policy. The dashed line in Figure 2.1 shows
the approximation to the optimal stopping boundary that we obtain by using
the decomposition based policy. We observe from this figure that we indeed
have CUt  Ct.
By using induction over the time periods, in Appendix A.4, we show that
V Uit (it j) is a convex function of . Furthermore, we establish that the total
expected demand we observe until we stop selling the product according to
the optimality equation in (2.3) gives a subgradient of V Uit (it j)with respect to
i. This result enables us to solve the optimization problem in (2.4) by using a
standard subgradient method.
2.6 Lower Bounds and Greedy Policy
The goal of this section is to complement the approach in the previous section
by providing lower bounds on the value functions. We begin this section bymo-
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tivating our lower bounds through Jensen’s inequality. We then show that our
lower bounds correspond to the expected profits obtained by a greedy policy
that makes its decisions based only on the current estimation, ignoring future
learning altogether. By using the lower bounds, we construct a policy to de-
cide if and when to stop selling the product. Finally, we establish that our lower
bounds become asymptotically tight as we scale the demand in each time period
linearly with the same rate.
2.6.1 A Deterministic Approximation
Our approach is based on exchanging the order in which we compute the ex-
pectation and the value function on the right side of the optimality equation
in (2.2). In particular, noting that we have Eft t + 1 tWt Yt(t)g = t, by
replacing EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g in the optimality equation in (2.2) with
Vt+1(Eft t + 1 tWt Yt(t)g) = Vt+1(t), we obtain the optimality equation
V Lt (t) = max
n
(r  KcTt)Dt + V Lt+1(t); 0
o
; (2.5)
with the boundary condition V L+1() = 0. The optimality equation above does
not involve any uncertainty, and the state does not change as long as we con-
tinue selling the product. In this case, letting []+ = maxf; 0g and using in-
duction over the time periods, it is possible to show that the value functions
computed through the optimality equation in (2.5) are explicitly given by
V Lt (t) = [r  KcTt]+
X
s=t
Ds; (2.6)
for all t = 1; : : : ;  and t 2 [0; 1]n. We defer the details of this simple induction
argument to Appendix A.5. As shown in the following proposition, the value
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function V Lt () provides a lower bound on the original value function. The su-
perscript L emphasizes this lower bound property.
Proposition 2.6.1 (Lower Bounds). For all t = 1; : : : ;  and t 2 [0; 1]n, we have
Vt(t)  V Lt (t).
Proof. We show the result by using induction over the time periods. The result
trivially holds at time period +1. Assuming that the result holds at time period
t+ 1, we have
EfV Lt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g = Ef[r  KcT(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))]+g
X
s=t+1
Ds
 [r  KcTEft t + 1 tWt Yt(t)g]+
X
s=t+1
Ds
= (r  KcTt)+
X
s=t+1
Ds = V
L
t+1(t); (2.7)
where the equalities follow from the closed form expression for V Lt () in (2.6)
and the inequality follows by noting that []+ is a convex function and using
Jensen’s inequality. In this case, we obtain
Vt(t) = max
n
(r  KcTt)Dt + EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g; 0
o
 max
n
(r  KcTt)Dt + EfV Lt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g; 0
o
 max
n
(r  KcTt)Dt + V Lt+1(t); 0
o
= V Lt (t);
where the first inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and the second
one is by (2.7).
From the discussion at the end of Section 2.3, we can interpret r   KcTt
as the expected net profit contribution of a sold unit. Therefore, the expression
for V Lt (t) given in (2.6) corresponds to the total expected profit obtained by
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a policy that continues selling the product at all future time periods whenever
the expected net profit contribution of a sold unit is positive. This policy does
not consider the benefits from learning the failure probabilities at future time
periods.
We can use the optimality equation in (2.5) to come up with a policy to de-
cide whether we should continue or stop selling the product at a particular time
period. In particular, if we use V Lt () as an approximation to Vt(), then we
can mimic the optimal policy by defining the set of states CLt = ft 2 [0; 1]n :
V Lt () > 0g and continuing selling the product at time period t if and only if
the state t at this time period satisfies t 2 CLt . We refer to this policy as the
greedy policy. Since we have V Lt (t)  Vt(t), we obtain CLt  Ct, which im-
plies that the greedy policy is more likely to stop selling the product when com-
pared with the optimal policy. Furthermore, noting (2.6), we can write CLt as
CLt = ft 2 [0; 1]n : r  KcTt > 0g and the stopping boundary from the greedy
policy is an (n 1)-dimensional hyperplane determined by r KcTt = 0. There-
fore, we do not even need to solve an optimality equation to find the decisions
made by the greedy policy. The dotted line in Figure 2.1 shows the approxi-
mation to the optimal stopping boundary that we obtain by using the greedy
policy and it demonstrates that we indeed have CLt  Ct.
2.6.2 Asymptotic Analysis
Although the greedy policy is simple to compute, it does not consider the ben-
efits from learning the failure probabilities and a natural question is when we
can expect the greedy policy to perform reasonably well. In this section, we
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consider an asymptotic regime where we scale the demand at each time period
linearly with the same rate, and show that the performance of the greedy pol-
icy becomes optimal under this regime. The asymptotic regime we consider is
interesting in the following sense. On the one hand, if the demand at each time
period is scaled up, then we collect a large amount of information right after the
first time period and our estimates of the failure probabilities immediately be-
come accurate. Thus, it may not be a huge problem to make decisions without
considering the benefits from learning the failure probabilities and the greedy
policy is expected to perform well. On the other hand, since the demand quan-
tities at the future time periods are also large, we have the potential to collect
a large amount of information about failure probabilities in the future, which
may change our current belief about failure probabilities dramatically. Further-
more, since the demand quantities are large, small errors in estimating the fail-
ure probabilities may have drastic consequences. Thus, ignoring the benefits
from learning may cause serious problems and the greedy policy may perform
poorly. From these two conflicting perspectives, it is not clear a priori whether
the greedy policy is expected to perform well or not. The rest of this section
resolves this question by showing that the greedy policy is optimal under our
asymptotic scaling regime.
We consider a family of problems fPm : m = 1; 2; : : :g indexed by the pa-
rameter m 2 Z+. In problem Pm, the demand at time period t is mDt and all
other problem parameters are the same as those in Section 2.3. Accordingly,
in problem Pm, we have mMt units that we could potentially have received as
failed units up until time period t. We continue using it to denote the propor-
tion of themMt units that we have actually received as failed units from failure
type i. In this case, if we let Pmit (it) be our prior belief at time period t for the
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probability of failure type i, then Pmit (it) has a beta distribution with parameters
(itmMt; (1   it)mMt). Similarly, in problem Pm, we have mWt units that we
can potentially receive as failed units for repairs at time period t. We use Y mit (it)
to denote the number of units that we actually receive as failed units from fail-
ure type i at time period t. In this case, Y mit (it) has a beta-binomial distribution
with parameters (mWt; Pmit (it)).
We use fVt( jm) : t = 1; : : : ; g to denote the value functions that we obtain
by solving the optimality equation in (2.2) for problem Pm. In other words,
these value functions are obtained by replacing Dt with mDt and Yt(t) with
Y mt (t) = (Y
m
1t (1t); : : : ; Y
m
nt (nt)) in the optimality equation in (2.2) and solving
this optimality equation. We note that t in problem Pm does not depend on
m since this quantity is given by t = mMt=mMt+1 = Mt=Mt+1. Similarly, we
use fV Lt ( jm) : t = 1; : : : ; g to denote the value functions that we obtain by
solving the optimality equation in (2.5) for problem Pm. Noting (2.6), we have
V Lt (t jm) = mV Lt (t j 1) for all t = 1; : : : ;  and t 2 [0; 1]n.
For problem Pm, it is optimal to continue selling the product at time period
t whenever the state t at this time period is in the set Ct(m) = ft 2 [0; 1]n :
Vt(t jm) > 0g. Replacing Vt(t jm) with the lower bound V Lt (t jm), we can
obtain an approximate policy for problem Pm by continuing selling the product
at time period t whenever the state t at this time period is in the set CLt (m) =
ft 2 [0; 1]n : V Lt (t jm) > 0g. Since we have V Lt (t jm)  Vt(t jm) for all
t 2 [0; 1]n, we naturally obtain CLt (m)  Ct(m). Furthermore, since V Lt (t jm) =
mV Lt (t j 1), we have CLt (m) = CLt (1) by the definition of CLt (m). Therefore, we
have CLt (1)  Ct(m) for all m 2 Z+. In the following proposition, we give an
ordering for fCt(m) : m 2 Z+g, showing that Ct(m) shrinks as m increases. The
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proof requires two intermediate results and it is deferred to Appendix A.6.
Proposition 2.6.2 (Learning is More Beneficial for Smaller Demand).
For t = 1; : : : ;  , t 2 [0; 1]n andm 2 Z+, we have CLt (1)  Ct(m+ 1)  Ct(m).
Proposition 2.6.2 indicates that the optimal policy is more likely to continue
selling the product when m is small. Noting that the demand quantities are
smaller when m is smaller, this result builds the intuition that if the demand
quantities are smaller, then we should be more willing to learn the failure prob-
abilities by continuing to sell the product. In other words, we intuitively expect
the value of learning to be large when the demand quantities are small. In ad-
dition, Proposition 2.6.2 also shows that our deterministic approximation is at
the extreme end in the sense that no matter how large the demand quantities
are, our deterministic approximation is more likely to stop selling the product
when compared with the optimal policy.
The following proposition shows that Vt(t jm) deviates from V Lt (t jm) by
a term that grows in the order of
p
m. We defer the proof to Appendix A.7.
Proposition 2.6.3 (Benefits of Learning Vanish with Increasing Demand).
For all t = 1; : : : ;  and t 2 [0; 1]n, we have
V Lt (t jm)  Vt(t jm)  V Lt (t jm) + Gt
p
m;
where Gt is a constant that depends on (D0; : : : ; D ), (c1; : : : ; cn) andK.
Since we have V Lt (t jm) = mV Lt (t j 1) for all t = 1; : : : ;  and t 2 [0; 1]n,
Proposition 2.6.3 implies that mV Lt (t j 1)  Vt(t jm)  mV Lt (t j 1) + Gt
p
m.
Therefore, as long as V Lt (t j 1) is strictly positive, both V Lt (t jm) and Vt(t jm)
grow linearly withm, but the difference between V Lt (t jm) and Vt(t jm) grows
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only in the order of
p
m. In other words, we have limm!1
Vt(t jm)
V Lt (t jm)
= 1 as long
as V Lt (t j 1) is strictly greater than zero. Intuitively speaking, when the demand
quantities get sufficiently large, the value of learning vanishes and the problem
become reasonably easy.
2.7 Computational Experiments
In this section, we provide computational experiments to test the performance
of the policies developed in Sections 2.5 and 2.6. We begin by describing our
benchmark policies and experimental setup. These are followed by our compu-
tational results.
2.7.1 Benchmark Policies
We compare the following four benchmark policies.
Ideal Benchmark Policy (IDE). This benchmark policy corresponds to an ide-
alized decision rule that is computed under the assumption that the true fail-
ure probabilities are known. If we know that the true failure probabilities are
given by the vector p = (p1; : : : ; pn), then we generate a revenue of r and in-
cur an expected repair cost of KcTp for each sold unit. Therefore, if we have
r > KcTp, then it is optimal to continue selling the product until the end of
the selling horizon, whereas if we have r  KcTp, then it is optimal to stop
selling the product as early as possible. Since there is no decision to be made at
the beginning of time period zero, the expected profit obtained by IDE is simply
D0 [r   KcTp] +
P
t=1Dt [r   KcTp]+. This expected profit corresponds to the
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idealized scenario of knowing the true failure probabilities, and it provides an
unattainable upper bound on the expected profit that can be obtained by any
policy that tries to learn the failure probabilities. Nevertheless, by comparing
the performance of a particular policy with this upper bound, we can get a feel
for how difficult the problem is and how well the policy performs.
Decomposition Based Policy (DBP). This benchmark policy corresponds to the
one described in Section 2.5. In particular, if our belief for the failure probabili-
ties at time period t is captured by the vector t, then DBP solves problem (2.4)
to compute V Ut (t), and continues selling the product if and only if t is in the
set CUt = f0t 2 [0; 1]n : V Ut (0t) > 0g.
Greedy Policy (GRP). This benchmark policy corresponds to the one described
in Section 2.6. If our belief for the failure probabilities at time period t is cap-
tured by the vector t, then GRP continues selling the product if and only if t
is in the set CLt = f0t 2 [0; 1]n : r KcT0t > 0g. We note that implementing GRP
does not require solving an optimality equation at all. Furthermore, the set CLt
does not depend on the time period.
Single Failure Approximation Policy (SFA). This policy is motivated by the ob-
servation that our problem is a generalized one-armed bandit problem where
the expected reward of the unknown arm depends on n unknown parameters.
If we can aggregate different failure types as a single failure type, then the prob-
lem reduces to a classical one-armed bandit problem. The idea behind SFA is to
approximate our belief for the failure probabilities by using a single weighted
average of these probabilities. The weights that we put on the different failure
probabilities are the repair costs so that themore costly failures get more weight.
In particular, SFA works as follows. We solve the single-dimensional optimality
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equation
V st (
s
t ) = max
n
(r  K cs st )Dt + EfV st+1(t st + 1 tWt Y st (st ))g; 0
o
;
where we let cs =
Pn
i=1 ci, Y
s
t (
s
t ) = Binomial(Wt;Beta(
s
t Mt; (1   st )Mt)) and
V s+1() = 0. We define Cst = fst 2 [0; 1] : V st (st ) > 0g; t = 1; : : : ;  to capture
the set of states for which we are willing to continue selling the product. If our
belief for the failure probabilities at time period t is captured by the vector t,
then SFA continues selling the product if and only if st (t) =
cTt
cs
is in the set
Cst . Note that st (t) is a weighted average of the components of t.
2.7.2 Experimental Setup
We use simulation to test the performance of the four benchmark policies. For
each test problem, we simulate the performance for 500 sample paths. At the be-
ginning of each sample path, we sample the true failure probabilities (p1; : : : ; pn)
such that pi has a beta distribution with mean i and standard deviation i and
the components of the vector p = (p1; : : : ; pn) are independent of each other.
Once we fix the true failure probabilities, we use these probabilities to gener-
ate the numbers of failed units throughout the selling horizon. In particular,
letting ~Yit be the number of units that fail from failure type i at time period
t, we generate ~Yit from the binomial distribution with parameters (Wt; pi). At
each time period, we update the state of the system by using the dynamics
t+1 = t t +
1 t
Wt
~Y t, where ~Y t = (~Y1t; : : : ; ~Ynt). The initial value of the state
variable is given by i1 = 1W0
~Yi0 for all i = 1; : : : ; n, which corresponds to the
fraction of units under warranty that fail from failure type i at time period zero.
If we are testing DBP, then we continue selling the product at time period t if
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and only if the state t at this time period satisfies t 2 CUt . Similarly, if we are
testing GRP, then we continue selling the product at time period t if and only
if we have t 2 CLt . If we are testing SFA, then we continue selling the prod-
uct at time period t if and only if st (t) 2 Cst . Finally, if we are testing IDE,
then we continue selling the product until the end of the selling horizon if and
only if r > KcTp. Otherwise, we stop selling the product as early as possi-
ble, which is the beginning of time period 1. By simulating the decisions of the
benchmark policies that we are testing, we accumulate the profit obtained over
the selling horizon. Averaging the accumulated profits on 500 different sam-
ple paths, we estimate the expected profit obtained by a particular benchmark
policy. We note that IDE has access to the true failure probabilities to make its
decisions, whereas DBP, GRP and SFA use only the samples of failed units given
by f ~Y t : t = 0; 1; : : : ; g. This way of testing the performance of the benchmark
policies corresponds to a frequentist framework, where the true failure prob-
abilities are fixed at the beginning of a sample path and all failures occur ac-
cording to these true failure probabilities. However, we note that the dynamic
programming formulation in (2.2) is under a Bayesian framework, where the
true failure probabilities are assumed to evolve over the time periods according
to the Bayes rule. As a result, although one can use the optimality equation in
(2.2) to obtain a policy to make stopping and continuing decisions over time, if
the performance of this policy is tested in a frequentist framework, then the to-
tal expected profit obtained by the optimal policy can be larger than or smaller
than the one predicted by the value function V1() evaluated at the initial belief.
Similarly, although we obtain tractable upper bounds fV Ut () : t = 1; : : : ; g on
fVt() : t = 1; : : : ; g by using the decomposition approach in Section 2.5, the to-
tal expected profits collected by our benchmark policies can be larger or smaller
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than the upper bound V U1 () on the value function V1() evaluated at the initial
belief.
A few setup runs indicated that if r is substantially larger than KcTp, then
it is clearly optimal to continue selling the product and DBP, GRP and SFA are
all quick to realize this fact. In this case, the performance of the three bench-
mark policies is comparable. Similarly, if r is substantially smaller than KcTp,
then it is clearly optimal to stop selling the product, in which case, DBP GRP
and SFA end up performing comparably as well. Therefore, test problems tend
to be more difficult when r is roughly equal to KcTp so that it is not easy to
detect immediately whether it is optimal to continue or stop selling the prod-
uct. To generate test problems with this characteristic, we set the mean vector
 = (1; : : : ; n) of p to satisfy r = KcT. In this case, if the standard deviation
 = (1; : : : ; n) of p is small, then the sampled value of p in many sample paths
roughly satisfies r = KcTp and we obtain test problems for which it is difficult
to detect whether it is optimal to continue or stop selling the product. Therefore,
we generally expect the test problems to be more difficult as  gets smaller.
In all of our test problems, the number of time periods in the selling horizon
is 12 and the warranty coverage is for six time periods so that we have  =
12 and K = 6. We work with test problems with two or five failure types,
corresponding to n = 2 or n = 5. For the demand at each time period, one
set of test problems assume that D0 = D1 = : : : = D = D and we vary D over
50; 100; 200; 500 and 1000, whereas another set of test problems assume thatD0 =
50 andD1 = : : : = D = D, varying D over 50; 100; 200; 500 and 1000. Therefore,
the first set of test problems correspond to the case where the demand in the
test marketing stage is proportional to the demand at subsequent time periods.
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As D gets larger, the demand at each time period is scaled up linearly with
the same rate. This way of scaling the demand corresponds to the asymptotic
regime in Section 2.6 and we expect the performance of GRP to get better as
D increases. On the other hand, the second set of test problems assume that
the test marketing stage always involves a small number of units, irrespective
of the magnitude of the demand at the subsequent time periods. The second
set of test problems arguably correspond to a more realistic case where firms
go through limited test marketing effort, whereas the first set of test problems
are useful to verify how quickly our asymptotic optimality result in Section 2.6
comes into play. In all of our test problems, we normalize the unit revenue to
r = 1. For the test problems with two failure types, we set the repair costs as
c = (0:4; 0:8), whereas we use c = (0:4; 0:5; 0:6; 0:7; 0:8) for the test problems
with five failure types. To choose the vector , we assume that 1 = 2 = : : : =
n and pick the common value by solving r = KcT for . Finally, we choose
the value of  by letting i = CV i so that CV gives the coefficient of variation
for each component of the vector p. We vary CV over 0:6; 0:62; 0:63 and 0:64. We
label our test problems by using the tuple (D0; D;n;CV ). In our first set of test
problems, we haveD0 = D, whereas in the second set of test problems, we have
D0 = 50. We vary D over f50; 100; 200; 500; 1000g, n over f2; 5g and CV over
f0:6; 0:62; 0:63; 0:64g. This setup provides 80 test problems for our computational
experiments.
2.7.3 Computational Results
We give our computational results in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Table 2.1 focuses on
the test problems where the demand at the test marketing stage is as large as
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the demand at the subsequent time periods, whereas Table 2.2 focuses on the
test problems where the demand at the test marketing stage is always 50. The
layouts of the two tables are the same. The left and right portions of the ta-
bles respectively give the results for the test problems with two and five failure
types. In each portion, the first column shows the characteristics of the test prob-
lems by using the tuple (D0; D;n;CV ). The second column shows the percent
gaps between the expected profits obtained by IDE and DBP, whereas the third
column shows the percent gaps between the expected profits obtained by DBP
and GRP. Finally, the fourth column shows the percent gaps between the ex-
pected profits obtained by DBP and SFA. Positive gaps in the last two columns
favor DBP, whereas negative gaps favor GRP or SFA. Since IDE makes its de-
cisions with full knowledge of the true failure probabilities, it always obtains
larger expected profits than the other three policies. Our computational exper-
iments indicate that DBP generally provides improvements over the remaining
two benchmark policies, GRP and SFA. Therefore, we design the presentation
of our computational results to demonstrate the benefits from using DBP.
The results in Table 2.1 indicate that DBP generally provides better per-
formance than GRP. The average performance gap between DBP and GRP is
10.44% and there are test problems where the gap between the two benchmark
policies can be quite drastic. For example, DBP outperforms GRP by more than
50% in expected profit for the test problem (50; 50; 5; 0:64). The performances of
DBP and SFA are generally comparable for the test problems with two failure
types, while DBP provides better performance than SFA for the problems with
five failure types. It is not too surprising that SFA does not perform very well
when the number of failure types gets larger because SFA makes its decisions
by aggregating all failure types together.
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We observe three trends in Table 2.1. First, the performance gaps between
IDE and DBP decrease as the demand at each time period increases. This trend
is sensible since we collect more information on the failure probabilities when
the demand is larger, in which case, DBP is able to assess the failure probabilities
quickly and make a sound decision on whether to continue or stop selling the
product. Similarly, the performance gaps between DBP and GRP decrease as the
demand at each time period increases. This observation is in agreement with the
results in Section 2.6, which show that the lower bounds used by GRP become
asymptotically tight as the demand at each time period increases linearly with
the same rate.
Second, the performance gap between DBP and GRP increases as CV de-
creases. As mentioned above, if CV gets smaller, then it becomes more likely
that the true failure probabilities p roughly satisfy r = KcTp. In this case, it
is more difficult to detect whether it is profitable to continue selling the prod-
uct. It is encouraging that DBP, which captures the learning process by using
a dynamic programming formulation, performs better than GRP as the under-
lying problem gets more difficult. A similar trend holds when we compare the
performances of DBP and SFA for the test problems with five failure types.
Third, comparing the left and right portions of the table, we see that the per-
formance gaps between IDE and DBP get larger when we have a larger number
of failure types. This indicates that the problem becomes more difficult when
there are more failure types. Furthermore, we observe that the performance
gaps between DBP and GRP, and also between DBP and SFA tend to increase
as the number of failure types increases. Overall, DBP provides noticeable im-
provements over GRP for the more difficult test problems, corresponding to the
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cases where demand at each time period is smaller, or CV is smaller, or the
number of failure types is larger. DBP also provides noticeable improvements
over SFA for problems with larger number of failure types and smaller CV .
Table 2.2 gives our computational results for the test problems where the
demand at the test marketing stage is always 50. In these test problems, DBP
uniformly performs better than GRP. Comparing Table 2.2 with Table 2.1, we
also observe that the performance gaps between DBP and GRP in Table 2.2 are
larger than those in Table 2.1. For the test problems in Table 2.1, GRP can make
use of the larger demand quantity at the test marketing stage to form a good
estimate of the failure probabilities and it is less crucial to learn the failure prob-
abilities at the subsequent time periods. For the test problems in Table 2.2, the
demand of 50 at the test marketing stage does not seem to be enough to form
a good estimate of the failure probabilities and it is important to consider the
benefits from learning the failure probabilities at the subsequent time periods.
The trends that we observe in Table 2.1 generally appear in Table 2.2. In par-
ticular, the performance gap between DBP and GRP increases as CV decreases
or the number of failure types increases. The performances of DBP and SFA are
comparable for the test problems with two failure types, while DBP provides
noticeable improvements over SFA for the test problems with five failure types.
Furthermore, for the test problems with five failure types, the performance gap
between DBP and SFA demonstrates increasing trend as CV decreases.
To comment on the computational effort for the different benchmark poli-
cies, GRP is easy to implement and the computation time per decision is neg-
ligible. SFA needs to solve a single-dimensional dynamic program once at the
beginning, after which the computation time per decision is also negligible. The
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computation time of DBP grows roughly linearly with the number of failure
types. For the test problems with five failure types, DBP takes about one minute
per decision on a Pentium IV Desktop PC with 2.4 GHz CPU and 4 GB RAM
running Windows XP. This computation time is mostly spent on solving prob-
lem (2.4) with a subgradient search method.
To sum up, our computational experiments indicate that while GRP and SFA
is easy to implement, DBP can provide improvements with reasonable compu-
tational effort. In addition, the performance improvement of DBP over GRP and
SFA is especially impressive for the test problems that we expect to be more dif-
ficult. In particular, DBP performs quite well when the demand at the test mar-
keting stage is small, or the number of failure types is large, or the true failure
probabilities are such that it is not immediately clear whether it is optimal to
continue or stop selling the product.
2.8 Extensions
In this section, we describe several extensions that are relatively straightforward
to incorporate into our model. All of the results in the chapter go through with
almost no modification under the first three extensions. The last extension is
based on the Dirichlet-multinomial learning model, which allows correlations
in our beliefs about the probabilities of different failure types. We briefly sum-
marize which results in the chapter still hold under this learning model.
Standard Substitute Product. We can extend our model to deal with the case
where there is a standard substitute product that brings a known net profit con-
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tribution of r0 per sold unit and stopping selling the current product means
switching to this standard product. In this case, all of our results go through
once we replace r with r   r0 in the optimality equation in (2.2).
Other Warranty Structures. The warranty coverage in the chapter is for K
time periods, but it is possible to work with other forms of warranty. For ex-
ample, units may be covered until the end of the selling horizon irrespective of
when they were sold or the warranty duration may depend on when the unit
was actually sold to a customer. The key observation is that since the demands
at different time periods are deterministic, it is straightforward to compute the
number of units that are under warranty coverage at any time period. All of
our results go through as long as we can compute the number of units that are
under warranty coverage at any time period.
Other Cost Structures. The cost structure in our model assumes that the cost
of repairing a unit that fails from a particular failure type is constant, irrespec-
tive how long the unit has been with the owner. It is not difficult to use repair
costs that depend on how long the unit has been with the owner. In particular,
if we use cik to denote the repair cost of a unit that fails from failure type i after
having been with the owner for k time periods, then a close inspection of the dy-
namic programming formulation in Section 2.3 shows that we can capture such
age-dependent repair costs by replacing KcTt in (2.2) with
Pn
i=1
PK 1
k=0 cik it.
More generally, all of our results go through if we replace KcTt in (2.2) with
an additively separable concave increasing function. This allows us to model
possible nonlinear costs associated with product failures.
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Dirichlet-Multinomial Learning Model. By using the Dirichlet-multinomial
model, we can capture the situation where each product can fail from one fail-
ure at a time. This induces correlations in our beliefs about the probabilities
of different failure types. Under the Dirichlet-multinomial learning model, the
learning dynamics is similar to that under the beta-binomial model we use in
this chapter. In particular, at time period t, the learning dynamics can still be
summarized by t+1 = t t+ 1 tWt Yt(t), but the difference is thatYt(t) is now a
Dirichlet-multinomial random variable instead of a random vector consisting of
n independent beta-binomial random variables. With this new interpretation of
the learning dynamics, we reach the same dynamic programming formulation
as in (2.2). Under the Dirichlet-multinomial learningmodel, the monotonicity in
Propositions 2.4.2 and Proposition 2.4.3 2.4.4 continue to hold. That is, the value
functions are componentwise decreasing, an optimal stopping boundary exists
and the optimality of continuing decision is preserved in the next time period if
there are no failures in the current time period. The upper bound in Proposition
2.5.1 may not hold anymore, since the components of Yt(t) are not indepen-
dent. It requires more advanced analysis in multi-dimensional stochastic orders
to prove or disprove the upper bound, and we have to leave it as an open ques-
tion for future research. The lower bound in Proposition 2.6.1 still holds, which
implies that we still obtain a lower bound from the deterministic approxima-
tion. Proposition 2.6.2 uses properties of beta-binomial random variables, and
it may not hold under the Dirichlet-multinomial learning model. Proposition
2.6.3 still holds so that the lower bound is asymptotically tight when we scale
the demand in each time period.
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2.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied a problem faced by a firm selling a product under
limited information about the probabilities of different failure types. The goal is
to learn the failure probabilities as the sales take place and dynamically decide
whether it is profitable to continue or stop selling the product. Our approach
builds on a dynamic programming formulation with embedded optimal stop-
ping and learning features, which is a generalized one-armed bandit problem,
where the expected reward of the unknown arm depends on multiple unknown
parameters. This dynamic programming formulation has a high-dimensional
state variable, and we proposed two approximation methods to address the
computational difficulties due to the high-dimensional state variable. The first
approximation method focuses on each failure type individually and solves a
sequence of dynamic programs with scalar state variables. The second approx-
imation method is based on a deterministic formulation that ignores the ben-
efits from learning the failure probabilities. The two approximation methods
are complementary to each other in the sense that while the first approximation
method provides upper bounds on the value functions, the second one provides
lower bounds. Our computational experiments indicated that although the ap-
proximationmethod based on upper bounds is more computationally intensive,
it can provide significant performance improvements.
Other than the extensions discussed in the previous section, there are other
practically important directions that would like to pursue and we leave these
directions as questions for future research. First, our model assumes that the
failure probabilities are unknown constants, but it is conceivable that the failure
probabilities may depend on age or usage of a unit. Second, our beta-binomial
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learning model assumes that different types of failures occur independently of
each other, while Dirichlet-multinomial model described in the previous section
ensures that each product can fail from one failure at a time, inducing negative
correlations between numbers of failures of different types. In reality, there may
be general correlations among the probabilities of different failure types and one
may desire to adopt other learning models that allow general correlations. For
example, instead of using Dirichlet distribution, wemay use generalized Dirich-
let distribution which allows general correlations and is still a conjugate prior
for multinomial distribution. Third, it is worthwhile to investigate the possi-
bility that it may be better for the company not to serve all of the demand in a
time period. By rationing supply in the early time periods, the company may
be able to learn about the reliability of the product while controlling the risk
of facing too many returns. Lastly, our approach in this chapter assumes that
the demand is deterministic. There are some settings with accurate forecasts or
advance demand information that make this assumption reasonable, but it is
certainly desirable to relax this assumption and incorporate stochastic demands
into the model. While analytical analysis may be difficult, some computational
work may be interesting and useful for practical applications.
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CHAPTER 3
PRICING AND CAPACITY ALLOCATION IN DUAL-CHANNEL HOTEL
REVENUEMANAGEMENT
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study a pricing and capacity allocation problem arising in
hotel revenue management setting with two sales channels. One channel is the
spot market where the hotel manager can adjust the price of hotel rooms dy-
namically, while in the other channel, the hotel manger needs to post a fixed
price at the beginning of the selling horizon. The problem arises when a con-
ference is to be held at location near the hotel. The capacity allocation between
the two channels also needs to be decided at the beginning of the selling hori-
zon, which can not be changed later on. The hotel operates in the two parallel
channels until some deadline, after which the two channels join together and
the price can be set dynamically.
For a mid-to-large size conference, the conference organizer usually nego-
tiates with the nearby hotels to reserve a block of rooms for conference partic-
ipants at a fixed price. Such hotel offer information is posted on the confer-
ence web site and accessible to participants. This type of arrangement creates
a conference market with fixed price parallel to the ordinary spot market with
dynamic pricing. In the conference market, constrained by the availability of
the reserved block of hotel rooms, conference participants can book rooms at
the posted fixed price before certain deadline, after which the fixed price offer
in the conference market expires. In case the reserved block in the conference
market does not get fully booked by the deadline, the remaining rooms in the
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conference and spot market join together, which can be priced dynamically and
are sold until the targeted night of stay. We call the final sales period after the
deadline the final market.
From the hotel’s perspective, there are several decisions to make under such
circumstances. At a tactical level, the hotel needs to decide the number of rooms
to reserve for the conference and the fixed price to offer in the conference mar-
ket. At an operational level, the hotel needs to decide its pricing policy in the
spot and final markets. Note that the tactical decisions are inputs to the oper-
ational pricing problem. We first study the operational pricing problem given
the tactical decisions. Building on the formulation for the operational pricing
problem, we then study the optimization problem in the tactical level to choose
the optimal capacity allocation between the spot and conference markets and
the fixed price in the conference market.
For the operational pricing problem, the exact formulation uses a two-
dimensional dynamic program whose state variable keeps track of remaining
capacities in both spot market and conference market. While the exact formula-
tion is reasonably tractable, the resulting policy is not convenient to implement
since we need to keep track of sales in both markets to make pricing decisions in
the spot market. We construct a single dimensional approximation to the exact
two dimensional formulation, which is asymptotically tight when the capacity
and number of time periods scale up linearly in the same rate. The policy from
the approximation is very appealing from an operational perspective, since we
only needs to keep track of the number of rooms left in the spot market to make
pricing decision. In numerical experiments, the policy has a very robust perfor-
mance with respect to both load factor and higher level decision. In particular,
53
the policy based on our approximation captures more than 99% of the optimal
revenue for any given tactical decisions on average. In contrast, the fixed price
policy based on a deterministic formulation can lose more than 13% of the rev-
enue if the tactical decision is not optimized.
The tactical decision problem turns out to be difficult to solve exactly due to
lack of structural properties. Based on a deterministic formulation of a relaxed
problem, we develop a heuristic to make decisions on capacity allocation and
conference market pricing simultaneously. For the overall problem, we con-
struct a mixed policy by combing the tactical level heuristic and the operational
level approximation. The policy is shown to be asymptotically optimal and pro-
vides promising performance in numerical experiments.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. An overview of the related
literature is provided in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we focus on the operational
level pricing problem in the spot and final markets, given the tactical decisions
on capacity allocation and fixed price for the conferencemarket. We characterize
structural properties of the exact formulation, and develop a single-dimensional
approximation. The policy based on our single-dimensional approximation is
shown to be asymptotic optimality, and its performance is evaluated through
numerical experiments. In section 3.4, we focus on the tactical decision problem
on capacity allocation and conference market pricing. We construct a heuris-
tic policy to find near optimal capacity allocation and conference market price
based on a deterministic formulation of a relax problem. We show that the
mixed policy combing the heuristic in the tactical level and the policy based
on our single-dimensional approximation in the operational level is asymptoti-
cally optimal. Numerical experiments are provided to evaluate the performance
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of the mixed policy for the overall problem. Section 3.5 concludes with future
research directions.
3.2 Literature Review
The dynamic pricing literature in revenue management is closely related to our
work. Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994) study the optimal dynamic pricing for a
single product over a finite horizon with a continuous time Poisson demand
model. They characterize the form of the optimal policy and show that a fixed
price policy based on a deterministic version of the problem is asymptotically
optimal. When the set of allowable prices is a discrete set, they propose a two-
price policy with a single switch and show its asymptotical optimality. Feng
and Gallego (1995) consider the optimal timing of a single price change from
an initial price to a fixed lower or higher price. Gallego and Van Ryzin (1997)
extend Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994) to a much more general setting that allows
multi-product with a network structure and time-dependent demand models.
Zhao and Zheng (2000) extend Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994) to allow nonho-
mogeneous demand processes and identify sufficient conditions under which
the optimal price decreases over time for a given inventory level. Assuming a
markup or markdown strategy, Feng and Xiao (2000b) study the dynamic pric-
ing problem when the price has to be chosen from a predetermined discrete
set. They characterize the structure properties of the value function and opti-
mal price, and provide an exact solution for the continuous-time model. Feng
and Xiao (2000a) extend the model to allow price reversal.
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Maglaras andMeissner (2006) show that multi-product dynamic pricing and
capacity allocation problems can be modeled in a common framework, and
develop asymptotically optimal policies through fluid approximations. Zhang
and Cooper (2009) consider the problem of pricing parallel flights that are sub-
stitutable with each other. They build upper and lower bounds on the value
functions and use these bounds to construct heuristic policies. Erdelyi and
Topaloglu (2010b) propose dynamic programming decomposition methods to
solve pricing problem in network revenue management. Recent papers on
multi-product dynamic pricing such as Dong, Kouvelis, and Tian (2009) and
Akc¸ay, Natarajan, and Xu (2010) incorporate customer choice into the pricing
model where customers choose from a set of substitutable products according
to certain utility maximization rule. Extensive overviews of pricing models can
be found in papers byMcGill and Van Ryzin (1999), Bitran and Caldentey (2003)
and Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003), and the book by Talluri and Van Ryzin
(2005).
3.3 Dynamic Pricing in Spot Market
In this section we study the dynamic pricing problem in the spot market, given
the tactical level decisions on capacity allocation and fixed price for the confer-
ence market. We assume a perfect market separation, in the sense that before
the end time of the conference market, conference customers only book hotel
rooms in the conference market at posted fixed price, while spot market cus-
tomer only book hotel rooms in the spot market. While it is understandable
that spot market customers may not be eligible for the posted fixed price in
the conference market, we also assume that conference customers only book in
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the conference market. This assumption does not restrict the applicability of
our model, as long as a certain (not necessarily fixed) portion of the conference
customers book rooms in the spot market. We discuss the relaxation of this
assumption in Section 3.5.
We first build a two dimensional dynamic programmingmodel for the prob-
lem and study structural properties of the value functions and optimal policy.
Then we construct a more computationally efficient approximation to the orig-
inal value function and show that the approximation is asymptotically exact
when the capacity and number of time periods in the selling season scale up
linearly in the same rate. Besides being computationally efficient, the policy
from this approximation is very attractive from an operational perspective, be-
cause we only need to keep track of the sales in the spot market to make pricing
decisions. In addition, the policy based on approximation shows robust perfor-
mance with respect to tactical decisions.
3.3.1 Formulation and Structural Properties
Wemanage a limited number of hotel rooms which are booked in a finite selling
horizon from time period 1 to T . The targeted night of stay is on time period
T + 1, and the total number of rooms available is C. A block of b hotel rooms
are reserve at fixed price pc for the conference participants until time  < T .
From time period 1 to  , conference participants will book rooms in the con-
ference market at the fixed price pc, while other customers book rooms in the
spot market. After time period  , the remaining rooms in conference and spot
market join together to be sold in the final market from time period  + 1 until
57
T . The price in the spot market and final market can be adjusted by the hotel
dynamically.
We adopt a Bernoulli model for the random demand, where there is exactly
one customer arriving during one time period. In particular, for t = 1; : : : ;  ,
let ct and st be the customer arrival probabilities at time period t from the
conference and spot market correspondingly, which satisfy ct + st = 1. Let
dc() and ds() be the demand functions in conference and spot market respec-
tively, which represent the probability that an arriving customer makes a book-
ing given the offered price in the corresponding market. The inverse demand
functions are pc() and ps(), which map the demand rates back to the offered
prices. We use demand rates as the decision variables instead of the offered
prices. For t = 1; : : : ;  , in the conference market, given the fixed demand rate
dc in each time period, the revenue rate is rc(dc) = dc pc(dc) for any t. In the spot
market, letting dst denote the demand rate at time period t, the revenue rate is
rs(dst) = dst ps(dst).
For t =  + 1; : : : ; T in the final market, exactly one demand arrives dur-
ing time t. Let df () be the demand function and pf () be the inverse demand
function. Given a demand rate dft, the revenue rate is rf (dft) = dft pf (dft). In
accordance with dynamic pricing literature, we assume that the revenue func-
tions rc(), rs() and rf () are continuous, bounded and concave, while satisfying
limd!0 rc(d) = 0; limd!0 rs(d) = 0, and limd!0 rf (d) = 0.
Using the notation defined above, the following two dimensional dynamic
programming recursion maximizes the total expected revenue from time pe-
riod t onwards, if the number of rooms left in the spot market is x and the
number of rooms left i the conference market is y. We use x to denote the re-
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maining capacity in the spot market and y to denote the remaining capacity in
the conference market. Then the sate space of the problem can be written as
D = (x; y) 2 Z2+ j x+ y  C	. When the remaining capacities at time period t
in the two markets are given by (x; y) 2 D, we can obtain the optimal policy by
solving the dynamic programming recursion
V dct (x; y) = max
dst2[0;1]
n
st[rs(dst) + dst V
dc
t+1(x  1; y)]
+ ct[rc(dc) + dc V
dc
t+1(x; y   1)] + (1  st dst   ct dc)V dct+1(x; y)
o
= max
dst2[0;1]
n
st[rs(dst)  dstxV dct+1(x; y)]
o
+ ct[rc(dc) + dc V
dc
t+1(x; y   1)] + (1  ct dc)V dct+1(x; y); (3.1)
where xV dct (x; y) = V
dc
t (x; y)   V dct (x   1; y). V dct (x; y) stands for the optimal
expected revenue from time period t onwards if the remaining capacity at time
period t is given by (x; y). Given the demand rate in the conference market dc
and the capacity allocated for the conferencemarket b, the optimal expected rev-
enue in the selling horizon is V dc1 (C   b; b). We use superscript dc to emphasize
that the value function depends on the demand rate dc determined by the fixed
price pc in the conference market. For notational simplicity, we will drop the
superscript dc throughout the rest of this section. In order to keep optimality
equation (3.1) uniform when x = 0 or y = 0, we define Vt(x; 1) =  pc+Vt(x; 0)
for x 2 [0; C], and Vt( 1; y) =  1 for y 2 [0; C]. The boundary condition
is Vt(0; 0) = 0; V+1(x; y) = 	+1(x + y), where 	t() is the expected revenue
function in the final market defined by the following dynamic programming
recursion:
	t(x) = max
dft2[0;1]
n
rf (dft) + dft	t+1(x  1) + (1  dft)	t+1(x)
o
= max
dft2[0;1]
n
rf (dft)  dft	t+1(x)
o
+	t+1(x); (3.2)
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where 	t+1(x) = 	t+1(x)   	t+1(x   1) and 	T+1()  0. Note that 	t(); t =
 +1; : : : ; T are the value functions from a classical single dimensional dynamic
pricing problem from time period +1 to T . As shown in Gallego and Van Ryzin
(1994), 	t() is an increasing and concave function. The next proposition shows
some structural properties for the value functions in optimality equation (3.1).
Proposition 3.3.1. We have the following structural properties hold for 8t = 1; : : : ; 
and any feasible pair of remaining capacities.
(i)xVt(x+ 2; y)  xVt(x+ 1; y)
(ii)xVt(x+ 1; y + 1)  xVt(x+ 1; y)
(iii)xVt+1(x+ 1; y)  xVt(x+ 1; y):
We defer the proof to Appendix B.1. Property (i) states that the marginal
value of one unit capacity in the spot market is decreasing in x, or in other
words, the value function is concave with respect to x. Define yVt(x; y) =
Vt(x; y)   Vt(x; y   1), and notice that yVt(x + 1; y)   yVt(x; y) = xVt(x +
1; y+1) xVt(x+1; y)  0 by (ii), hence the value function Vt(x; y) is submod-
ular. Property (iii) states that the marginal value of one unit capacity in the spot
market is decreasing with respect to t.
Let dVst(x; y) be the optimal demand rate at time period twith state (x; y), and
pVst(x; y) be the corresponding optimal price. From (3.1) we know that dVst(x; y) is
characterized by r0s(dVst(x; y)) = xVt+1(x; y), hence, corresponding to the three
properties, we get that dVt (x; y) is increasing in x; y and t, hence the optimal
price pVst(x; y) is decreasing in x; y and t. In other words, the optimal price in the
spot market is smaller when the remaining capacity in either the spot market or
the conference market is larger. Given the remaining capacities in both markets
fixed, the optimal prices decrease over time.
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3.3.2 A Single-Dimensional Approximation
Because the remaining rooms in the conference and spot market will join to-
gether in the final market at time period +1, the sales taking place in the confer-
ence market has an impact on the pricing policy in the spot market. Intuitively,
if the reserved rooms in the conference market are getting booked quickly, then
we are confident that the reserved rooms will be fully booked by  , hence we
will want to keep the price in the spot market at a high level. On the other hand
if the demand in the conference market is not very large and we anticipate that
there will be many rooms left in the conference market, then we will want to
price lower in the spot market to stimulate the demand in order to make use of
the remaining capacity in the conference market after time  to achieve higher
revenue. Hence we use the two dimensional dynamic programming recursion
(3.1) to keep track of the number of rooms left in both spot and conference mar-
ket. While this formulation can make optimal pricing decisions in the spot mar-
ket considering the booking dynamics in both markets, it is not operationally
convenient for hotel managers, since we have to constantly watch both mar-
kets to make decisions in the spot market. Besides, while the two dimensional
dynamic programming computation is manageable with one conference mar-
ket, the computation of optimal policy quickly becomes unmanageable if, for
example, there are multiple conferences to be held at the same time and the ho-
tel reserves rooms for multiple conference markets. Essentially the formulation
will be a high dimensional dynamic program and the “curse of dimensionality”
prevents us to compute the optimal policy efficiently.
Starting from this observation, we want to construct an operationally simple
policy. One idea is to model the dynamic pricing problem in spot market with
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a single dimensional dynamic program which only tracks the number of rooms
left in the spot market, while the boundary condition at time period  + 1 is
modified appropriately to account for the possible capacity joining from the
conference market.
Given fixed demand rate dc and the initial capacity of b in the conference
market, according to the Bernoulli demand model we adopt, the total demand
Dc in the conference market from time period 1 to  has a Poisson binomial
distribution with parameters (c1dc; : : : ; cdc). If the arrival probabilities are
stationary, i.e., there exists c such that ct = c;8t = 1; : : : ;  , then Dc has a
Binomial distribution with parameters (; cdc). The remaining capacity at the
end of time period  in the conference market can be written as b minfb;Dcg =
(b   Dc)+ where we use ()+ to denote maxf0; g. Starting from this idea, we
construct the following dynamic program in the spot market from period 1 to
period  :
t(x) = max
dst2[0;1]
n
st[rs(dst) + dstt+1(x  1)] + (1  st dst)t+1(x)
o
= max
dst2[0;1]
n
st[rs(dst)  dstt+1(x)]
o
+ t+1(x); (3.3)
with the boundary condition t(0) = E	+1((b   Dc)+);+1(x) = E	+1(x +
(b Dc)+). Note that (b Dc)+ represents the random remaining capacity in the
conference market at time period  +1. So we have modified the boundary con-
dition to account for the possible capacity joining from the conference market
at time period  + 1. Besides, t(x) represents the the total expected revenue in
the spot and final market from time period t until the end of the selling horizon
T , but it does not include the revenue collected in the conference market.
Let dst(x) be the optimal demand rate derived from (3.3) at time period t
with state x, and pst(x) be the corresponding price. We call the policy that offers
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price pst(x) at time period t in state x the Single Dimensional Approximation
policy (SDA). By following this policy, the total expected revenue during the
entire selling horizon is 1(C   b) + pcE(minfb;Dcg), where the second term
represents the expected revenue in the conference market. Observing that the
optimal policy from (3.3) is feasible for (3.1), we have a lower bound on the
optimal total expected revenue V1(C   b; b).
Proposition 3.3.2. We have 1(C   b) + pcE(minfb;Dcg)  V1(C   b; b).
Since the single-dimensional dynamic program (3.3) is computationally eas-
ier to solve compared with (3.1), it is of interest to see the performance of the dy-
namic pricing policy from (3.3). Before that we need to develop several bounds
and inequalities for the value functions in (3.1) and (3.3).
3.3.3 Bounds and Inequalities Based on Deterministic Prob-
lems
Consider a deterministic version of the pricing problem in the spot and final
market. The hotel has C   b rooms available in the spot market at time period
1, which is a continuous quantity. The hotel can control the demand rate in the
spot and final market through pricing. For t = 1; : : : ;  , if controlled demand
rate is dst  1, then the realized demand in time period t is stdst. At time
period  + 1, a continuous capacity E[(b   Dc)+] joins the available inventory
of rooms, where Dc is the demand in conference market from time period 1 to
 . For t =  + 1; : : : ; T , if the controlled demand rate is dft, then the realized
demand is dft exactly. The hotel wants to maximize its total revenue through
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controlling the demand rates from time period 1 to T . The following nonlinear
programming solves the revenue maximization problem.
(NLP1) Z1 = max
X
t=1
st rs(dst) +
TX
t=+1
rf (dft)
subject to
X
t=1
st dst  C   b
X
t=1
st dst +
TX
t=+1
dft  C   b+ E(b Dc)+ (3.4)
0  dst; dft  1; 8t = 1; : : : ; T:
The next proposition shows that the above nonlinear program provides an up-
per bound for revenues in the spot market through both value function (3.1) and
(3.3). The proof is deferred to Appendix B.2.
Proposition 3.3.3. For given b and dc, we have V1(C   b; b)  Z1 + pcEminfb;Dcg;
and 1(C   b)  Z1.
Herewe state three equivalent facts that will be used throughout this section.
For a deterministic scalar z and a real-valued random variable Z with finite
mean  and finite variance 2, we have
(I) Ef[z   Z]+g  [p2 + (z   )2 + (z   )]=2  [z   ]+ + =2,
(II) Ef[Z   z]+g  [p2 + (z   )2   (z   )]=2  [ z + ]+ + =2,
(III) EminfZ; zg  minf; zg   =2.
The first two are shown by Gallego (1992), while Fact (III) can be easily derived
from Fact (II).
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By moving the expectation inside the operator ()+ in (3.4) and adding one
additional term , we get a slightly different nonlinear program
(NLP2) Z2() = max
X
t=1
strs(dst) +
TX
t=+1
rf (dft)
subject to
X
t=1
stdst  C   b
X
t=1
stdst +
TX
t=+1
dft  C   b+ (b  E(Dc))+ +  (3.5)
0  dst; dft  1;8t = 1; : : : ; T
Due to convexity of the function ()+, Jensens’ inequality tells that (b E(Dc))+ 
E(b   Dc)+. Thus when  = 0, the constraint (3.5) in (NLP2) is tighter than the
constraint (3.4) in (NLP1), hence we have Z2(0)  Z1. On the other hand, letting
(Dc) be the standard deviation of Dc, and using Fact (I) we have E(b Dc)+ 
(b   E(Dc))+ + (Dc)=2. Thus constraint (3.5) with  = (Dc)=2 is looser than
constraint (3.4), and we have Z1  Z2(c=2). Thus we obtain
Z2(0)  Z1  Z2((Dc)=2): (3.6)
Noting that the objective function in (NLP2) is concave while the constraints are
linear, we can show the following property.
Proposition 3.3.4. There exists an optimal solution for (NLP2) which satisfies that
dst() = d

s(); t = 1; : : : ; ; d

ft() = d

f (); t =  +1; : : : ; T for some d

s() and df ().
Furthermore, Z2() is a concave function with respect to .
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Now we can rewrite (NLP2) as follows:
(NLP20) Z2() = max (
X
t=1
st)rs(ds) + (T   )rf (df ) (3.7)
subject to (
X
t=1
st)ds  C   b (3.8)
(
X
t=1
st)ds + (T   )df  C   b+ (b  E(Dc))+ + 
(3.9)
0  ds; df  1: (3.10)
Let (ds; df ) be the optimal primal solution for (NLP2’) with  = 0, and (
; )
be the corresponding optimal Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints
(3.8) and (3.9). From the concavity of (NLP2’), we know that Z2() is a concave
function whose subgradient at  = 0 is . Hence we have
Z2()  Z2(0) +  : (3.11)
Combining (3.6) and (3.11), we have
Z2(0)  Z1  Z2(0) +  (Dc)=2: (3.12)
From now on we will focus on (NLP2’) with  = 0. For notational simplicity,
we let Z2 = Z2(0) = (
P
t=1 st)rs(d

s) + (T   )rf (df ). Let (ps; pf ) be the prices
corresponding to (ds; df ). This solution suggests a simple policy: We use a fixed
price ps in spot market from time period 1 to  , and another fixed price pf from
time period  + 1 to T . We call this policy Fixed Price (FP) policy. If we letW be
the total expected revenue collected in the spot and final market by following
this policy for the original problem with stochastic demand, then we have
W = ps EminfC   b;Ds(ds)g
+ pf Eminf(C   b Ds(ds))+ + (b Dc)+; Df (df )g; (3.13)
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where Ds(ds) is the total demand in spot market from time period 1 to  , which
follows a Poisson binomial distribution with parameters (s1ds; s2ds; : : : ; sds)
(or a Binomial distribution with parameters (; sds) with stationary arrival
probabilities), andDf (df ) is the total demand from time period +1 to T , which
follows a binomial distribution with parameters (T ; df ). We have the follow-
ing chain of inequalities:
1  1(C   b) + pc Eminfb;Dcg
V1(C   b; b) 
W + pc Eminfb;Dcg
V1(C   b; b)
 W + pcEminfb;Dcg
Z1 + pc Eminfb;Dcg 
W
Z1
 W
Z2 +  c=2
: (3.14)
The first inequality follows from Proposition 3.3.2, the second inequality follows
from the observation that the FP policy is feasible for dynamic program recur-
sion (3.3) hence W  1(C   b), the third inequality follows from Proposition
3.3.3, the fourth inequality follows the sinceW  1(C   b)  Z1, while the last
inequality follows from (3.12).
3.3.4 Asymptotic Analysis
We consider a sequence of problems fPm : m = 1; 2; : : :g indexed by parameter
m 2 Z+. In problem Pm, the total capacity is mC and the number of rooms
reserved for conference market is mb. The selling horizon starts from time pe-
riod 1 and lasts until time periodmT , while the conference market is open from
time period 1 until time period m , and the remaining capacity in the confer-
ence market is released to the spot market at time periodm+1. The conference
market has a fixed price pc and corresponding demand rate dc. Let de be the
round up function and mst = sdt=me; mct = cdt=me. For time period t  m in
problem Pm, the arrival probability in the spot market is mst while the arrival
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probability in the conference market is mct . We essentially repeat each time pe-
riod in problemP1 m times to get problemPm, hence we use the ceiling function
to establish the correspondence between the arrival probabilities in problem Pm
and P1.
With this definitions, we note that the problem studied so far in this section
is P1. For t   , the arrival probabilities in both spot and conference markets at
time periods fm(t   1) + 1; : : : ;mtg in problem Pm are the same as the arrival
probabilities in corresponding markets at time period t in problem P1. This is
a standard method in revenue management literature to scale the problem to
show asymptotic optimality results. Our goal here is to show that the pricing
policy derived from the single dimensional approximation in (3.3) is asymp-
totically optimal for problem Pm when m approaches infinity. For simplicity
of notation, we assume stationary arrival probabilities in this subsection, i.e.,
mst = s; 
m
ct = c;8t = 1; : : : ;m , althrough the result in this subsection holds
with non-stationary arrival probabilities.
For problem Pm, the two dimensional dynamic program value function
V m1 (m(C  b);mb) is the optimal total expected revenue. The single dimensional
dynamic program value function m1 (m(C   b)) is the expected revenue of the
SDA policy in the spot and final market. Dmc is the total demand in the con-
ference market, which has a Binomial distribution with parameters (m; s dc).
Zm1 is the optimal objective value of (NLP1) for problem Pm and it provides an
upper bound for the maximum revenue in the spot and final market, while Zm2
is the optimal objective value of (NLP2’) for problem Pm with  = 0. Wm is the
expected revenue of the Fixed Price policy derived from (NLP2’). The following
proposition states that as m goes to infinity, the expected revenue achieved by
68
the SDA policy together with the expected revenue in the conference market is
asymptotically optimal.
Proposition 3.3.5. We have limm!1
m1 (m(C b))+pc Eminfmb;Dmc g
Vm1 (m(C b);mb) = 1.
Proof. Note that in (NLP2’) with  = 0 for problem Pm, all the coefficients scale
linearly with m, hence the optimal primal and dual variables do not scale with
m, i.e., the fixed price policy for Pm is the same as the fixed price policy for P1.
In particular, the optimal solution for Pm is (ds; df ) with corresponding prices
(ps; p

f ), the optimal dual variables are (
; ), and we have Zm2 = mZ2. The
chain of inequalities (3.14) for problem Pm can be written as
1  
m
1 (m(C   b)) + pc Eminfmb;Dmc g
V m1 (m(C   b);mb)
 W
m
Zm2 + 
 (Dmc )=2
; (3.15)
where
Wm = ps Eminfm(C   b); Dms (ds)g
+ pf Eminf[m(C   b) Dms (ds)]+ + (mb Dmc )+; Dmf (df )g; (3.16)
where Dms (ds) is the total demand in the spot market from time period 1 to m ,
which follows a binomial distribution with parameters (m; s ds), and Dmf (d

f )
is the total demand from time period m + 1 to mT , which follows a binomial
distribution with parameters (m(T  ); df ). For the first term in (3.13), we have
ps Eminfm(C   b); Dms (ds)g
 ps fminfm(C   b);E(Dms (ds))g   (Dms (ds))=2g
= ps
n
minfm(C   b);msdsg  
p
m sds(1  sds)=2
o
= ps
n
msd

s  
p
m sds(1  sds)=2
o
= msrs(d

s) G1
p
m;
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where G1 = ps
p
 sds(1  sds)=2. The first inequality follows from Fact (III)
and the second equality follows from constraint (3.8). Let K(Dms (ds); Dmc ) =
[m(C   b)   Dms (ds)]+ + (mb   Dmc )+, then the second term in (3.13) can be
written as pf E minfK(Dms (ds); Dmc ); Dmf (df )g. We have the following chain of
inequalities:
pf
n
E min

K(Dms (d

s); D
m
c ); D
m
f (d

f )
	o
 pf
n
E min

E[K(Dms (ds); Dmc )]; Dmf (df )
	  (K(Dms (ds); Dmc ))=2o
 pf

min

E[K(Dms (ds); Dmc )];E(Dmf (df ))
	
 (Dmf (df ))=2  (K(Dms (ds); Dmc ))=2
	
 pf

min

[m(C   b)  E(Dms (ds))]+ + [mb  E(Dmc )]+;E(Dmf (df ))
	
 (Dmf (df ))=2  (K(Dms (ds); Dmc ))=2
	
= pf

min

[m(C   b) m sds]+ + [mb  E(Dmc )]+;m(T   ) df
	
 (Dmf (df ))=2  (K(Dms (ds); Dmc ))=2
	
= pf

min

m(C   b) m sds + [mb  E(Dmc )]+;m(T   ) df
	
 (Dmf (df ))=2  (K(Dms (ds); Dmc ))=2
	
= pf
n
m(T   ) df   (Dmf (df ))=2  (K(Dms (ds); Dmc ))=2
o
 pf
n
m(T   ) df   (Dmf (df ))=2  (Dms (ds))=2  (Dmc )=2
o
= m(T   ) rf (df ) G2
p
m;
whereG2 = pf
nq
(T   ) df (1  df )+
p
 sds(1  sds)+
p
 cdc(1  cdc)
o
=2.
The first and second inequalities follow from Fact (III), the third inequality fol-
lows from convexity of ()+, the second equality follows from constraint (3.8),
the third equality follows from constraint (3.9), and the last inequality follows
from Lemma B.3.1 we give in Appendix B.3. Combing the above two terms, we
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have
Wm  msrs(ds) +m(T   ) rf (df ) G1
p
m G2
p
m = mZ2   (G1 +G2)
p
m:
Now we continue the chain of inequality (3.15) for problem Pm as
1  
m
1 (m(C   b)) + pc Eminfmb;Dmc g
V m1 (m(C   b);mb)
 W
m
Zm2 + 
 (Dmc )=2
 mZ2   (G1 +G2)
p
m
mZ2 + 
p
m ctdc(1  ctdc)
=
Z2   (G1 +G2)=
p
m
Z2 + 
p
 cdc(1  cdc)=
p
m
m!1   ! 1:
3.3.5 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we provide numerical experiments to evaluate the performance
of the policies developed for the operational level problem on dynamic pricing
in the spot and final markets. We begin by describing the benchmark policies
and the experimental setup.
Benchmark Policies
We compare the following three benchmark policies.
Optimal Policy (OPT). This benchmark policy corresponds to solving the two
dimensional dynamic programming recursion in (3.1) and recording the opti-
mal prices at every possible state. In hotel operation, before the conference
market offer expires, the hotel manager keeps track of the number of rooms
remaining in both conference and spot market, and offers price pVst(x; y) if there
are x rooms left in the spot market and y rooms left in the conference market at
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time period t. After the conference market offer expires, the hotel manager sets
prices according to the single dimensional dynamic programming recursion in
(3.2) for the final market. Given conference market price pc with corresponding
demand rate dc, and capacity allocation b, the total expected revenue achieved
by OPT policy is V dc1 (C   b; b). Since this is the optimal expected revenue, we
use the gap between the revenues achieved by other policies and the revenue
achieved by OPT policy to indicate the performance of other policies.
Single Dimensional Approximation Policy (SDA). This benchmark policy corre-
sponds to solving the single dimensional dynamic programming recursion in
(3.3). In hotel operation, before the conference market offer expires, the hotel
manager only keeps track of the number of rooms remaining in the spot mar-
ket and offers price pst(x) if there are x rooms left in the spot market. After
the conference market offer expires, the hotel manager sets prices according to
the single dimensional dynamic programming recursion in (3.2) for the final
market. Given conference market price pc with corresponding demand rate dc
and capacity allocation b, the total expected revenue achieved by SDA policy is
dc1 (C   b) + pcEminfb;Dc(dc)g.
Fixed Price Policy (FP). This benchmark policy corresponds to solving the
nonlinear program (NLP2) with  = 0, and offering fixed price ps from time
period 1 to  in the spot market and fixed price pf from time period  + 1 to T
in the final market. Given conference market price pc with corresponding de-
mand rate dc and capacity allocation b, the total expected revenue achieved by
FP policy isW (b; dc)+ pcEminfb;Dc(dc)g, whereW (b; dc) is given in (3.13) asW .
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Experimental Setup
The overall problem is defined by the following parameters: total number of
rooms available C, total number of time periods T , deadline of conference mar-
ket offer  , arrival probabilities in the spot market st; t = 1; : : : ;  , and the de-
mand functions dc(), ds() and df (). In our experiments, we set  = 34 T and
use stationary arrival probabilities st = s = 0:5; ct = c = 0:5; t = 1; : : : ;  .
We adopt exponential demand models dc(p) = e c p, ds(p) = e s p and df (p) =
e f p, where c; s; f are price sensitivity parameters for the corresponding de-
mand models. We set (s; c; f ) 2 f(1; 1; 0:5); (1; 0:75; 0:5)g to represent two
price sensitivity scenarios. The case with (s; c; f ) = (1; 1; 0:5) represents a sit-
uation where the price sensitivities of conference participants and spot market
customers are the same, while the price sensitivity is lower in the final market
periods. The case with (s; c; f ) = (1; 0:75; 0:5) represents a situation where
conference participants are less sensitive compared to spot market customers,
while the overall price sensitivity in the final market is lower.
Notice that with these demand models, the unconstraint maximizer of
the three revenue functions are the same. In particular, argmaxd rc(d) =
argmaxd rs(d) = argmaxd rf (d) = e
 1 , d0. For an overall problem instance
with capacity C and number of time periods T , we define the load factor as
l(C; T ) = T d
0
C
, where the numerator is the total expected demand if we set
the price to maximize the expected one period revenue in each of the mar-
kets at any given time period. The load factor measures the tightness of the
capacity of the problem. We want to explore the performance of different
policies under different load factors. We vary T among f80; 140; 200g. For
T = 80, we vary C in f24; 20; 16; 12; 8g so that the load factors are in the set
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L = f1:23; 1:47; 1:84; 2:45; 3:68g. For T = 140, we vary C in f42; 35; 28; 21; 14g
and for T = 200 we vary C in f60; 50; 40; 30; 20g so that the load factors are al-
ways in the same set L. Note that in this way we are scaling T and C 0s linearly
in the same rate, which corresponds to the asymptotic regime in Section 3.3.4,
hence we can expect that both FP policy and SDA policy perform better as T
increases from 80 to 200. In total we have 2  3  5 = 30 problem instances.
Since the performance of different policies is contingent on the tactical deci-
sions on conference market demand rate dc and capacity allocation b, for each
overall problem with a set of parameters, we compute the expected revenue of
different policies at different (dc; b) combinations. Since the unconstraint maxi-
mizer for rc() is d0, we know that the optimal demand rate in conference mar-
ket must be within the interval [0; d0]. We divide the interval into N equally
spaced subintervals and vary dc in f iN d0 : i = 0; 1; : : : ; Ng, while b is varied
in set C = f0; 1; : : : ; Cg. Thus we generate a set of N(C + 1) operational level
subproblems for each problem instance.
We report three performance statistics of FP and SDA policy for each set
of subproblems under one overall problem: revenue gap compared to the
OPT policy at the optimal (dc; b) combination, which achieves the maximum
V dc1 (C   b; b) among the N(C + 1) subproblems; maximum revenue gap com-
pared to the OPT policy across all N(C + 1) subproblems; and average revenue
gap of the N(C + 1) subproblems compared to the OPT policy. All the revenue
gaps are reported as a percentage of the corresponding revenue achieved by
OPT policy. The first statistic reflects the performance we can expect from dif-
ferent policies if we solve the tactical level decision problems to optimality and
use the optimal conference pricing and capacity allocation; the second statistic
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reflects the performance of different policies in the worst case scenario if (dc; b)
are chosen randomly in their feasible region; while the third statistic reflects
the average performance of different policies if (dc; b) are chosen randomly in
their feasible region. It turns out that the three key performance statistics do not
change much when we increase N beyond 20, hence we set N = 20.
Numerical Results
The results of the numerical experiments are reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
Table 3.1 shows the results for problem instances with (s; c; f ) = (1; 1; 0:5),
while Table 3.2 shows the results for problem instances with (s; c; f ) =
(1; 0:75; 0:5). Each table consists of three portions: the top portion reports rev-
enue gaps of FP and SDA policy compared to OPT policy at the optimal (dc; b)
combination according to V dc1 (C   b; b); the middle portion reports maximum
revenue gaps across the set of subproblems for each overall problem instance;
the bottom portion reports the average revenue gaps across the subproblems for
each overall problem instance. Within each portion, the structures of the table
are the same. An overall problem instance is characterized by two parameters in
each portion of the table: number of time periods T in the first column and load
factor in the second row. The second column indicates which policy’s revenue
gaps we are reporting in the corresponding row, while the revenue gaps are re-
ported from column three to seven and row three to eight. Finally the last row
reports the mean improvements of SDA policy compared with FP policy across
the three overall problem instances with the same load factor. All revenue gaps
and mean improvements are reported as a percentage of the revenue obtained
by OPT policy.
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Table 3.1: Revenue gaps of FP and SDA policy compared to OPT policy with
(s; c; f ) = (1; 1; 0:5).
gap at optimal load factor
T Policy 1.23 1.47 1.84 2.45 3.68
80
FP 5.99% 5.52% 5.07% 4.89% 5.16%
SDA 0.68% 0.67% 0.72% 0.70% 0.60%
140
FP 5.26% 4.89% 4.66% 4.65% 5.01%
SDA 0.48% 0.58% 0.54% 0.56% 0.47%
200
FP 4.73% 4.46% 4.29% 4.39% 4.78%
SDA 0.37% 0.47% 0.43% 0.43% 0.39%
mean impr. 4.82% 4.39% 4.11% 4.08% 4.50%
max gap load factor
T Policy 1.23 1.47 1.84 2.45 3.68
80
FP 6.95% 8.10% 7.81% 10.33% 13.68%
SDA 0.95% 1.17% 1.19% 1.02% 0.80%
140
FP 5.92% 6.69% 6.33% 9.63% 12.52%
SDA 0.72% 0.95% 1.05% 0.91% 0.73%
200
FP 5.21% 5.81% 5.48% 9.08% 13.06%
SDA 0.58% 0.80% 0.93% 0.82% 0.65%
mean impr. 5.28% 5.90% 5.49% 8.76% 12.36%
average gap load factor
T Policy 1.23 1.47 1.84 2.45 3.68
80
FP 2.83% 4.43% 4.75% 5.02% 5.51%
SDA 0.13% 0.20% 0.25% 0.25% 0.18%
140
FP 2.19% 3.66% 4.10% 4.49% 5.05%
SDA 0.08% 0.13% 0.18% 0.18% 0.13%
200
FP 1.86% 3.20% 3.69% 4.12% 4.69%
SDA 0.06% 0.10% 0.14% 0.14% 0.10%
mean impr. 2.20% 3.62% 3.99% 4.35% 4.95%
From Table 3.1 we can make several observations. First, when (dc; b) are cho-
sen to maximize V dc1 (C b; b), the performance of FP and SDA policy is not very
sensitive to load factors. On average, SDA policy achieves 99:46% the optimal
revenue, while it offers 4:38% improvement over FP policy. Second, when (dc; b)
are chosen randomly within their feasible regions, the maximum revenue gap of
FP policy tends to increasewith load factor, while it increases dramaticallywhen
the load factor is larger than 1:84. In contrast, themaximum revenue gap of SDA
policy is not very sensitive to load factor, while it actually has a decreasing trend
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when the load factor is larger than 1:84. On average SDA policy achieves 99:12%
the optimal revenue in the worst case, and provides 7:56% improvement over
FP policy, with the largest improvement valued at 12:88%. Third, when (dc; b)
are chosen randomly within their feasible regions, the average revenue gap of
FP policy increases with load factor, while the average revenue gap of SDA pol-
icy is not very sensitive to load factor. Over all the subproblems, SDA policy
achieves 99:85% the optimal revenue, and gives 3:82% improvement over FP
policy. Finally, for all the three statistics, we observe that given fixed load factor,
the revenue gaps of both FP and SDA policy decrease as T increases. This is
consistent with the asymptotic optimality result in Section 3.3.4. We have simi-
lar observations in Table 3.2 where the conference participants are less sensitive
to price compared with spot market customers.
Compared to OPT policy, SDA policy captures more than 99% of the optimal
revenue on average by solving a single dimensional dynamic program which
only tracks the number of rooms in the spot market. This is very attractive
from an operational point of view. Compared to FP policy, other than providing
sizable improvements, we find that SDA policy is robust in the following two
senses: it is sensitive neither to load factor, nor to higher level tactical decisions
on conference market pricing and capacity allocation. This robustness could
make SDA an attractive policy for hotel managers. In particular, as shown in
Section 3.4 below, the tactical decision problem is a difficult optimization prob-
lem which lacks structural properties, and heuristics are usually used to com-
pute a near optimal (dc; b) combination. Even if we are able to find the true op-
timal conference market price and capacity allocation in the tactical level, this
is done at the very beginning of the selling horizon, so the “optimal” tactical
decisions are based on rough estimates of various parameters, which might be
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Table 3.2: Revenue gaps of FP and SDA policy compared to OPT policy with
(s; c; f ) = (1; 0:75; 0:5):
gap at optimal load factor
T Policy 1.23 1.47 1.84 2.45 3.68
80
FP 5.44% 4.85% 4.52% 4.35% 4.70%
SDA 0.62% 0.73% 0.78% 0.66% 0.61%
140
FP 4.78% 4.38% 4.22% 4.33% 4.59%
SDA 0.44% 0.54% 0.61% 0.59% 0.49%
200
FP 4.30% 4.00% 3.97% 4.13% 4.40%
SDA 0.34% 0.43% 0.48% 0.51% 0.39%
mean impr. 4.38% 3.84% 3.61% 3.68% 4.07%
max gap load factor
T Policy 1.23 1.47 1.84 2.45 3.68
80
FP 6.45% 7.89% 7.81% 8.73% 11.55%
SDA 0.85% 1.05% 1.04% 0.90% 0.70%
140
FP 5.42% 6.54% 6.33% 8.23% 10.28%
SDA 0.65% 0.85% 0.93% 0.79% 0.64%
200
FP 4.77% 5.69% 5.48% 7.60% 10.61%
SDA 0.53% 0.71% 0.82% 0.71% 0.57%
mean impr. 4.87% 5.84% 5.61% 7.38% 10.18%
average gap load factor
T Policy 1.23 1.47 1.84 2.45 3.68
80
FP 2.62% 4.16% 4.46% 4.68% 5.11%
SDA 0.12% 0.18% 0.23% 0.23% 0.16%
140
FP 2.02% 3.43% 3.84% 4.17% 4.66%
SDA 0.07% 0.12% 0.16% 0.16% 0.11%
200
FP 1.71% 3.00% 3.45% 3.83% 4.32%
SDA 0.05% 0.09% 0.12% 0.13% 0.09%
mean impr. 2.04% 3.40% 3.75% 4.05% 4.58%
changed later on in the selling horizon, and this will ruin the optimality of the
original tactical decisions. However, due to practical constraints, the tactical de-
cisions cannot be changed later on once made at the very beginning, hence it is
important to have a policy that is robust to the tactical decisions.
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3.4 Capacity Allocation and Conference Market Pricing
In this section, building on the formulation for the operational level dynamic
pricing problem in the spot market, we study the overall problem with a focus
on the tactical decisions about capacity allocation between spot and conference
markets and finding optimal fixed price for conference market. While it turns
out that the tactical decision problem lacks desirable structures, we construct
a heuristic based on a deterministic formulation for a relaxed version of the
overall problem, and show its asymptotically optimality when the capacity and
number of time periods scale up linearly in the same rate. Finally, we construct
a mixed policy by combining the heuristic for tactical decisions and SDA pol-
icy for operational level pricing decisions, and the mixed policy is also asymp-
totically optimal. The performance of different policies are evaluated through
numerical experiments.
3.4.1 Relaxed Problem and Bounds
From the discussion following equation (3.2), we know that given the price in
the conference market pc (or the demand rate dc) and the number of rooms re-
served for conference market b, the total expected revenue in the selling horizon
is V dc1 (C   b; b). Hence the tactical decision problem can be written as
(HIGH) Zh = max V
dc
1 (C   b; b) (3.17)
subject to 0  dc  1
0  b  C; b 2 Z:
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Figure 3.1: Optimal revenue as a function of b and dc for a problem in-
stance with the following parameters: T = 40;  = 20; C =
14; c = s = 0:5; ds(p) = e
 p; dc(p) = e p; df (p) = e 0:1p.
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Unfortunately, V dc1 (C   b; b) is not necessarily concave in either b or dc. For a
problem instance with exponential demand models, Figure 3.1 shows V dc1 (C  
b; b) as a function of b and dc when the other parameter is fixed. It is clear from
the figure that V dc1 (C   b; b) is not concave in either component.
Due to the lack of structural properties, in order to solve problem (3.17) op-
timally, we essentially need to use discrete approximation to the feasible space
of dc, i.e., the interval [0; 1]. In particular, letting S = fi=N : i = 0; 1; : : : ; Ng,
C = f0; 1; : : : ; Cg, for each dc 2 S , we solve the two-dimensional dynamic pro-
gram recursion (3.1) to obtain V dc1 (C b; b) for all values of b. There we can solve
maxb2C V dc1 (C   b; b) to find the optimal capacity allocation for fixed value of dc.
Given a fixed N value, this approach takes O(N(C2 + (T   )C)) time. We
can increase N to get more accurate approximation to the optimal value, with
an increased computational complexity. This approach is computationally in-
efficient, and might be difficult for hotel managers to adopt. We next develop
a relaxation of the original problem and its deterministic formulation, which
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provides a simple heuristic for problem (3.17).
In the original problem, the price in the conference market is fixed while
dynamic pricing can be used in the spot market. We relax this constraint to
allow dynamic pricing in both markets. For this relaxed problem, the following
dynamic programming recursion maximizes the expected revenue from time
period t onwards if the number of rooms left in spot and conference market are
x and y respectively. For t = 1; : : : ;  and (x; y) 2 D, we solve
Jt(x; y) = max
dst;dct2[0;1]
n
st[rs(dst)+dstJt+1(x 1; y)]+ct[rc(dct)+dctJt+1(x; y 1)]
+ (1  st dst   ct dct)Jt+1(x; y)
o
; (3.18)
with boundary condition Jt(0; 0) = 0; J+1(x; y) = 	+1(x + y). For any given
dc, if we add the constraint dct0 = dc;8t0 = t; : : : ;  , then the recursion (3.18) will
coincide with (3.1). Hence we have V dct (x; y)  Jt(x; y); 8dc 2 [0; 1]. Intuitively,
this is saying that problem (3.18) is indeed a relaxation of the original problem.
For this relaxed problem, the tactical level decision is to choose the capacity
allocation parameter b in order to achieve maximum revenue, i.e.,maxb2C J1(C 
b; b).
Consider a deterministic version of the relaxed problem: The hotel has C
rooms available in total at time period 1, which is a continuous quantity. The
hotel can control the capacity allocation b and the prices in both spot and con-
ference market. For t = 1; : : : ;  , if demand rates in spot and conference market
are dst and dct, then the realized demands during time period t in the two mar-
kets are stdst and ctdct correspondingly. Given the number of rooms reserved
for conference market b, the demand realized from time period 1 to  can not
exceed b in the conference market, while it can not exceed C  b in the spot mar-
ket. Starting from time period  + 1, the two markets join together as a single
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market and share the remaining capacity. For t =  + 1; : : : ; T , if the demand
rate is dft, then the realized demand is dft exactly. The hotel wants to maximize
its total revenue by controlling capacity allocation b, the demand rates in both
markets from time period 1 to  , and the demand rates from time period  +1 to
T . The following nonlinear program solves the revenue maximization problem:
(NLP3) Z3 = max
X
t=1
ct rc(dct)+
X
t=1
st rs(dst) +
TX
t=+1
rf (dft) (3.19)
subject to
X
t=1
ct dct  b
X
t=0
st dst  C   b
X
t=1
ct dct +
X
t=1
st dst +
TX
t=+1
dft  C
0  dct; dst  1; 8t = 1; : : : ; 
0  dft  1; 8t =  + 1; : : : ; T
0  b  C:
Using very similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3.3.3, we can show
that the above nonlinear program provides an upper bound for the total ex-
pected revenue of the relaxed problem, hence it is also an upper bound for the
total expected revenue of the original problem.
Proposition 3.4.1. For any b 2 C and dc 2 [0; 1], we have V dc1 (C   b; b)  J1(C  
b; b)  Z3. In particular Zh  Z3.
We skip the detail of the proof because it is very similar to the proof of Propo-
sition 3.3.3. We make a note here that it is difficult to show V dc1 (C   b; b)  Z3
directly without introducing the relaxed problem (3.18). Noting that the con-
straints in (NLP3) are linear while the objective function is concave, we can
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show the following property.
Proposition 3.4.2. There exists an optimal solution (b; dst; dct; dft) for (NLP3), which
satisfies dst = ds; dct = dc; t = 1; : : : ;  , and dft = df ; t =  + 1; : : : ; T .
Let (ps; pc; pf ) be the optimal prices corresponding to ( ds; dc; df ). We con-
struct a simple Fixed Price with Capacity Allocation (FPCA) policy for the orig-
inal problem based on the optimal solution of (NLP3) as follows: From time
period 1 to  , we use a fixed price pc in the conference market and a fixed price
ps in the spot market; from time period +1 to T , we use a fixed price pf . For the
capacity allocation, we choose b0 = argmaxb

W (b) : b 2 fbbc; dbeg	, where W (b)
is the expected revenue achieved by the fixed prices (ps; pc; pf ) given capacity
allocation b. In particular, we have
W (b) = pc Eminfb;Dc( dc)g+ ps EminfC   b;Ds( ds)g
+ pf Eminf(b Dc( dc))+ + (C   b Ds( ds))+; Df ( df )g; (3.20)
where Dc( dc) is the total demand in conference market from time period
1 to  , which follows a Poisson binomial distribution with parameters
(c1 dc; c2 dc; : : : ; c dc) (or a Binomial distributionwith parameters (; c dc)with
stationary arrival probabilities); Ds( ds) is the total demand in spot market from
time period 1 to  , which follows a Poisson binomial distribution with pa-
rameters (s1 ds; s2 ds; : : : ; s ds) (or a Binomial distribution with parameters
(; s ds) with stationary arrival probabilities); and Df ( df ) is the total demand
from time period  + 1 to T , which follows a binomial distribution with param-
eters (T   ; df ).
The following property holds for W (b). The proof is deferred to Appendix
B.4.
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Lemma 3.4.3. W (b) is a piecewise linear function for 0  b  C, whose points of
non-differentiability are integers in C.
An immediate result from this lemma is that W (b0)  W (b). Hence we have
the following chain of inequalities:
1 
W (b0)
Zh

W (b)
Zh

W (b)
Z3
: (3.21)
The first inequality holds since FPCA is a feasible policy for the original prob-
lem, while the third inequality holds due to Proposition 3.4.1.
3.4.2 Asymptotic analysis
Similar to the asymptotic analysis for the operational level spot market pric-
ing problem in Section 3.3.4, we consider a series of problems Pm indexed by
m = 1; 2; : : :, where the problem we study above in this section can be written
as P1. Notice that Pm is a operational level problem given certain exogenous
conference market price pc and capacity allocation mb, while Pm is an overall
problemwhere the conference market price and capacity allocation are inherent
decision variables. Problem Pm has the same parameters as problem Pm except
that Pm does not have fixed conference market price or capacity allocation.
For problem Pm, we let Zmh be the optimal expected revenue, Zm3 be the
deterministic upper bound from (NLP3), and bm be the optimal capacity al-
location from (NLP3). Since b in (NLP3) is treated as a continuous vari-
able, the objective function and optimal capacity allocation for Pm scale lin-
early with m, while the optimal demand rates ( dc; ds; df ) do not scale with
m. Let Wm() be the total expected revenue achieved by the FPCA policy,
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b0m = argmaxb

Wm(b) : b 2 fbbmc; dbmeg	, and Dmc ( dc); Dms ( ds); Dmf ( df ) be the
demands in the conference, spot and final markets by the FPCA policy. Follow-
ing an argument similar to that in the proof of Proposition 3.3.5, we have
Wm(b0m) 
mX
t=1
mct rc(
dc)  1
2
(Dmc (
dc)) +
mX
t=1
mst rs(
ds)  1
2
(Dms (
ds))
+
mTX
t=m+1
rf ( df )  1
2
(Dmc (
dc))  1
2
(Dms (
ds))  1
2
(Dmf (
df ))
=Zm3   (Dmc ( dc))  (Dms ( ds)) 
1
2
(Dmf (
df )): (3.22)
We have Zm3 = mZ3;bm = mb. Furthermore, the standard deviations of
Dmc (
dc); D
m
s (
ds) and Dmf ( df ) all scale linearly with
p
m, i.e., there exists a con-
stant G where (Dmc ( dc)) + (Dms ( ds)) +
1
2
(Dmf (
df )) = G
p
m. Thus, we can
continue the chain of inequalities (3.21) for problem Pm as follows:
1 
Wm(b0m)
Zmh

Wm(mb)
Zm3
 Z
m
3  G
p
m
Zm3
=
mZ3  G
p
m
mZ3
= 1  G
Z3
p
m
m!1   ! 1; (3.23)
where the third inequality follows from (3.22). Hence we have shown the fol-
lowing result.
Proposition 3.4.4. FPCA policy is asymptotically optimal for the overall problem when
the capacity and number of time periods scale up linearly in the same rate.
We can construct a mixed policy by combing FPCA and the SDA policy for
spot market pricing in the following way: We solve (NLP3) to get the fixed price
in conference market pc and capacity allocation b, from which we derive b0. We
choose (pc;b0) as the tactical level decisions. Then we adopt SDA policy to do
dynamic pricing in the spot market for fixed values of pc and b0. We call this
policy the Mixed policy (MXD). Since the fixed prices of FPCA in the spot and
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final markets are feasible for the dynamic programming recursion (3.3) used by
SDA, we get that the MXD policy performs as least as good as FPCA. Thus we
have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4.5. MXD policy performs at least as good as FPCA policy, hence it is also
asymptotically optimal.
3.4.3 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of FPCA and MXD policy for the
overall problem through numerical experiments. We use the same experimental
setup and overall problem instances as in Section 3.3.5. For each problem in-
stance, we report the revenue gaps of the two policies compared to OPT policy.
Note that FPCA andMXD use the same (dc; b) combination from (NLP3), which
may not be the same as the one used by OPT policy. The numerical results are
provided in Table 3.3. The top portion of the table contains results for problem
instances with (s; c; f ) = (1; 1; 0:5), while the bottom portion contains results
for problem instances with (s; c; f ) = (1; 0:75; 0:5).
The observation from Table 3.3 is very similar to that for the top portion of
Table 3.1 and 3.2 in Section 3.3.5, where we were comparing FP and SDA pol-
icy at the optimal (dc; b) combination used by OPT policy. In particular, MXD
achieves more than 99% of the optimal revenue, while offering 4:12% improve-
ment over FPCA policy on average. This means that by solving (NLP3), we
obtain a very good approximation to the optimal (dc; b) combination, which is
difficult to get through the exact formulation in (3.17). Also, we still observe that
given fixed load factor, the revenue gaps of FPCA and MXD policy decrease as
86
Table 3.3: Revenue gaps of FPCA and MXD policy compared to OPT policy.
(s; c; f ) = (1; 1; 0:5)
gaps load factor
T Policy 1.23 1.47 1.84 2.45 3.68
80 FPCA 6.32% 5.63% 5.21% 5.00% 5.13%
MXD 1.06% 1.01% 0.96% 0.82% 0.60%
140 FPCA 5.46% 5.01% 4.77% 4.75% 4.92%
MXD 0.70% 0.71% 0.67% 0.64% 0.41%
200 FPCA 4.84% 4.55% 4.37% 4.47% 4.70%
MXD 0.51% 0.54% 0.49% 0.49% 0.33%
mean impr. 4.78% 4.31% 4.08% 4.09% 4.47%
(s; c; f ) = (1; 0:75; 0:5)
gaps load factor
T Policy 1.23 1.47 1.84 2.45 3.68
80 FPCA 5.63% 5.02% 4.68% 4.74% 4.84%
MXD 0.99% 0.98% 0.96% 1.03% 0.66%
140 FPCA 4.91% 4.55% 4.33% 4.42% 4.69%
MXD 0.67% 0.71% 0.67% 0.70% 0.50%
200 FPCA 4.39% 4.13% 4.03% 4.15% 4.51%
MXD 0.50% 0.57% 0.57% 0.59% 0.44%
mean impr. 4.26% 3.81% 3.61% 3.66% 4.15%
the number of time periods increases, which is consistent with the asymptotic
optimality results in Section 3.4.2.
3.5 Conclusions and Extensions
We study the pricing and capacity allocation problem in a dual channel hotel
revenue management setting. When a conference is to be held at a location near
the hotel, the conference organizer often requests to reserve a block of rooms
for conference participants at a fixed price, and the reservation expires if the
reserved rooms are not fully booked by a deadline before the date of confer-
ence. This adds a conference market channel parallel to the spot market, where
dynamic pricing practice is widely adopted. The hotel manager faces several
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decision in this setting. At a tactical level, the hotel manager need to decide the
number of rooms to reserve and the fixed price to offer for conference partici-
pants. At an operational level, given the tactical decisions, the dynamic pricing
policy in the spot market needs to be optimized considering the conference mar-
ket channel.
For the operational level problem on spot market pricing, we construct a sin-
gle dimensional approximation to the exact two dimensional dynamic program-
ming formulation, by modifying the boundary condition of a classical single di-
mensional dynamic pricing recursion to incorporate the possible remaining ca-
pacity from the conference market. We show that the approximation is asymp-
totically tight when the capacity and number of time periods scale up linearly
in the same rate. The novel part of the analysis is that the natural determin-
istic formulation of the operational level problem does not provide a scalable
upper bound. We utilize an scalable approximation to the natural deterministic
formulation, which provides a an upper bound with a small perturbation. The
SDA policy from the approximation is not only appealing from an operational
perspective, it also shows robust performance in numerical experiments with
respect to load factor and tactical level decision inputs.
For the tactical problem in the higher level, based on a deterministic formu-
lation of a relaxed problem, we develop a heuristic to make decisions on con-
ference market pricing and capacity allocation simultaneously. For the overall
problem, we construct a MXD policy by combining the tactical level heuristic
and the operational level SDA policy, and show that the MXD policy is asymp-
totically optimal. Numerical experiments indicate that theMXDpolicy provides
promising performance.
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There are several possible extensions that are worth future investigation.
First, the asymptotic analysis in Section 3.3.4 and 3.4.2 is based on the assump-
tion that the demand model in each of the three markets is time invariant. Un-
der this assumption, the deterministic formulations suggest fixed prices in each
market, which we can analyze conveniently. An important extension is to study
whether the results in this chapter hold under time dependent demand models.
By taking advantage of properties of Poisson Process, Gallego and Van Ryzin
(1997) show that a pricing policy derived from the deterministic formulation
of the stochastic problem is asymptotically optimal under a continuous time
dynamic pricing model. This makes us believe that our results in this chap-
ter would hold with time dependent demand models under continuous time
framework. However, it is not clear whether this is true under discrete time
framework as we used in this chapter. We leave this as an open problem for
future research.
Second, in this chapter we focus on the problem with single-night stay. It
is a natural extension to consider the problem with multiple-night stay. The
multiple-night stay problem is significantly more complicated and usually stud-
ied through heuristics. Since we can set different prices for different nights in
the spot market, by solving each night’s problem individually, our MXD pol-
icy provides a heuristic to solve the multiple-night stay problem, although it
ignores the interdependence of demands for different nights. A possible mod-
ification is to add some penalty if the capacity of one night runs out, so that
the capacities of different nights can be depleted in a more or less synchronized
fashion.
Third, in this chapter, we assume that conference market and spot market
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are separated perfectly. In particular, the demand function in each market only
depends on the price offered in its ownmarket, and all future conferencemarket
demands are lost once the reserved rooms for the conference are fully booked. It
is of interest to relax this assumption to incorporate the behavior of conference
participants into the model. For instance, conference participants may compare
the current price in the spot market with the fixed price in the conference mar-
ket and choose the one with the smaller price. This complicates the problem in
the following way. In our current model, given the conference market price and
capacity allocation, the revenue in the conference market is not affected by the
pricing policy in the spot market. However this will not be true if the customer
behavior is incorporated in the model, since the demand rate in the conference
market is affected by the price in the spot market. However the idea behind
the SDA policy might be still very appealing, which is to approximate the orig-
inal value function by a single dimensional dynamic program with modified
boundary conditions.
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CHAPTER 4
REVENUEMANAGEMENT INMULTIPLE MARKETS: PRICING
FLEXIBILITY VERSUS CAPACITY FLEXIBILITY
4.1 Introduction
A firm can sell a product in different markets, where customers in the same
market share similar characteristics so that their demand can be modeled by a
common function of the offered price. One important strategic decision for the
firm is whether it should adopt price discrimination by charging different prices
to customers in different markets. While it is believed that price discrimination
benefits the seller in a monopoly setting in general, it is not necessarily true if
the seller is required to allocate its capacity to different markets at the beginning
of the selling horizon.
More specifically, the firm has two options to set up its operations. The first
option is to allocate its capacity to different markets and charge different prices
for the inventories allocated to different markets. In other words, the firm ob-
tains pricing flexibility in this setting. However, the demand in each market can
only be satisfied by the allocated inventory to its own market. If the firm runs
out of inventory in a market, then all future demands in this market will be lost.
In other words the firms loses capacity flexibility in this setting. We call this
option with pricing flexibility but no capacity flexibility the “Separate Pricing”
setting.
The second option is to sell the product in a single market to all the cus-
tomers. In contrast to the Separate Pricing setting, the firm needs to offer a
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single common price, while capacity allocation is not needed and all of its ca-
pacity can be used to satisfy the demand from any customers. Hence, the firm
loses pricing flexibility while obtains capacity flexibility in this setting. We call
this option the “Joint Pricing” setting.
In this chapter, using consistent demand models, we study the trade off be-
tween pricing flexibility and capacity flexibility based on dynamic program-
ming formulations. Under general conditions, we show that when the capacity
and number of time periods in the selling horizon scale up linearly in the same
rate, the benefit of pricing flexibility eventually outweighs the cost of capac-
ity flexibility. This result motivates a hybrid model where we adopt Separate
Pricing at the early stage and switch to Joint Pricing towards the end of the
selling horizon. The exact dynamic programming formulation uses a multi-
dimensional vector to keep track of the number of remaining inventories in
every markets, hence is intractable to solve due to the high-dimensional state
space. We develop heuristics using a single dimensional approximation for each
market, whose boundary condition is based on a deterministic formulation.
Computational experiments indicate that the heuristics perform extremely well
compared to other policies when the capacity is tight, the number of markets
is large, or the price sensitivities of customers in different markets are widely
dispersed.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. An overview of the related
literature is provided in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, building on dynamic pro-
gramming formulations for Separate Pricing and Joint Pricing problems, we
show under general conditions that Separate Pricing is better when the capac-
ity and the length of selling horizon scale up. We also construct examples un-
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der which Joint Pricing achieves larger expected revenue compared to Separate
Pricing. Thus, neither Separate Pricing nor Joint Pricing is uniformly superior
to the other. In Section 4.4, we study a hybrid model, where Separate Pricing
is adopted from the beginning of the selling horizon to some deadline, after
which Joint Pricing is used. While the hybrid model is intractable due to the
high-dimensional state space, we construct asymptotically optimal policies us-
ing single dimensional approximations. In Section 4.5, we conduct numerical
experiments to evaluate the performance of different policies, while conclusion
and future research directions are presented in Section 4.6.
4.2 Literature Review
There are two streams of literature that are related to our work. The first
stream of literature is the study of pricing discrimination versus uniform pric-
ing in economics literature, where deterministic demand models are adopted
widely. When a monopolist serves two independent markets with linear de-
mands, Robinson (1933) shows that compared to uniform pricing, third-degree
price discrimination leaves total output unchanged and therefore reduces social
welfare if discriminatory prices are different. Schmalensee (1981) shows that for
a monopolist with constant marginal cost facing independent demands, third
degree price discrimination raises social welfare only if it increases total output.
Malueg (1993) provides bounds on the ratio of social welfare achieved by pric-
ing discrimination and uniform pricing given particular restrictions on market
demands. Malueg and Snyder (2006) develop bounds of the ratio of a monopo-
list’s profit achieved by pricing discrimination and uniform pricing. All of these
models use deterministic demandmodels and do not have a capacity constraint.
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Our problem can be thought as a stochastic version of the problem with fixed
capacity constraint and dynamic demand revealed over time.
The second stream of work involves dynamic pricing in revenue manage-
ment literature. Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994) study the optimal dynamic pric-
ing policy for a single product over a finite horizon with a continuous time
Poisson demand model. They characterize the form of the optimal policy and
show that a fixed price policy based on a deterministic version of the problem
is asymptotically optimal as the volume of expected sales tends to infinity. The
deterministic bounds in this chapter resemble theirs. Gallego and Van Ryzin
(1997) extend Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994) to a more general setting that allows
time-dependent demand models and multiple products assembled from multi-
ple resources according to a network structure. Zhao and Zheng (2000) extend
Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994) to allow nonhomogeneous demand processes and
identify sufficient conditions under which the optimal price decreases over time
for a given inventory level. Assuming a markup or markdown strategy, Feng
and Xiao (2000b) study the dynamic pricing problem when the price has to be
chosen from a predetermined discrete set. They characterize the structural prop-
erties of the value function and optimal policy, and provide an exact solution
for the continuous-time model. Feng and Xiao (2000a) extend the model to al-
low price changes in both increasing and decreasing directions. Maglaras and
Meissner (2006) show that multi-product dynamic pricing and capacity alloca-
tion problems can be modeled in a common framework, and develop asymptot-
ically optimal policies through fluid approximations. Zhang and Cooper (2009)
consider the problem of pricing parallel flights that are substitutable with each
other. They build upper and lower bounds on the value functions and use these
bounds to construct heuristic policies. Erdelyi and Topaloglu (2010b) propose
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dynamic programming decompositionmethods to solve pricing problem in net-
work revenue management. Recent papers on multi-product dynamic pricing
such as Dong et al. (2009) and Akc¸ay et al. (2010) incorporate customer choice
into the pricing model where customers choose from a set of substitutable prod-
ucts according to certain utility maximization rule. Extensive overviews of pric-
ing models can be found in papers by McGill and Van Ryzin (1999), Bitran and
Caldentey (2003) and Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003), and the book by Tal-
luri and Van Ryzin (2005).
4.3 Separate Pricing vs. Joint Pricing
A firm sells a product to customers in n different markets within a finite selling
horizon consisting of time periods 1; : : : ; T . At the beginning of the selling hori-
zon, the total capacity available is C units. For t = 1; : : : ; T , there is exactly one
customer arriving during time period t. In particular, we let i be the probability
that an arriving customer is from market i in a time period, where
Pn
i=1 i = 1.
Time invariant arrival probabilities are assumed only for the sake of notational
simplicity, while all the results in this chapter hold with time dependent ar-
rival probabilities. Customers in different markets have different sensitivities
to the offered price. More specifically, for market i with demand function di(),
i = 1; : : : ; n, given the offered price pi, the probability that a market i customer
makes a purchase is di(pi). The inverse demand function is pi(), which maps
the demand rate back to the offered price. We use demand rates as the decision
variables instead of the offered prices. Given demand rate di, the revenue rate
is given by ri(di) = di pi(di). In accordance with dynamic pricing literature, we
assume that the revenue functions ri(); i = 1; : : : ; n are continuous, bounded
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and concave, and satisfy limdi!0 ri(di) = 0.
If the firms chooses the Separate Pricing setting, it needs to choose a capacity
allocation characterized by b = (b1; : : : ; bn) with
Pn
i=1 bi = C at the beginning
of the selling horizon, and future demands in market i will be lost if bi units
have already been sold in this market. For market i, the firm adopts a dynamic
pricing strategy. At time period t = 1; : : : ; T with remaining capacity xi  bi, the
total expected revenue onwards in market i can be calculated by the following
dynamic programming recursion:
Hit(xi) = max
dit2[0;1]
n
i[ri(dit) + ditHi;t+1(xi   1)] + (1  i dit)Hi;t+1(xi)
o
= max
dit2[0;1]
n
i[ri(dit)  ditHi;t+1(xi)]
o
+Hi;t+1(xi); (4.1)
where Hi;t+1(xi) = Hi;t+1(xi)   Hi;t+1(xi   1). The boundary condition is
Hit(0) = 0; Hi;T+1() = 0. If a demand rate dit is chosen at time t, it means that
we offer price pi(dit) at this time period. The total expected revenue the firm can
collect in this Separate Pricing setting with capacity allocation b is
Pn
i=1Hi1(bi).
Letting Rsep be the total expected revenue obtained from Separate Pricing, and
B = fb 2 Zn : 0  bi  C;
Pn
i=1 bi = Cg, we have
Rsep = max
b2B
nX
i=1
Hi1(bi): (4.2)
If the firm chooses the Joint Pricing setting, a common price needs to be of-
fered at any time period. Here we still use the demand rate for each market
as the decision variable, hence the demand rates dit; i = 1; : : : ; n need to satisfy
the condition that p1(d1t) = p2(d2t) = : : : = pn(dnt). Letting S = fd 2 [0; 1]n :
p1(d1) = p2(d2) = : : : = pn(dn)g, at time period period t = 1; : : : ; T with remain-
ing capacity y  C, the following dynamic programming recursion maximizes
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the total expected revenue onwards:
	t(y) = max
dt2S
n nX
i=1
iri(dit) +
nX
i=1
idit	t+1(y   1) + (1 
nX
i=1
i dit)	t+1(y)
o
= max
dt2S
n nX
i=1
iri(dit) 
nX
i=1
idit	t+1(y)
o
+	t+1(y); (4.3)
where 	t+1(y) = 	t+1(y)   	t+1(y   1). The boundary condition is 	t(0) =
0;	T+1() = 0. LettingRjoint be the total expected revenue from the Joint Pricing
setting, we have Rjoint = 	1(C).
We want to know whether Rsep  Rjoint or Rsep < Rjoint, and under which
conditions each of the two inequalities holds. First, we show that the following
two nonlinear programs provide up bounds for Rsep and Rjoint respectively.
(NLP1) Zsep = max
TX
t=1
nX
i=1
i ri(dit) (4.4)
subject to
TX
t=1
i dit  bi; i = 1; : : : ; n (4.5)
nX
i=1
bi = C (4.6)
0  bi  C; i = 1; : : : ; n (4.7)
dt 2 [0; 1]n; t = 1; : : : ; T; (4.8)
(NLP2) Zjoint = max
TX
t=1
nX
i=1
i ri(dit) (4.9)
subject to
TX
t=1
nX
i=1
i dit  C (4.10)
dt 2 S; t = 1; : : : ; T: (4.11)
Notice that (NLP1) and (NLP2) share the same objective function. The con-
straints (4.5)-(4.7) in (NLP1) indicate that a capacity allocation is needed, while
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the constraint (4.8) implies that we are allowed to set different prices in different
markets. In contrast, constraint (4.10) in (NLP2) indicates that there is no need
to do capacity allocation in this setting, while constraint (4.11) implies that a
common price needs to be set across different markets. We have the following
result regarding to (NLP1) and (NLP2).
Proposition 4.3.1. Rsep  Zsep, Rjoint  Zjoint and Zjoint  Zsep.
Proof. We skip the detail of proof for Rsep  Zsep and Rjoint  Zjoint, since
the approach is very similar to the proof of Proposition 4.4.1 in Section 4.4.2.
The idea is to construct a feasible solution for the nonlinear program based on
the optimal pricing policy, whose objective value is the same as the expected
revenue of the optimal policy. For Zjoint  Zsep, we note that a feasible solu-
tion for (NLP1) can be constructed using the optimal solution of (NLP2). In
particular, if d2t ; t = 1; : : : ; T is the optimal solution for (NLP2), then we let
 = (1; 2; : : : ; n) where i =
PT
t=1 id
2
itPT
t=1
Pn
j=1 jtd
2
jt
; i = 1; : : : ; n. If we set b1 = C
and d1t = d2t ; t = 1; : : : ; T , it is easy to verify that (d1t ; b1) is a feasible solution for
(NLP1) with the same objective value. Hence we have Zjoint  Zsep.
Next, using the optimal solution of (NLP2), we construct a pair of nonlinear
programs with the same objective function, but the constraint in one is tighter
than the constraint in the other. This pair of nonlinear programs are used to
connect Rsep and Rjoint. We first state an useful fact here which can be derived
from a similar result shown in Gallego (1992).
Fact (I): For a deterministic scalar z and a real-valued random variable Z with
finite mean  and finite variance 2, we have EminfZ; zg  minf; zg   =2.
As in the proof of Proposition 4.3.1, we let fd2t : t = 1; : : : ; Tg be the opti-
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mal solution for (NLP2), and  = (1; 2; : : : ; n) where i =
PT
t=1 id
2
itPT
t=1
Pn
j=1 jtd
2
jt
; i =
1; : : : ; n. Now consider the following two nonlinear programs:
(NLP3)Z3 = max
TX
t=1
nX
i=1
i ri(dit)
subject to
TX
t=1
i dit  iC; i = 1; : : : ; n (4.12)
dt 2 [0; 1]n; t = 1; : : : ; T; (4.13)
(NLP4)Z4 = max
TX
t=1
nX
i=1
i ri(dit)
subject to
TX
t=1
i dit  iC; i = 1; : : : ; n
dt 2 S; t = 1; : : : ; T: (4.14)
According to the definition of , we see that (NLP4) is a rewrite of (NLP2),
hence Zjoint = Z4. Besides, (NLP3) and (NLP4) are the same except that (NLP4)
uses the tighter constraint (4.14) while (NLP3) uses the looser constraint (4.13).
Hence we have the following chain of inequalities:
Rjoint  Zjoint = Z4  Z3: (4.15)
Due to the concavity assumption of ri(), we know that there exists an opti-
mal solution for (NLP3) f dt : t = 1; : : : ; Tg which satisfies d1 = d2 = : : : = dT :=
d. Besides, it is easy to verify that ( d;C) is a feasible solution for (NLP1) with
an objective value Z3. Hence we have Z3  Zsep. In addition, we can construct
feasible policies for the Separate Pricing problem (4.2) based on d. Essentially
we offer demand rate di and corresponding price pi( di) in market i throughout
the selling horizon. We call this policy as the Fixed Price policy. Given a capac-
ity allocation vector b, letting W (b) be the expected revenue of the Fixed Price
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policy, we have
W (b) =
nX
i=1
Eminfbi; Di( di)g pi( di);
whereDi( di) is the total demand in market i under the Fixed Price policy, which
follows a Binomial distribution with parameters (T; i di). Letting B0 = fb 2
[0; C]n :
Pn
i=1 bi = Cg, i.e., B0 is the continuous relaxation of B, it is not hard to
verify the following fact.
max
b2B
W (b) = max
b2B0
W (b):
Let b be the maximizer ofW (b) over B and B0, then the Fixed Price policy with
capacity allocation b is feasible for Separate Pricing problem (4.2). Hence we
have the following chain of inequalities:
Rsep  W (b)  W (C) =
nX
i=1
EminfiC;Di( di)g pi( di)

nX
i=1

minfiC; T i dig   1
2
(Di( di))

pi( di)
=
nX
i=1
T i di pi( di)  1
2
nX
i=1
(Di( di)) pi( di)
= Z3   1
2
nX
i=1
(Di( di)) pi( di): (4.16)
The third inequality holds due to Fact (I). The second equality follows from con-
straint (4.12), and the last equality follows from the definition of d. Combining
inequality (4.15) and (4.16), we get
Rsep  Rjoint  Z3   Z4   1
2
nX
i=1
(Di( di)) pi( di): (4.17)
Next we show that under some general conditions, Separate Pricing collects
more revenue eventually when the capacity and the number of time periods
scale up. In order to do so, we consider a sequence of problems fPm : m =
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1; 2; : : :g indexed by parameter m 2 Z+. In problem Pm, the total capacity is
mC, while the selling horizon starts from time period 1 until time period mT .
For time period t = 1; : : : ;mT in problem Pm, the probability that an arriving
customer is of type i is mi = i. With this definitions, we note that the problem
studied above is P1. For Problem Pm, letting Rmsep and Rmjoint to denote the ex-
pected revenues from Separate Pricing and Joint Pricing respectively, we have
the following theorem:
Theorem 4.3.2. There exist !  0;   0 such that
Rmsep  Rmjoin
Rmjoin
 !   p
m
: (4.18)
Proof. For Problem Pm, we let Zmsep; Zmjoint; Zm3 ; Zm4 be the optimal objective val-
ues of (NLP1) - (NLP4) respectively. It is not hard to verify that  based on the
optimal solution of (NLP2) does not scale with m, neither does the optimal so-
lution d for (NLP3). Besides, Zmsep; Zmjoint; Zm3 and Zm4 all scale linearly with m.
In particular, we have Zm3 = mZ3; Zm4 = mZ4. Similar to (4.15) and (4.17) for
Problem P1, we have
Rmjoint  Zmjoint = Zm4  Zm3 (4.19)
Rmsep  Rmjoint  Zm3   Zm4  
1
2
nX
i=1
(Dmi (
di)) pi( di); (4.20)
where Dmi ( di) is the total demand in market i throughout the selling horizon
given the fixed demand rate di. Hence Dmi ( di) follows a Binomial distribution
with parameters (mT; i di), thus (Dmi ( di)) =
p
mT i di(1  i di). Now com-
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bining (4.19) and (4.20) we have
Rmsep  Rmjoint
Rmjoint
 Z
m
3   Zm4   12
Pn
i=1
p
mT i di(1  i di)
Zm4
=
mZ3  mZ4   12
Pn
i=1
p
mT i di(1  i di)
mZ4
=
Z3   Z4
Z4
 
Pn
i=1
p
T i di(1  i di)
2Z4
p
m
:
Letting ! = Z3 Z4
Z4
 0 and  =
Pn
i=1
p
T i di(1 i di)
2Z4
 0, the result follows.
Recall that Z3 and Z4 are optimal objective values of (NLP3) and (NLP4),
where the constraint in (NLP4) is tighter than that in (NLP3). When the demand
functions in all the markets are the same, we have Z3 = Z4. However, in general
we have Z3  Z4, and it is not hard to construct problem instances with Z3 > Z4,
in which case ! 6= 0, and for anym  ( 
!
)2, we haveRmsep  Rmjoin. In other words,
as long as Z3 > Z4, Separate Pricing achieves larger expected revenue than Joint
Pricing whenm is large enough.
Intuitively, the above results says that pricing flexibility is more important
than capacity flexibility when the capacity and the number of time periods are
large enough. On the other hand, when the capacity and number of time peri-
ods in the selling horizon is small, in particular, when the total capacity is 1, if
we choose Separate Pricing, then we can only generate revenue from one of the
markets. However, if we choose Joint Pricing, we can always capture the same
revenue from this market while generating revenue from other markets with
positive probability. Hence we have Rmsep < Rmjoin in this case. Thus neither Sep-
arate Pricing nor Joint Pricing is always superior to the other. It is sensible that
for a general problem, it may be beneficial to adopt a hybrid method where we
use Separate Pricing initially with a large capacity, and switch to Joint Pricing
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towards the end of selling horizon when the remaining capacity is small. We
study this hybrid model in the next section.
4.4 Hybrid model
Motivated by the observation in last section, we consider a hybrid model where
the firm uses Separate Pricing in the early stage of the selling horizon and
switches to Joint Pricing towards the end of the selling horizon. This model has
some potential applications. For instance, in fashion goods retail industry, it is
difficult to carry out replenishment within the selling season. The firm usually
distributes the available inventory to retail stores in different regions at the be-
ginning of the selling season. Once such distribution is finished, redistribution
of inventories within the season is rare due to high transportation and overhead
cost. When the end of the selling season approaches with a smaller total inven-
tory, the firmmay collect the remaining inventories in these retail stores and sell
them in a few outlet stores, or through a cental online outlet store. In this section
we study such a hybrid model and develop approximate solutions.
4.4.1 Formulation
In the hybrid model we have two additional two parameters: The end time for
Joint Pricing  and the capacity allocation vector b = (b1; : : : ; bn)with
P
i bi = C.
For a  2 f1; : : : ; Tg, Separate Pricing is adopted from time period 1 to  while
Joint Pricing is used from time period  + 1 to T . During time period 1 to  ,
the firm operates in n separate markets. The available capacity in market i is
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bi, and excess demands will be lost if the total demand in market i exceeds bi.
Remaining capacities in all the markets will join together at time  + 1, and
the Joint Pricing will be adopted there afterwards until time period T , at which
time the remaining capacity becomes obsolete. We call the market in which the
firm operates from time period  + 1 to T the joint market or the final market
interchangeably. The firm’s problem is to find a pricing policy that maximizes
the total expected revenue generated over the entire selling horizon.
For t = 1; : : : ;  , we use a n-dimensional vector x = (x1; : : : ; xn) to represent
the remaining capacities in all the markets, where xi is the remaining capacity
in market i. At time period t, if the remaining capacity is x, then the following
dynamic programming recursion maximizes the total expected revenue from
time period t onwards:
Vt(x) = max
d
(
nX
i=1
i(ri(dit) + dit Vt(x  ei)) + (1 
nX
i=1
idit)Vt+1(x)
)
=
nX
i=1
max
dit
fi(ri(dit)  ditiVt+1(x))g+ Vt+1(x); (4.21)
wherei Vt+1(x) = Vt+1(x) Vt+1(x ei), and ei is an n-dimensional unit vector
with 1 at the i-th component and 0 at all other components. The boundary
condition is Vt(0; 0) = 0; V+1(x) = 	+1(
Pn
i=1 xi), where 	t() is the expected
revenue from Joint Pricing defined by optimality equation (4.3). Note that 	t()
is needed only for t =  + 1; : : : ; T , i.e., in the final market periods.
In the final market time periods from  + 1 to T , the decision in each time
period is essentially a single common price to offer. Hence instead of controlling
an n-dimensional decision vector dt 2 S = fd 2 [0; 1]n : p1(d1) = p2(d2) =
: : : = pn(dn)g as in equation (4.3), we prefer to control a single decision variable
dft = d1t with implied price pft = p1(dft). For i = 1; : : : ; n, the demand rate in
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market i at time period t is di(pft) = di(p1(dft))
:
= di(dft), while the one period
revenue function is rf (dft) =
Pn
i=1 iri(di(dft)) =
Pn
i=1 idi(dft) pft. With these
new notations, we can rewrite (4.3) as
	t(y) = max
dft2[0;1]
n
rf (dft) 
nX
i=1
idi(dft)	t+1(y)
o
+	t+1(y): (4.22)
In order to make sure (4.22) can be solved in an efficient manner, we assume
rf (dft) is continuous, bounded and concave, and
Pn
i=1 idi(dft) is convex. Note
that the implication of the assumption is that rf (dft)   
Pn
i=1 idi(dft) is con-
cave for any   0, hence we have a concave maximization problem in the
dynamic programming recursion, which is easy to solve. For instance, when all
the markets use linear demand moedel with the same price range, the condition
is satisfied.
While the dynamic programming recursion (4.22) in the final market is
tractable to solve, the value function (4.21) from time period 1 to  has an n-
dimensional state space, and it is impractical to solve exactly for any real size
problems when the dimension exceeds 3 or 4. We will develop and analyze
tractable approximations for (4.21) in the rest of this chapter.
Note that if	+1(
Pn
i=1 xi) is additively separable, then the high dimensional
dynamic program (4.21) can be decomposed into n independent single dimen-
sional dynamic programs, which are tractable to solve. In other words, the in-
tractability of the dynamic programming (4.21) is due to a non-separable bound-
ary condition at time period  + 1. Intuitively, since the remaining capacities
from different markets will join together at time period  + 1 , and the expected
revenue from the total remaining capacity at  + 1 is a non-separable function,
the evolutions of sales in different markets have an impact on each other’s pric-
ing policy. For instance, when n = 2, if the capacity in market 1 is depleted
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quickly, then it is unlikely that we will have a large amount of remaining capac-
ity from market 1 at the end of time period  . Hence we may want to keep the
price in market 2 at a high level, since we have (T   ) sales opportunities in the
final market and the capacity will be scarce. On the other hand if the demand in
market 1 is not very large and we anticipate that there will be a large number of
remaining capacity in market 1 at the end of time period  , then wemay want to
price lower in market 2 to stimulate demands in order to make use of the plenty
remaining capacity at time period  + 1 in the final market to achieve higher
revenue.
From the discussion we see that it is the interaction among different markets
that creates an intractable dynamic programming recursion. Besides, even if we
were able to solve (4.21) and get the optimal policy, it will not be a practically
attractive policy, since we need to monitor the remaining capacities in all the
markets to make pricing decision in each market. If we can break up the in-
teraction among different markets and still have a good approximation to the
original value function (4.21), then we have a tractable approximation and an
operationally attractive policy that only needs the local capacity information to
make local pricing decisions.
Note that the interaction among different markets is realized at time period
 + 1 when all the remaining capacities join together. For a specific market i,
the impact of other markets on market i’s pricing policy is through the total
remaining capacity at time period  + 1. In other words, if we know exactly the
total remaining capacity at time period  + 1 from markets other than i, then
we can set the prices in market i from time period 1 to  optimally. Following
this idea, we first develop a nonlinear program based on the formulation of
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a deterministic counterpart of the original stochastic problem, from which we
extract a simple Fixed Price policy. Then we use the resulting capacity from the
Fixed Price policy as an approximation to the remaining capacities in different
markets at time period +1, based on which we construct better pricing policies
for time period 1 to  .
4.4.2 Tractable Policies Based on a Deterministic Formulation
Consider a deterministic version of the hybrid model: The firm has C units of
products to sell at time period 1, which is a continuous quantity. There are n sep-
arate markets initially, and the firm has allocates bi units to market i at the be-
ginning of the selling horizon, where
Pn
i=1 bi = C. For t = 1; : : : ; ; i = 1; : : : ; n,
if the offered demand rate in market i is dit, then the realized demand is exactly
idit with a revenue of ri(dit). At time period  + 1, the remaining capacities in
all the markets join together as a single final market. For t =  + 1; : : : ; T , if the
controlled demand rate is dft, then the realized demand is
Pn
i=1 idi(dft) with a
revenue of rf (dft). The firm wants to maximize its total revenue by controlling
dit; t = 1; : : : ; ; i = 1; : : : ; n and dft; t =  + 1; : : : ; T . The following nonlinear
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program solves the revenue maximization problem:
(NLP5) Z5 = max
X
t=1
nX
i=1
i ri(dit) +
TX
t=+1
rf (dft) (4.23)
subject to
X
t=1
i dit  bi; i = 1; : : : ; n (4.24)
X
t=1
nX
i=1
i dit +
TX
t=+1
nX
i=1
idi(dft)  C (4.25)
0  dit  1; t = 1; : : : ; ; i = 1; : : : ; n (4.26)
0  dft  1; t =  + 1; : : : ; T: (4.27)
The next proposition shows that Z5 from (NLP5) provides an upper bound
for the optimal total expected revenue of the stochastic version of the hybrid
model. The proof is deferred into Appendix C.1.
Proposition 4.4.1. We have V1(b)  Z5 for any given b satisfying
Pn
i=1 bi = C.
Due to the assumptions about ri(); rf () and
Pn
i=1 di(dft), we know that
(NLP5) is a concave maximization problem, and the proof for the following
lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 4.4.2. There exists an optimal solution fdt : t = 1; : : : ; g; fdft : t =  +
1; : : : ; Tg for (NLP5) which satisfies that dt = d; t = 1; : : : ;  and dft = df ; t =
 + 1; : : : ; T for some d and df .
An immediate result based on Lemma 4.4.2 is that we can write Z5 =Pn
i=1  iri(d

i ) + (T   )rf (df ). Besides, Lemma 4.4.2 also implies a Fixed Price
policy where we use a fixed price pi = pi(di ) in market i from time period 1
to  , i = 1; : : : ; n, and another fixed price pf = p1(d

f ) in the joint market from
time period  + 1 to T . If this Fixed Price policy is adopted, the total number of
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demand in market i from time period 1 to  is Di(di ), which follows a Binomial
distribution with parameters (; idi ). The revenue inmarket i from time period
1 to  can be written as pi minfbi; Di(di )g. At time period  + 1, the remaining
capacity from market i can be written as (bi   Di(di ))+, where we use ()+ to
denote the function maxf0; g. Then the revenue in the joint market from time
period  + 1 to T can be written as pf minf
Pn
i=1(bi   Di(di ))+; Df (df )g, where
Df (d

f ) is the demand in the joint market, which follows a Binomial distribu-
tion with parameters (T   ;Pni=1 idi(df )). Hence the total expected revenue
achieved by the Fixed Price policy can be written as
RFP =
nX
i=1
piEminfbi; Di(di )g+ pfEmin
(
nX
i=1
(bi  Di(di ))+; Df (df )
)
: (4.28)
While the Fixed Price policy is an attractive policy from operational point
of view, we use it as a building block to construct other tractable policies with
better performance. The idea is as follows. We pick one market j, and for any
market i 6= j, we offer the fixed price pi from time period 1 to  as in the Fixed
Price policy. For market j, when the remaining capacity at time period t is xj 
bj , we use a dynamic pricing policy based on the following single dimensional
dynamic programming recursion:
jt(xj) = max
djt2[0;1]
n
j[rj(djt) + djtj;t+1(xj   1)] + (1  j djt)j;t+1(xj)
o
= max
djt2[0;1]
n
t[rj(djt)  djtj;t+1(xj)]
o
+ j;t+1(xj); (4.29)
with the boundary condition jt(0) = E	+1(
P
i6=j(bi   Di(di ))+) and
j;+1(xj) = E	+1(xj +
P
i6=j(bi   Di(di ))+), where
P
i6=j(bi   Di(di ))+ is the
total number of remaining capacities at time period  + 1 in all markets other
than j, which use fixed prices from time period 1 to  as in the Fixed Price pol-
icy. When any market i 6= j uses the fixed price pi from time period 1 to  , given
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the remaining capacity xj in market j at time period t, jt(xj) represents the
maximum expected revenue we can achieve in market j from time period t to 
and in the final market from time period  + 1 to T . Notice that dj and df with
their corresponding prices pj and pf are feasible for the dynamic programming
recursion (4.29) and (4.22) respectively, which implies that
j1(bj)  pjEminfbj; Dj(dj)g+ pfEmin
(
nX
i=1
(bi  Di(di ))+; Df (df )
)
:
Now we have constructed a policy using fixed price pi in market i 6= j from
time period 1 to  , dynamic pricing policy implied by (4.29) in market j from
time period 1 to  , and the dynamic pricing policy implied by (4.22) in the joint
market from time period  +1 to T . The total expected revenue from this policy
can be written as
Rj = j1(bj) +
X
i6=j
piEminfbi; Di(di )g

nX
i=1
piEminfbi; Di(di )g+ pfEmin
(
nX
i=1
(bi  Di(di ))+; Df (df )
)
= RFP :
(4.30)
Note that (4.30) holds for any j = 1; : : : ; n, thus by varying our choice of j,
we can find the best such policy which achieves the maximum total expected
revenue
RFBD = max
j2f1;:::;ng
Rj: (4.31)
We call this policy the Fixed Price Based Dynamic Pricing policy (FBD). Clearly
we have RFBD  RFP . We analyze the performance of this policy in next sub-
section.
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4.4.3 Asymptotic Analysis
In this section, we show that when the number of time periods and the initial
capacities scale up linearly in the same rate, the FBD policy is asymptotically
optimal.
We consider a sequence of problems fPm : m = 1; 2; : : :g indexed by param-
eter m 2 Z+. In problem Pm, the total capacity is mC, while the initial capacity
allocation vector is m b. The selling horizon starts from time period 1 and lasts
until time periodmT . From time period 1 tom , the firm operates in n separate
markets and is able to set different prices in different markets. The arrival prob-
ability in market i at any time period is given by i, which satisfies
Pn
i=1 i = 1.
At time period m + 1, the remaining capacities from all the markets join to-
gether, which is used to satisfy the demand in the joint market from time period
m + 1 tomT .
With this definitions, we note that the problem we study in the previous
section is P1. Our goal here is to show that both the Fixed Price policy and
the FBD policy are asymptotically optimal for problem Pm when m approaches
infinity. For problem Pm, letting V m1 (m b) denote the optimal expected revenue,
while RmFP and R
m
FBD denote the expected revenue achieved by the Fixed Price
policy and the FBD policy respectively, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.4.3. For any given b satisfying
Pn
i=1 bi = C, we have limm!1
RmFBD
Vm1 (m b)
=
limm!1
RmFP
Vm1 (m b)
= 1:
Proof. LetZm5 be the optimal objective function of (NLP5) for problem Pm, which
upper bounds V m1 (m b). Note that in (NLP5) for problem Pm, all the coefficients
scale linearly withm. Thus the optimal solution does not scale withmwhile the
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objective function scales linearlywithm, i.e., the optimal solution is (d; df )with
corresponding prices (p; pf ), and we have Z
m
5 = mZ5 = m
Pn
i=1  iri(d

i ) +
m(T   )rf (df ). Similar to (4.28) for problem P1, we have
RmFP =
nX
i=1
piEminfmbi; Dmi (di )g+ pfEmin
(
nX
i=1
[mbi  Dmi (di )]+; Dmf (df )
)
;
(4.32)
where Dmi (di ) is the total demand in market i from time period 1 to m , which
follows a binomial distribution with parameters (m; i di ); and Dmf (d

f ) is the
total demand from time period m + 1 to mT , which follows a Binomial distri-
bution with parameters (m(T   );Pni=1 idi(df )). The first summation in (4.32)
represents the total expected revenue in the separate markets from time period
1 to  , while the second term is the total expected revenue in the joint market
from time period  + 1 to T . For each i = 1; : : : ; n, we have
pi Eminfmbi; Dmi (di )g  pi fminfmbi;E(Dmi (di ))g   (Dmi (di ))=2g
= pi
n
minfmbi;m  idi g  
p
m idi (1  idi )=2
o
= pi
n
m id

i  
p
m idi (1  idi )=2
o
= m iri(d

i ) Gi
p
m;
whereGi = pi
p
 idi (1  idi )=2. The first inequality follows from Fact (I) and
the second equality follows from feasibility constraint (4.24).
Let K =
Pn
i=1[mbi   Dmi (di )]+, then E(K) 
Pn
i=1[mbi   E(Dmi (di ))]+ due
to Jensen’s Inequality. Besides, the second term in (4.32) can be written as
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pf E minfK;Dmf (df )g. We have the following chain of inequalities:
pf

E min

K;Dmf (d

f )
		  pf E minE(K); Dmf (df )	  12(K)

 pf

min

E(K);E(Dmf (df ))
	  1
2
(Dmf (d

f )) 
1
2
(K)

 pf
(
min
(
nX
i=1
[mbi   E(Dmi (di ))]+;E(Dmf (df ))
)
  1
2
(Dmf (d

f )) 
1
2
(K)
)
= pf
(
min
(
nX
i=1
[mbi  m idi ]+;m(T   )
nX
i=1
idi(d

f )
)
 1
2
(Dmf (d

f )) 
1
2
(K)

= pf
(
min
(
nX
i=1
[mbi  m sds];m(T   )
nX
i=1
idi(d

f )
)
 1
2
(Dmf (d

f )) 
1
2
(K)

= pf
(
m(T   )
nX
i=1
idi(d

f ) 
1
2
(Dmf (d

f )) 
1
2
(K)
)
 pf
(
m(T   )
nX
i=1
idi(d

f ) 
1
2
(Dmf (d

f )) 
1
2
nX
i=1
(Dmi (d

i ))
)
= m(T   ) rf (df ) Gf
p
m;
where
Gf =
pf
2
8<:
vuut(T   ) nX
i=1
idi(df )(1 
nX
i=1
idi(df )) +
nX
i=1
p
 idi (1  idi )
9=; :
The first and second inequalities follow from Fact (I), the third inequality holds
due to the fact about E(K) shown above, the second equality follows from con-
straint (4.24), the third equality follows from constraint (4.25), and the last in-
equality follows fromLemma B.3.1 shown inAppendix B.3. Combing the above
two terms, we have
RmFP  m
nX
i=1
iri(d

i ) +m(T   ) rf (df ) 
nX
i=1
Gi
p
m Gf
p
m = mZ5  G
p
m;
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whereG =
Pn
i=1Gi+Gf . Therefore we have the following chain of inequalities:
1  R
m
FBD
V m1 (m b)
 R
m
FP
V m1 (m b)
 R
m
FP
Zm5
 mZ5  G
p
m
mZ5
= 1  G
Z5
p
m
m!1   ! 1:
4.5 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of different policies through nu-
merical experiments. We begin by describing the benchmark policies and the
experimental setup.
4.5.1 Benchmark and Policies
Upper Bound (UPB). This corresponds to the optimal objective function Z5 from
(NLP5), which is an upper bound for V1(b). Since we can not get the exact value
of the optimal expected revenue V1(b) for high dimensional problems, we use
this upper bound to get a feel for optimality gaps.
Fixed Price Policy (FP). This benchmark policy corresponds to solving the
nonlinear program (NLP5), and offering fixed price pi in market i from time
period 1 to  and fixed price pf from time period  + 1 to T in the joint market.
The total expected revenue achieved by FP policy is given by RFP in equation
(4.28). Note that RFP can be calculated exactly.
Fixed Price Based Dynamic Pricing Policy (FBD). This benchmark policy cor-
responds to solving the single dimensional dynamic programming recursion
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in (4.29) for each j 2 f1; : : : ; ng, calculating the expected revenue Rj given in
(4.30), and finding the maximum total expected revenue RFBD given in (4.31).
Suppose k = argmaxj2f1;:::;ngRj , then for any market i 6= k, FBD uses the fixed
price pi based on (NLP5) from time period 1 to  . For market k, FBD uses a
dynamic pricing strategy implied by kt(xk) defined in (4.29). In other words,
letting dkt(xk) be the optimal decision variable at time period t with state xk in
(4.29), FBD offers price pk(dkt(xk)) in market kwhen there are xk units remaining
at time period t. Note that FBD only needs to keep track of the the remaining
capacity in market k from time period 1 to  . From timer period  +1 to T , FBD
uses the dynamic pricing policy implied by dynamic programming recursion
(4.22). In other words, letting d	ft(y) be the optimal decision variable of (4.22) at
time period t with state y, FBD offers price p1(d	ft(y)) in the joint market at time
period t when there are y units remaining in total. The total expected revenue
of FBD is RFBD, which can be calculated exactly too.
Mixed Policy (MXD). This benchmark policy is also based on solving the
single dimensional dynamic programming recursion in (4.29) for each j 2
f1; : : : ; ng. Instead of picking one market and adopting dynamic pricing in the
chosen market while keeping fixed prices in all other markets as in FBD policy,
MXD uses dynamic pricing in all the markets, pretending that every other mar-
ket is using fixed price from the optimal solution of (NLP5). More specifically,
for t = 1; : : : ;  and j = 1; : : : ; n, letting djt(xj) be the optimal decision variable
at time period t with state xj in (4.29), MXD offers price pj(djt(xj)) in market j
when there are xj units remaining at time period t. Note that with MXD, the
pricing decision in market j only depends on the remaining capacity in market
j. From time period  + 1 to T , MXD uses the same dynamic pricing strategy
implied by (4.22) as FBD. Unlike FP or FBD, the total expected revenue achieved
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by MXD can not be computed exactly, hence we estimate it through simulation.
4.5.2 Experimental Setup
A hybrid problem instance is defined by the following parameters: Initial ca-
pacity C, number of time periods in the selling horizon T , number of markets
n, capacity allocation vector b, and ending time of separate markets  . The de-
mand process is characterized by arrival probabilities i and the demand func-
tions di(); i = 1; : : : ; n. In our experiments, we set  = 34T and use symmetric
arrival probabilities i = 1=n; i = 1; : : : ; n. We adopt linear demand functions
where di(pi) = i(1   pi=pmax), where pmax is the maximum price at which the
corresponding demand rate is 0. We use a common maximum price pmax = 2
for all the markets, and vary i in [0; 1]. Note that the price sensitivity of the
demand model in market i is given by i=pmax, and the demand function vector
 = (1; : : : ; n) completely characterizes the demand models given fixed pmax.
With this setting, when the controlled demand rate is dft at time period t in the
joint market, the assumption that di(dft) = di(pi(dft)) is convex and rf (dft) is
concave is satisfied.
We work with test problems with 2 or 5 markets, corresponding to
n = 2 or n = 5. For each (C; T ) combination, when n = 2, we vary
 in f(0:6; 0:6); (0:8; 0:4); (1:0; 0:2)g. Similarly, when n = 5, we vary 
in f(0:6; 0:6; 0:6; 0:6; 0:6); (0:8; 0:7; 0:6; 0:5; 0:4); (1:0; 0:8; 0:6; 0:4; 0:2)g. Hence for
each (C; T ) combination, we have 6 problem instances in total with different
numbers of markets and different demand models.
Under this setup, the revenue function in market i is given by ri(di) =
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pmax
i
di (i  di), hence the unconstraint maximizer of the revenue function ri(di)
is given by d0i = i=2. For a problem instance where initial capacity is C, the
number of time periods is T and the demand function vector is , if we set the
price in each market to maximize the one period revenue in each time period,
then the total expected demand is T
Pn
i=1 id
0
i . Hence we can define the load
factor of the problem as l(C; T;) = T
Pn
i=1 id
0
i
C
= T
2C
Pn
i=1 i
n
, which is a measure
of the tightness of the capacity for the problem instance. We want to evalu-
ate the performance of different policies under different load factors. Note that
given C and T , the load factor depends on
Pn
i=1 i
n
. For each (C; T ) combina-
tion, due to the way we set up the demand vector , all the 6 problem instances
corresponding to n = 2 and n = 3with different ’s share the same load factor.
We vary T among f80; 160; 240g. For T = 80, we vary C in f16; 12; 9; 7g
so the load factors are varied in the set L = f1:50; 2:00; 2:67; 3:43g. For each
C 2 f16; 12; 9; 7g, we solve a modified version of (NLP5) to generate the capac-
ity allocation vector b: we treat b as a decision variable in (NLP5) and add a
constraint that
Pn
i=1 bi = C. This modification does not change the concavity
property of the nonlinear program. Then we round the capacity allocation im-
plied by the optimal solution of this modified nonlinear program to integers,
which is denoted by b(C), and use b(C) throughout the computation of all the
benchmark policies for this problem instance. For T = 160 and T = 240, we
vary C in f32; 24; 18; 14g and f48; 36; 27; 21g respectively, so that the load factors
are always in the same set L. Note that in this way we are scaling T and C 0s
linearly in the same rate. We also scale the capacity allocation vector b in a lin-
ear fashion. More specifically, when T = 160 and C 2 f32; 24; 18; 14g, we use a
capacity allocation vector 2 b(C=2); when T = 240 and C 2 f48; 36; 27; 21g, we
use a capacity allocation vector 3 b(C=3). This scaling approach corresponds to
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the asymptotic regime in Section 4.4.3. Hence we can expect that both FP and
FBD policies perform better as T increases from 80 to 240. According to our ex-
perimental setup, a problem instance is completely characterized by (T;C;),
or equivalently by (T; l;), where l is the load factor. Hence in total we have
3  4  6 = 72 problem instances.
4.5.3 Experimental Results
We give our computational results in Table 4.1 and 4.2. Table 4.1 shows the
results for problem instances with 2 separate markets, while Table 4.2 shows
results for problem instances with 5 separate markets. In each table, the first
two columns give parameters (; T ), while columns 4 to 7 in the second row
indicate the load factors of the problem instances. For each problem instance,
we report three statistics: the gap between the upper bound by UPB and the
expected revenue achieved byMXD policy denoted by “UPB vs. MXD”; the gap
between the expected revenue achieved by MXD policy and FP policy denoted
by “MXD vs. FP”; and the gap between the expected revenue achieved byMXD
policy and FBD policy denoted by “MXD vs. FBD”. All the gaps are reported as
a percentage. For each pair, a positive gap means that the revenue achieved by
the former policy (or bound) is larger than that achieved by the latter policy. We
also report the average gaps across each row and column of the table.
From Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 we can make several observations. First of all,
among the three policies, MXD outperforms FP and FBD in every problem in-
stance, while FBD achieves larger expected revenue than FP in every instance.
On average, MXD offers 5:98% improvement over FP policy in expected rev-
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Table 4.1: Revenue gaps for problem instances with 2 separate markets.
n=2 load factor l
 T Measures 1.50 2.00 2.67 3.43 Average
(0.6, 0.6) 80
UPB vs. MXD 7.39% 7.92% 8.36% 8.34% 8.00%
MXD vs. FP 2.63% 4.25% 6.77% 9.84% 5.87%
MXD vs. FBD 0.63% 0.68% 0.45% 0.51% 0.57%
(0.6, 0.6) 160
UPB vs. MXD 4.26% 4.51% 4.58% 4.62% 4.49%
MXD vs. FP 2.62% 3.76% 5.40% 7.15% 4.73%
MXD vs. FBD 0.68% 0.67% 0.61% 0.53% 0.62%
(0.6, 0.6) 240
UPB vs. MXD 3.16% 3.36% 3.38% 3.33% 3.31%
MXD vs. FP 2.38% 3.26% 4.58% 6.02% 4.06%
MXD vs. FBD 0.50% 0.44% 0.39% 0.37% 0.43%
(0.8, 0.4) 80
UPB vs. MXD 8.32% 8.80% 9.81% 8.29% 8.81%
MXD vs. FP 3.15% 4.91% 8.52% 9.57% 6.54%
MXD vs. FBD 0.37% 0.60% 0.69% 0.49% 0.54%
(0.8, 0.4) 160
UPB vs. MXD 4.61% 4.82% 5.24% 5.14% 4.95%
MXD vs. FP 2.87% 3.99% 6.28% 8.28% 5.36%
MXD vs. FBD 0.44% 0.45% 0.59% 0.65% 0.53%
(0.8, 0.4) 240
UPB vs. MXD 3.54% 3.64% 3.71% 3.62% 3.63%
MXD vs. FP 2.64% 3.64% 5.19% 6.64% 4.53%
MXD vs. FBD 0.27% 0.31% 0.34% 0.35% 0.32%
(1, 0.2) 80
UPB vs. MXD 8.10% 9.50% 10.10% 9.59% 9.32%
MXD vs. FP 3.16% 5.35% 8.62% 11.28% 7.10%
MXD vs. FBD 0.12% 0.30% 0.53% 0.58% 0.38%
(1, 0.2) 160
UPB vs. MXD 4.85% 5.18% 4.78% 5.87% 5.17%
MXD vs. FP 3.14% 4.36% 5.65% 9.36% 5.63%
MXD vs. FBD 0.28% 0.27% 0.23% 0.47% 0.31%
(1, 0.2) 240
UPB vs. MXD 3.66% 3.71% 3.77% 3.87% 3.75%
MXD vs. FP 2.86% 3.71% 5.35% 7.03% 4.74%
MXD vs. FBD 0.16% 0.13% 0.21% 0.18% 0.17%
Average
UPB vs. MXD 5.32% 5.72% 5.97% 5.85% 5.71%
MXD vs. FP 2.83% 4.14% 6.26% 8.35% 5.39%
MXD vs. FBD 0.38% 0.43% 0.45% 0.46% 0.43%
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enue, while the maximum improvement is as high as 14:56%. The improvement
of MXD over FBD is marginal at 0:63% on average.
Second, for fixed  and load factor, when T increases from 80 to 160 and
then to 240, both “UPB vs. MXD” and “MXD vs. FP” decrease monotonically. In
other words, as T increases, the gap between the deterministic upper bound and
the revenue of MXD policy decreases; the gap between the expected revenue of
MXD and FP also decreases. This is consistent with the asymptotic optimality
result of FP and FBD policy in Section 4.4.3. Note that since MXD outperforms
both FP and FBD uniformly, we conjecture that MXD policy is also asymptoti-
cally optimal, although we are not able to show this conjecture rigourously.
Third, for fixed T and , the gap between the revenues of MXD and FP
policy increases monotonically when the load factor increases. This observation
makes intuitive sense: when the capacity becomes much tighter in the system,
it becomes more important to respond to the fluctuation of the demand process.
FP policy does not respond to demand fluctuation since fixed prices are offered
no matter what. MXD is able to respond to demand fluctuation since for any
market, the price offered by MXD at any time period depends on the remaining
capacity at that time period. FBD stands somewhere in between FP and MXD
since it only responds to demand fluctuation in the picked market.
Fourth, for fixed T and load factor, when the markets become more different
with each other with respect to price sensitivities, the gap between the expected
revenues of MXD and FP has an increasing trend. In other words, when the
markets are more different with each other, the benefit of using MXD policy is
more significant.
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Table 4.2: Revenue gaps for problem instances with 5 separate markets.
n=5 load factor l
 T Measures 1.50 2.00 2.67 3.43 Average
(0.6,0.6,0.6,0.6,0.6) 80
UPB vs. MXD 10.80% 11.82% 12.12% 12.65% 11.85%
MXD vs. FP 2.76% 5.50% 9.52% 14.56% 8.08%
MXD vs. FBD 0.81% 0.84% 1.10% 0.97% 0.93%
(0.6,0.6,0.6,0.6,0.6) 160
UPB vs. MXD 5.77% 6.28% 6.67% 6.72% 6.36%
MXD vs. FP 2.88% 4.44% 6.86% 9.59% 5.94%
MXD vs. FBD 1.05% 0.93% 0.74% 0.76% 0.87%
(0.6,0.6,0.6,0.6,0.6) 240
UPB vs. MXD 4.08% 4.40% 4.66% 4.69% 4.46%
MXD vs. FP 2.52% 3.72% 5.48% 7.50% 4.80%
MXD vs. FBD 0.77% 0.67% 0.49% 0.42% 0.59%
(0.8,0.7,0.6,0.5,0.4) 80
UPB vs. MXD 11.46% 11.99% 12.93% 12.55% 12.23%
MXD vs. FP 3.16% 5.69% 10.34% 14.50% 8.42%
MXD vs. FBD 0.86% 0.91% 1.15% 1.03% 0.99%
(0.8,0.7,0.6,0.5,0.4) 160
UPB vs. MXD 6.32% 6.97% 6.56% 6.67% 6.63%
MXD vs. FP 3.13% 5.02% 6.67% 9.43% 6.06%
MXD vs. FBD 1.08% 1.03% 0.70% 0.70% 0.88%
(0.8,0.7,0.6,0.5,0.4) 240
UPB vs. MXD 4.40% 5.04% 5.06% 4.75% 4.81%
MXD vs. FP 2.69% 4.34% 6.30% 7.74% 5.27%
MXD vs. FBD 0.69% 0.75% 0.67% 0.49% 0.65%
(1,0.8,0.6,0.4,0.2) 80
UPB vs. MXD 13.27% 12.59% 12.18% 12.47% 12.63%
MXD vs. FP 4.02% 6.03% 9.48% 14.28% 8.45%
MXD vs. FBD 1.02% 0.91% 1.00% 0.93% 0.97%
(1,0.8,0.6,0.4,0.2) 160
UPB vs. MXD 6.96% 7.34% 6.85% 7.25% 7.10%
MXD vs. FP 3.41% 5.15% 7.18% 10.72% 6.62%
MXD vs. FBD 1.06% 0.88% 0.71% 0.85% 0.87%
(1,0.8,0.6,0.4,0.2) 240
UPB vs. MXD 4.99% 5.41% 4.92% 4.97% 5.07%
MXD vs. FP 3.02% 4.66% 6.05% 8.27% 5.50%
MXD vs. FBD 0.81% 0.76% 0.55% 0.55% 0.67%
Average
UPB vs. MXD 7.56% 7.98% 7.99% 8.08% 7.90%
MXD vs. FP 3.06% 4.95% 7.54% 10.73% 6.57%
MXD vs. FBD 0.90% 0.85% 0.79% 0.74% 0.82%
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Finally, if we compare Table 4.1 and 4.2, we observe that the gaps between
the expected revenues of MXD and FP with 5 markets are uniformly larger than
that with 2 markets. In particular, for problem instances with 2 markets, MXD
offers 5:39% improvement on average over FP policy, while it offers 6:57% im-
provement on average when there are 5 markets. Besides, while the gaps be-
tween expected revenues of MXD and FBD policy are small in the instances
shown, we do observe that as the number of markets increases, the benefit of
MXD policy over FBD policy becomes more significant. In particular, although
not shown in the tables, we make a note here that for problem instances with 11
markets, the gap between the revenues of MXD and FBD can be larger than 3%.
Overall, the benefit of MXD over FP and FBD is more significant when we have
more markets. This observation also make good intuitive sense, since MXD re-
sponds to demand fluctuations in everymarket, while FBD responds to demand
fluctuations in one market and FP does not respond to demand fluctuations at
all.
In summary, we observe that MXD policy is the best policy overall, and its
benefits are more significant when the load factor is large, the the total number
of markets is large, or different markets have drastic differences in their price
sensitivities.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study a problem where we sell a product in different
markets with different price sensitivities. A strategic decision is whether we
should adopt price discrimination by allocating capacity to different markets
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and charging different prices in different markets, or we should pool the mar-
kets together and charge a single price. If the former is chosen, we obtain total
pricing flexibility while lose capacity flexibility by committing certain number
of inventories to each market. If the latter is chosen, we lose pricing flexibility
since a common price needs to be offered, however, we have total capacity flexi-
bility since there is nomarket separation andwe can use any remaining capacity
to satisfy the demand from any of the markets.
Using consistent demand models, we characterize the region where the ben-
efit of pricing flexibility outweighs the cost of capacity flexibility. The character-
ization also motivates a hybrid model where we adopt pricing discrimination
at the early stage and switch to joint pricing towards the end of the selling hori-
zon. The optimal dynamic prices in the hybrid model are intractable to solve
due to the high dimensional state space. We develop heuristics based on sin-
gle dimensional approximation for each market, whose boundary condition is
based on a deterministic formulation. Computational experiments indicate that
the heuristics show significant improvements over the fixed price policy, espe-
cially in problem instances where the capacity is tight, the number of markets
is larger, or the price sensitivities of customers in different markets are more
dispersed.
There are a couple of questions which are worth further investigation. First
of all, as noted in Section 4.5.2, we use a modified version of (NLP5) to gen-
erate the capacity allocation vector, which is asymptotically optimal when the
capacity and number of time periods scale up linearly in the same rate. It is of
interest to see if V1(b) belongs to a class of discrete concave functions, in which
case tractable methods could be devised to find the optimal capacity allocation
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among the different markets. Second, the hybrid model is mainly characterized
by the deadline of separate pricing  . We treat  as a given parameter, while
it actually could be a decision variable that the seller can control. Due to the
intractability of the hybrid model given fixed  , we do not see a tractable ap-
proach to find the optimal value of  . However, it is an interesting problem to
develop some tractable approximations which involve  as a decision variable.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation we study three multi-dimensional problems in single-
resource revenue management. The main contributions of the work lie in de-
veloping tractable approximations to the original intractable formulations and
generating operationally appealing policies with good performance in theory
and practice.
Chapter 2 deals with a problem faced by a firm selling a product under lim-
ited information about the probabilities of different failure types. The goal is
to learn the failure probabilities as the sales take place and dynamically decide
whether it is profitable to continue or stop selling the product. Our approach
builds on a dynamic programming formulation with embedded optimal stop-
ping and learning features. This dynamic programming formulation has a high-
dimensional state variable, andwe proposed two approximationmethods to ad-
dress the computational difficulties due to the high-dimensional state variable.
The first approximation method focuses on each failure type individually and
solves a sequence of dynamic programs with scalar state variables. The second
approximation method is based on a deterministic formulation that ignores the
benefits from learning the failure probabilities. The two approximationmethods
are complementary to each other in the sense that while the first approximation
method provides upper bounds on the value functions, the second one provides
lower bounds.
This problem opens up several possible directions for future research. First,
our model in Chapter 2 assumes that the failure probabilities are unknown con-
stants, but it is conceivable that the failure probabilities may depend on age or
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usage of a unit. It is of interests to extend the model to age-dependent failure
probabilities. Second, our beta-binomial learning model assumes that different
types of failures occur independently of each other, while Dirichlet-multinomial
model ensures that each product can fail from one failure at a time, inducing
negative correlations between numbers of failures of different types. In reality,
there may be general correlations among the probabilities of different failure
types and one may desire to adopt other learning models that allow general
correlations. In order to continue future research in this direction, more the-
ory on multi-dimensional stochastic orders is needed. Third, it is worthwhile
to investigate the possibility that it may be better for the company not to serve
all of the demand in a time period. By rationing supply in the early time peri-
ods, the company may be able to learn about the reliability of the product while
controlling the risk of facing too many returns.
In Chapter 3, we study the pricing and capacity allocation problem in a dual
channel hotel revenue management setting, where a fixed price is used in a
conference market and dynamic pricing can be employed in a spot market. The
two markets join together after a predetermined deadline. The decision maker
needs to allocate the capacity between the two markets and fix the price in the
conference market at the beginning of the selling horizon.
For the operational problem of making the pricing decisions in the spot mar-
ket, we construct a single dimensional approximation to the exact two dimen-
sional dynamic programming formulation. The idea is to modify the bound-
ary condition of a classical single dimensional dynamic pricing recursion to in-
corporate the possible joining capacity from the conference market at a future
time. The policy based on our single dimensional approximation is not only
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appealing from an operational perspective, it also shows robust performance in
numerical experiments with respect to load factor and higher level tactical de-
cisions. At the tactical level, based on a deterministic formulation of a relaxed
problem, we develop a heuristic to make decisions on conference market pric-
ing and capacity allocation simultaneously. The mixed policy by combining the
tactical level heuristic and the operational level pricing policy based on single
dimensional approximation is asymptotically optimal, and it shows satisfactory
performance in numerical experiments.
There are a couple of directions to enrich the model. First, while we focus
on the problem with single night stay, it is a natural extension to consider the
problem with multiple nights stay. The multiple nights stay problem is signif-
icantly more complicated and usually studied through heuristics. Our mixed
policy may prove useful in designing good heuristics. Second, in this chapter,
we assume that the conference market and the spot market are separated per-
fectly. In particular, the demand function in each market only depends on the
price offered in its own market, and all future conference market demands are
lost once the reserved rooms for the conference are fully booked. It is of interest
to relax this assumption to model the possibility that conference customers can
still make bookings in the spot market.
In Chapter 4, we study a problem where we sell a product to different mar-
kets with heterogeneous price sensitivities. A strategic decision is whether we
should adopt price discrimination by allocating capacity to different markets
and charging different prices in different markets, in which case we gain pricing
flexibility, or we should merge all markets and all capacities together, in which
case we obtain capacity flexibility. We characterize the region where the benefit
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of pricing flexibility outweighs the benefit of capacity flexibility. For a hybrid
model where we adopt price discrimination at the early stage and switch to joint
pricing towards the end of the selling horizon, we develop tractable approxima-
tions based on a single-dimensional approximation for each market. Computa-
tional experiments indicate that the policy based on our single-dimensional ap-
proximation shows significant improvement over the fixed price policy based
on a deterministic approximation, especially when the capacity is tight, the
number of markets is large, or the price sensitivities of customers in different
markets are more dispersed.
There are a couple questions which are worth further investigation. First, in
Chapter 4 we were not able to show structural properties of the value function.
It is of interest to see if V1(b) belongs to a class of discrete concave functions,
in which case tractable methods could be devised to find the optimal capacity
allocation vector b among the different markets. Second, the hybrid model is
mainly characterized by the deadline  . In Chapter 4 we treat  as a given pa-
rameter, while it actually could be a decision variable that the seller can control.
It is interesting to develop a model that involves  as a decision variable.
128
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Simplification of the Cost Function
In this section, we show that Ct(t) St(t) + St+1(t) = K
Pn
i=1 ci itDt. To see
that this identity holds, we use the definitions of Ct() and St() to obtain
Ct(t)  St(t) + St+1(t)
=
nX
i=1
tX
s=0
1(t  s < K)Ds ci  
nX
i=1
1X
`=t
t 1X
s=0
ci 1(`  s < K)Ds it
+
nX
i=1
1X
`=t+1
tX
s=0
ci 1(`  s < K)Ds it
=
nX
i=1
1X
`=t
tX
s=0
ci 1(`  s < K)Ds it  
nX
i=1
1X
`=t
t 1X
s=0
ci 1(`  s < K)Ds it
=
nX
i=1
1X
`=t
ci 1(`  t < K)Dt it = K
nX
i=1
ci itDt;
where the first equality uses the fact thatWt =
Pt
s=0 1(t  s < K)Ds.
A.2 Proofs of Structural Properties
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2. Using the notation defined after Lemma 2.4.1, the ran-
dom variable Yit(it) can be written as Binomial(Wt;Beta(itMt; (1  it)Mt)). In
this case, by using the second part of Lemma 2.4.1 and the discussion that fol-
lows this lemma, we observe that the family of random variables fYit(it) : it 2
[0; 1]g is stochastically increasing and stochastically convex. Thus, the first part
of Lemma 2.4.1 implies that ft it + 1 tWt Yit(it) : it 2 [0; 1]g is a stochastically
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increasing and stochastically convex family of random variables. We are now
ready to show the desired result by using induction over the time periods. The
result trivially holds at time period  +1. Assuming that the result holds at time
period t+ 1, we write the expectation on the right side of (2.2) as
EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g
= EfEfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t)) jYjt(jt) for all j 2 f1; : : : ; ng n figgg:
Since Vt+1(t+1) is decreasing and convex in i;t+1 by the induction argument and
the family of random variables ft it+ 1 tWt Yit(it) : it 2 [0; 1]g is stochastically
increasing and stochastically convex, it follows that
EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t)) jYjt(jt) for all j 2 f1; : : : ; ng n figg
is a decreasing and convex function of it for any realization of the random
variables Yjt(jt) for j 2 f1; : : : ; ng n fig. Noting that fYit(it) : i = 1; : : : ; ng
are independent of each other, taking expectation in the expression above, we
get that EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g is a decreasing and convex function of it.
Therefore, since (r   KcTt)Dt is a decreasing and linear function of it, (r  
KcTt)Dt + EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g is decreasing and convex in it. Noting
that the pointwise maximum of two decreasing and convex functions is also
decreasing and convex, the optimality equation in (2.2) implies that Vt(t) is
decreasing and convex in it.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.4. Since it is optimal to continue at time period twhen the
state of the system is t, it must be the case that (r  KcTt)Dt + EfVt+1(t t +
1 t
Wt
Yt(t))g > 0. If no units fail at time period t, then the state at time period t+
1 is t+1 = t t. To obtain a contradiction, we assume that (r KcTt+1)Dt+1+
EfVt+2(t+1 t+1 + 1 t+1Wt+1 Yt+1(t+1))g  0 so that it is optimal to stop at time
130
period t + 1 when the state is t+1 = t t. The last inequality implies that (r  
KcTt+1)Dt+1  0 since we have Vt()  0 for all t = 1; : : : ;  by the optimality
equation in (2.2). In this case, we have
0 < (r KcTt)Dt+EfVt+1(t t+ 1 tWt Yt(t))g  (r KcTt)Dt+EfVt+1(t t)g
= (r  KcTt)Dt  (r  Kt cTt)Dt = (r  KcTt+1)Dt  0;
which is a contradiction and this completes the proof. The second inequality in
the chain of inequalities above follows by noting that t t  t t + 1 tWt Yt(t)
and using the fact that the value functions are decreasing by Proposition 2.4.2.
The first equality follows from the fact that Vt+1(t t) = 0 since we assume that
it is optimal to stop at time period t+ 1when the state is t t.
A.3 Simplifying the Computation of Expectations Involving
Beta-Binomial Random Variables
In this section, we show that by replacing the beta-binomial random variable
Yit(it) in the optimality equation (2.2) with a binomial random variable Zit(it)
with parameters (Wt; it), we obtain lower bounds on the value functions. Using
the vector Zt(t) = (Z1t(1t); : : : ; Znt(nt)), we consider the optimality equation
Vt(t) = max
n
(r  KcTt)Dt + Ef Vt+1(t t + 1 tWt Zt(t))g; 0
o
; (A.1)
with the boundary condition V+1() = 0, and the expectation is computed with
respect to the binomial random variable Zt(t). The main result of this section
is the following proposition, which shows that the value function Vt() provides
a lower bound on the original value function.
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Proposition A.3.1. For all t = 1; : : : ;  and t 2 [0; 1]n, we have Vt(t)  Vt(t).
The proof of the above result makes use of the following general form of
Jensen’s inequality for componentwise convex functions.
Lemma A.3.2. If g() : <n ! < is a componentwise convex function and X =
(X1; : : : ; Xn) is a random variable taking values in <n with independent components,
then Efg(X)g  g(EfXg).
Proof. We prove the result by induction on n. When n = 1, we have a scalar
convex function and the result trivially holds by the standard form of Jensen’s
inequality. Assuming that the result holds when we deal with functions that
map <n 1 to <, we have
Efg((X1; : : : ; Xn))g = EfEfg((X1; : : : ; Xn 1; Xn)) jX1; : : : ; Xn 1gg:
Since g() is componentwise convex, g((X1; : : : ; Xn 1; Xn)) is a convex func-
tion of Xn and applying Jensen’s inequality on the scalar convex function
g(X1; : : : ; Xn 1; ), we obtain
Efg((X1; : : : ; Xn 1; Xn)) jX1; : : : ; Xn 1g  g((X1; : : : ; Xn 1;EfXng));
where we use the fact that the distribution of Xn conditional on X1; : : : ; Xn 1 is
the same as the unconditional distribution of Xn. Viewing g(; : : : ; ;EfXng) on
the right side of the inequality above as a function that maps <n 1 to <, by the
induction assumption, we have
Efg((X1; : : : ; Xn 1;EfXng))g  g((EfX1g; : : : ;EfXn 1g;EfXng));
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so that we obtain
Efg(X)g = EfEfg((X1; : : : ; Xn 1; Xn)) jX1; : : : ; Xn 1gg
 Efg((X1; : : : ; Xn 1;EfXng))g
 g((EfX1g; : : : ;EfXn 1g;EfXng)) = g(EfXg):
Proof of Proposition A.3.1. We show the result by using induction over the time
periods. The result trivially holds at time period  +1. Assuming that the result
holds at time period t+ 1, we have
EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g = EfEfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t)) jPt(t)gg
= EfGt+1(Pt(t))g; (A.2)
where we use the vector Pt(t) = (P1t(1t); : : : ; Pnt(nt)) and define the function
Gt+1() : [0; 1]n ! < as Gt+1(p) = EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t)) jPt(t) = pg. Con-
ditional on Pit(it) = pi, the random variable Yit(it) has a binomial distribution
with parameters (Wt; pi). Therefore, noting that the family of random variables
fBinomial(Wt; pi) : pi 2 [0; 1]g is stochastically convex and Vt+1() is component-
wise convex by Proposition 2.4.2, Gt+1(p) = EfVt+1(t t+ 1 tWt Yt(t)) jPt(t) =
pg is componentwise convex in p. In this case, Jensen’s inequality in Lemma
A.3.2 implies that EfGt+1(Pt(t))g  Gt+1(EfPt(t)g) = Gt+1(t) and we con-
tinue the chain of equalities in (A.2) as
EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g
Gt+1(t) = EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t)) jPt(t) = tg
=EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Zt(t))g  Ef Vt+1(t t + 1 tWt Zt(t))g;
133
where the second equality follows from the fact that conditional on Pt(t) = t,
the random variable Yt(t) has the same distribution as Zt(t) and the sec-
ond inequality follows from the induction assumption. Therefore, we have
EfVt+1(t t + 1 tWt Yt(t))g  Ef Vt+1(t t + 1 tWt Zt(t))g and noting the op-
timality equations in (2.2) and (A.1), it follows that Vt(t)  Vt(t).
A.4 Convexity of the Upper Bound
In this section, we establish that V Uit (it j) is a convex function of  and show
how to compute a subgradient of V Uit (it j)with respect to . We begin by using
induction over the time periods to show that V Uit (it j) is a convex function of .
The result trivially holds at time period  + 1. Assuming that the result holds at
time period t+1, it follows that V Ui;t+1(t it+
1 t
Wt
Yit(it) j) is a convex function
of  for every realization of Yit(it). Therefore, (i Kci it)Dt+EfV Ui;t+1(t it+
1 t
Wt
Yit(it) j)g is a convex function of . Since the pointwise maximum of two
convex functions is also convex, (2.3) implies that V Uit (it j) is a convex function
of .
We need to define some new notation to compute the subgradient of
V Uit (it j) with respect to . We let 1it( j) : [0; 1] ! f0; 1g be the decision
function at time period t that we obtain by solving the optimality equation in
(2.3). Then we have 1it(it j) = 1 whenever (i  Kci it)Dt + EfV Ui;t+1(t it +
1 t
Wt
Yit(it) j)g > 0 and 1it(it j) = 0 otherwise. In the optimality equation in
(2.3), if we start with state it at time period t and use it(it j) to denote the
total expected demand that we observe until we stop selling the product, then
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it(it j) satisfies the recursion
it(it j) = 1it(it j)
n
Dt + Efi;t+1(t it + 1 tWt Yit(it) j)g
o
; (A.3)
with the boundary condition i;+1( j) = 0. In the rest of this section, we use
induction over the time periods to show that V Uit (it j ) satisfies the subgradient
inequality
V Uit (it j ^)  V Uit (it j) + it(it j) [^i   i]; (A.4)
which implies that it(it j) is a subgradient of V Uit (it j) with respect to . If
we start with state it at time period t and follow the decision function 1is( j) at
time periods s = t; t+1; : : : ;  , thenit(it j) corresponds to the total expected
demand that we observe until we stop selling the product. Therefore, we can
use Monte Carlo simulation to estimate it(it j). Alternatively, noting that
the random variable Yit(it) has a finite number of realizations, we can compute
it(it j) by computing is( j) for a finite number of values at time periods
s = t+ 1; t+ 2; : : : ;  .
The subgradient inequality in (A.4) trivially holds at time period  + 1. As-
suming that this subgradient inequality holds at time period t+ 1, we write the
optimality equation in (2.3) as
V Uit (it j) = 1it(it j)
n
(i  Kci it)Dt + EfV Ui;t+1(t it + 1 tWt Yit(it) j)g
o
:
On the other hand, since we have 1it(it j) 2 f0; 1g, if we solve the optimality
equation in (2.3) after replacing  with ^, then the value function V Uit (it j ^)
satisfies
V Uit (it j ^)  1it(it j)
n
(^i  Kci it)Dt + EfV Ui;t+1(t it + 1 tWt Yit(it) j ^)g
o
:
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Subtracting the last equality from the last inequality side by side, we obtain
V Uit (it j ^)  V Uit (it j) + 1it(it j)
n
Dt [^i   i]
+ EfV Ui;t+1(t it + 1 tWt Yit(it) j ^)g   EfV Ui;t+1(t it + 1 tWt Yit(it) j)g
o
: (A.5)
The induction assumption implies that
EfV Ui;t+1(t it + 1 tWt Yit(it) j ^)g   EfV Ui;t+1(t it + 1 tWt Yit(it) j)g
 Efi;t+1(t it + 1 tWt Yit(it) j)g [^i   i]; (A.6)
in which case, the subgradient inequality in (A.4) follows by using (A.6) and
(A.3) in (A.5).
A.5 Closed Form Expression for the Lower Bound
In this section, we use induction over the time periods to show that the value
functions computed through the optimality equation in (2.5) are given by the
closed form expression in (2.6). The result trivially holds at time period  + 1.
Assuming that the result holds at time period t + 1, the optimality equation in
(2.5) implies that
V Lt (t) = max
n
(r  KcTt)Dt + [r  KcTt]+
X
s=t+1
Ds; 0
o
= [r  KcTt]+
X
s=t
Ds;
where the second equality follows by noting that the max operator returns a
nonzero value if and only if r  KcTt > 0.
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A.6 Shrinking Ct(m) as a Function ofm
In this section, our ultimate goal is to give a proof for Proposition 2.6.2. This
proof requires establishing results for stochastic convex orders that do not ap-
pear in the earlier literature and we begin this section with two new results for
stochastic convex orders. For two random variables X and Y , we say that X
is greater than or equal to Y in stochastic convex order whenever Ef(Y )g 
Ef(X)g for any convex function () : < ! <. We denote this stochastic con-
vex order between X and Y by using Y cx X . The following two lemmas
show convex orders for the families of random variables fBinomial(W; )=W :
W = 1; 2; : : :g and fBinomial(mW;Beta(mM; (1   )mM))=mW : m = 1; 2; : : :g
for any fixed  2 [0; 1]. These lemmas are useful for proving Proposition 2.6.2,
but they may also have independent interest.
Lemma A.6.1. For any fixed  2 [0; 1], letting X(W ) = Binomial(W; )=W , we have
X(W + 1) cx X(W ).
Proof. Throughout the proof, we use =st to denote equality in distribution. By
Theorem 3.A.4 in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007), it suffices to construct a
pair of random variables X^(W + 1) and X^(W ) such that X^(W + 1) =st X(W +
1); X^(W ) =st X(W ) and fX^(W + 1); X^(W )g is a martingale.
We let X^(W + 1) = X(W + 1) = Binomial(W + 1; )=(W + 1), in which case,
X^(W +1) takes values in the set f0; 1=(W +1); : : : ;W=(W +1); 1g. We construct
X^(W ) in the followingway. If X^(W+1) = 0 or 1, then we set X^(W ) = X^(W+1).
If, on the other hand, X^(W + 1) = j=(W + 1) for some j = 1; : : : ;W , then we
set X^(W ) = (j   1)=W with probability j=W j=(W+1)
1=W
and X^(W ) = j=W with
probability j=(W+1) (j 1)=W
1=W
. One can check that these probabilities add up to
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one.
We proceed to show X^(W ) =st X(W ). To see this equivalence in distribu-
tion, we note that
PfX^(W ) = 0g
=PfX^(W ) = 0 j X^(W + 1) = 0gPfX^(W + 1) = 0g
+ PfX^(W ) = 0 j X^(W + 1) = 1=(W + 1)gPfX^(W + 1) = 1=(W + 1)g
=1

W + 1
0

(1  )W+1 + 1=W   1=(W + 1)
1=W

W + 1
1

 (1  )W
=(1  )W+1 + 1
W + 1
(W + 1)  (1  )W = (1  )W :
Similarly, we can show that PfX^(W ) = 1g = W . On the other hand, for j =
1; : : : ;W   1, the definition of X^(W ) implies that
PfX^(W ) = j
W
g = PfX^(W ) = j
W
j X^(W + 1) = j
W+1
gPfX^(W + 1) = j
W+1
g
+ PfX^(W ) = j
W
j X^(W + 1) = j+1
W+1
gPfX^(W + 1) = j+1
W+1
g
=
j=(W + 1)  (j   1)=W
1=W

W + 1
j

j (1  )W+1 j
+
(j + 1)=W   (j + 1)=(W + 1)
1=W

W + 1
j + 1

j+1 (1  )W j
=
W   j + 1
W + 1

(W + 1)W : : : (W   j + 2)
j!

j (1  )W+1 j
+
j + 1
W + 1

(W + 1)W : : : (W   j + 1)
(j + 1)j!

j+1 (1  )W j
=

W
j

j (1  )W j (1   + ) =

W
j

j (1  )W j:
Therefore, we have X^(W ) =st Binomial(W; )=W =st X(W ).
It remains to show that fX^(W+1); X^(W )g is a martingale. Correspondingly,
if X^(W + 1) = 0 or 1, then we naturally have EfX^(W )jX^(W + 1)g = X^(W + 1)
and the martingale equality holds. If, on the other hand, X^(W +1) = j=(W +1)
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for some j = 1; : : : ;W , then we have
EfX^(W )jX^(W + 1)g
=
j   1
W

j=W   j=(W + 1)
1=W

+
j
W

j=(W + 1)  (j   1)=W
1=W

=
j
W + 1
= X^(W + 1):
Therefore, fX^(W + 1); X^(W )g is indeed a martingale.
Corollary A.6.2. For any fixed  2 [0; 1], let X(m) = Ym()
mW
, where Y m() =
Binomial(mW;Pm()) and Pm() = Beta(mM; (1   )mM), then it holds that
X(m+ 1) cx X(m) for allm = 1; 2; : : :.
Proof. The result follows by noting that for any convex function () : < ! <,
we have
E
n

Y m()
mW
o
= E
n

Binomial(mW;Pm())
mW
o
 E
n

Binomial(mW;Pm+1())
mW
o
 E
n

Binomial((m+ 1)W;Pm+1())
(m+ 1)W
o
= E
n

 Y m+1()
(m+ 1)W
o
: (A.7)
To see that the first inequality holds, for p 2 [0; 1], we let g(p) =
E
n


Ym()
mW

jPm() = p
o
so that the expression on the left side of the first in-
equality can be written as Efg(Pm())g. Therefore, the first inequality can be
written as Efg(Pm())g  Efg(Pm+1())g. To see that this last inequality holds,
conditional on Pm() = p, Y m() has a binomial distribution with parameters
(mW; p). Due to stochastic convexity of the binomial family fBinomial(mW; p) :
p 2 [0; 1]g, we get that g() is also a convex function. In this case, the first in-
equality in (A.7) follows from the monotone convergence property of the beta
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operator under convex functions shown by Adell, Badia, de la Cal, and Plo
(1996). The second inequality in (A.7) follows by conditioning on Pm+1() and
applying the above lemmaW times.
Proof of Proposition 2.6.2. The proposition states that if t 2 Ct(m + 1), then we
have t 2 Ct(m). Noting the definition of Ct(m), it suffices to show that
1
m
Vt(t jm)  1
m+ 1
Vt(t jm+ 1)
for all t = 1; : : : ;  and t 2 [0; 1]n. We show this inequality by using induction
over the time periods. The result trivially holds at time period  + 1. Assuming
that the result holds at time period t+ 1, we have
1
m
EfVt+1(t t + 1 tmWt Y mt (t) jm)g
 1
m+ 1
EfVt+1(t t + 1 tmWt Y mt (t) jm+ 1)g
 1
m+ 1
EfVt+1(t t + 1 t(m+1)Wt Y m+1t (t) jm+ 1)g: (A.8)
The first inequality above follows from the induction assumption. To see that
the second inequality holds, we note that Vt+1( jm+1) is a componentwise con-
vex function by Proposition 2.4.2, in which case, we can apply Corollary A.6.2
component by component n times. To obtain the final result in the statement of
Proposition 2.6.2, we observe that
1
m
Vt(t jm) = max
n
(r  KcTt)Dt + 1
m
EfVt+1(t t + 1 tmWt Y mt (t) jm)g; 0
o
 max
n
(r  KcTt)Dt + 1
m+ 1
EfVt+1(t t + 1 t(m+1)Wt Y m+1t (t) jm+ 1)g; 0
o
=
1
m+ 1
Vt(t jm+ 1);
where the two equalities follow from the optimality equation in (2.2) and the
inequality uses (A.8).
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 2.6.3
In this section, we give a proof for Proposition 2.6.3, which says that Vt(t jm)
deviates from V Lt (t jm) by a term that grows in the order of
p
m.
Proof. Since Proposition 2.6.1 shows the first inequality, we only focus on the
second inequality. The proof uses induction over the time periods to show that
Vt(t jm)  V Lt (t jm) + Gt(t)
p
m, where Gt(t) is a componentwise concave
function of t, which does not depend on m. The result trivially holds at time
period  + 1. Assuming that the result holds at time period t + 1, we define
the random variablemt+1(t) asmt+1(t) = t t +
1 t
mWt
Y mt (t). In this case, we
obtain
EfVt+1(mt+1(t) jm)g  EfV Lt+1(mt+1(t) jm)g+ EfGt+1(mt+1(t))g
p
m
 EfV Lt+1(mt+1(t) jm)g+Gt+1(Efmt+1(t)g)
p
m
= Ef[r  KcTmt+1(t)]+g
X
s=t+1
mDs +Gt+1(t)
p
m;
(A.9)
where the first inequality follows from the induction assumption, the second
inequality follows by noting that Gt+1() is a componentwise concave func-
tion and using the general form of Jensen’s inequality for componentwise con-
vex functions that we derive in Appendix A.3 and the last equality follows by
using the closed form expression for V Lt+1( jm) given in (2.6) and noting that
Efmt+1(t)g = t.
We proceed to bound the expectation Ef[r KcTmt+1(t)]+g on the right side
of (A.9). The variance of the random variable KcTmt+1(t) can be bounded by
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noting that
Var(KcTmt+1(t))
= K2
nX
i=1
c2i Var(
m
i;t+1(it)) = K
2 (1  t)2
m2W 2t
nX
i=1
c2i Var(Y
m
it (it)) (A.10)
= K2
(1  t)2
m2W 2t
nX
i=1
c2i
mWt (mMt it)mMt (1  it)(mMt +mWt)
(mMt)2 (mMt + 1)
 K2 (1  t)
2(Mt +Wt)
mWtMt
nX
i=1
c2i it (1  it);
where the first equality follows because components of mt+1(t) are indepen-
dent, the third equality uses the fact that Y mit (it) is a beta-binomial random
variable with parameters (mWt; Pmit (it)) and Pmit (it) is a beta random variable
with parameters (itmMt; (1   it)mMt), and the inequality follows simply by
noting that mMt + 1  mMt. For a deterministic scalar z and a real-valued ran-
dom variable Z with finite mean  and finite variance 2, Gallego (1992) shows
that Ef[z  Z]+g  [p2 + (z   )2 + (z   )]=2  [z   ]+ + =2. Therefore, we
can bound the expectation Ef[r  KcTmt+1(t)]+g by
Ef[r  KcTmt+1(t)]+g
 [r  KcTt]+ + 1
2
vuutK2 (1  t)2(Mt +Wt)
mWtMt
nX
i=1
c2i it (1  it)
= [r  KcTt]+ + Lt(t)p
m
;
where we let Lt(t) =
K (1 t)
2
q
(Mt+Wt)
WtMt
Pn
i=1 c
2
i it (1  it). In this case, we can
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continue the chain of inequalities in (A.9) as
EfVt+1(mt+1(t) jm)g

h
[r  K cTt]+ + Lt(t)p
m
i X
s=t+1
mDs +Gt+1(t)
p
m
= [r  K cTt]+
X
s=t+1
mDs +
p
mLt(t)
X
s=t+1
Ds +Gt+1(t)
p
m:
= [r  K cTt]+
X
s=t+1
mDs +Gt(t)
p
m;
where we let Gt(t) = Lt(t)
P
s=t+1Ds +Gt+1(t). We note that Lt() is compo-
nentwise concave and since Gt+1() is componentwise concave by the induction
assumption, it follows that Gt() is also componentwise concave. To finish the
proof, we write the optimality equation in (2.2) as
Vt(t jm) = max
n
(r  KcTt)mDt + EfVt+1(mt+1(t) jm)g; 0
o
 [r  KcTt]+mDt + EfVt+1(mt+1(t) jm)g
 [r  KcTt]+mDt + [r  K cTt]+
X
s=t+1
mDs +Gt(t)
p
m
= V Lt (t jm) +Gt(t)
p
m;
where the first inequality follows by noting that [r  KcTt]+  r  KcTt and
Vt+1()  0 and the second equality follows by noting (2.6). This completes
the induction argument and we have Vt(t jm)  V Lt (t jm) + Gt(t)
p
m for all
t = 1; : : : ;  and t 2 [0; 1]n.
To obtain the result in the statement of the proposition, we let 1
2
=
(1
2
; : : : ; 1
2
) 2 <n and note that Lt(t)  Lt(12) for all t = 1; : : : ;  and t 2 [0; 1]n.
In this case, we obtain Gt(t)  Gt(12) and letting Gt = Gt(12) in the statement of
the proposition suffices.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3.1
In this section we provide proofs for Proposition 3.3.1.
Proof of (i). We show this result by induction over the time periods. The re-
sult trivially holds at time  + 1 since V+1(x; y) = 	+1(x + y), which is a
concave function. Assuming that the result holds at time period t + 1, define
f ij = arg max
dst2[0;1]
n
rs(dst)  dstxVt+1(x+ i; y + j)
o
; i; j 2 f0; 1; 2g, we have
xVt(x+ 2; y) xVt(x+ 1; y)
= Vt(x+ 2; y)  Vt(x+ 1; y)  Vt(x+ 1; y) + Vt(x; y)
= st[rs(f

20)  f 20xVt+1(x+ 2; y)] + ct[rc(dc) + dc Vt+1(x+ 2; y   1)]
+ (1  ct dc)Vt+1(x+ 2; y)
  fst[rs(f 10)  f 10xVt+1(x+ 1; y)] + ct[rc(dc) + dc Vt+1(x+ 1; y   1)]
+(1  ct dc)Vt+1(x+ 1; y)g
  fst[rs(f 10)  f 10xVt+1(x+ 1; y)] + ct[rc(dc) + dc Vt+1(x+ 1; y   1)]
+(1  ct dc)Vt+1(x+ 1; y)g
+ st[rs(f

00)  f 00xVt+1(x; y)] + ct[rc(dc) + dc Vt+1(x; y   1)]
+ (1  ct dc)Vt+1(x; y):
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By combining and rearranging terms, we can continue the equality as
xVt(x+ 2; y) xVt(x+ 1; y)
= st[rs(f

20)  f 20xVt+1(x+ 2; y)]  st[rs(f 10)  f 10xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]
  st[rs(f 10)  f 10xVt+1(x+ 1; y)] + st[rs(f 00)  f 00xVt+1(x; y)]
+ ct dc[xVt+1(x+ 2; y   1) xVt+1(x+ 1; y   1)]
+ (1  ct dc)[xVt+1(x+ 2; y) xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]:
Due to the definition of f 10, the above equation is upper bounded by
st[rs(f

20)  f 20xVt+1(x+ 2; y)]  st[rs(f 20)  f 20xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]
  st[rs(f 00)  f 00xVt+1(x+ 1; y)] + st[rs(f 00)  f 00xVt+1(x; y)]
+ ct dc[xVt+1(x+ 2; y   1) xVt+1(x+ 1; y   1)]
+ (1  ct dc)[xVt+1(x+ 2; y) xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]
=  st f 20[xVt+1(x+ 2; y) xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]
+ st f

00[xVt+1(x+ 1; y) xVt+1(x; y)]
+ (1  ct dc)[xVt+1(x+ 2; y) xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]
+ ct dc[xVt+1(x+ 2; y   1) xVt+1(x+ 1; y   1)]
 (1  ct dc   st f 20)[xVt+1(x+ 2; y) xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]  0:
The first inequality follows from the induction assumption, while the last in-
equality holds because (1 ct dc st f 20)  (1 ct st)  0 and the induction
assumption.
Proof of (ii). We use induction argument over time periods to show the result.
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At time period  + 1, we have
xV+1(x+ 1; y + 1) xV+1(x+ 1; y)
= V+1(x+ 1; y + 1)  V+1(x; y + 1)  V+1(x+ 1; y) + V+1(x; y)
= 	+1(x+ y + 2) 	+1(x+ y + 1) 	+1(x+ y + 1) + 	+1(x+ y)  0
due to the concavity of 	+1(). Assuming that the result holds at time period
t+ 1, we have
xVt(x+ 1; y + 1) xVt(x+ 1; y)
= Vt(x+ 1; y + 1)  Vt(x; y + 1)  Vt(x+ 1; y) + Vt(x; y)
= st[rs(f

11)  f 11xVt+1(x+ 1; y + 1)] + ct[rc(dc) + dc Vt+1(x+ 1; y)]
+ (1  ct dc)Vt+1(x+ 1; y + 1)
  fst[rs(f 01)  f 01xVt+1(x; y + 1)] + ct[rc(dc) + dc Vt+1(x; y)]
+(1  ct dc)Vt+1(x; y + 1)g
  fst[rs(f 10)  f 10xVt+1(x+ 1; y)] + ct[rc(dc) + dc Vt+1(x+ 1; y   1)]
+(1  ct dc)Vt+1(x+ 1; y)g
+ st[rs(f

00)  f 00xVt+1(x; y)] + ct[rc(dc) + dc Vt+1(x; y   1)]
+ (1  ct dc)Vt+1(x; y)
= st[rs(f

11)  f 11xVt+1(x+ 1; y + 1)]  st[rs(f 10)  f 10xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]
  st[rs(f 01)  f 01xVt+1(x; y + 1)] + st[rs(f 00)  f 00xVt+1(x; y)]
+ ct dc[xVt+1(x+ 1; y) xVt+1(x+ 1; y   1)]
+ (1  ct dc)[xVt+1(x+ 1; y + 1) xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]
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Due to the definition of f 10 and f 01, the above equation is upper bounded by
 st[rs(f 11)  f 11xVt+1(x+ 1; y + 1)]  st[rs(f 11)  f 11xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]
  st[rs(f 00)  f 00xVt+1(x; y + 1)] + st[rs(f 00)  f 00xVt+1(x; y)]
+ ct dc[xVt+1(x+ 1; y) xVt+1(x+ 1; y   1)]
+ (1  ct dc)[xVt+1(x+ 1; y + 1) xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]
=  st f 11[xVt+1(x+ 1; y + 1) xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]
+ st f

00[xVt+1(x; y + 1) xVt+1(x; y)]
+ (1  ct dc)[xVt+1(x+ 1; y + 1) xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]
+ ct dc[xVt+1(x+ 1; y) xVt+1(x+ 1; y   1)]
 (1  ct dc   st f 11)[xVt+1(x+ 1; y + 1) xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]  0;
The first inequality follows from the induction assumption, while the last in-
equality holds because (1 ct dc st f 11)  (1 ct st)  0 and the induction
assumption.
Proof of (iii).
xVt(x+ 1; y) xVt+1(x+ 1; y) = Vt(x+ 1; y)  Vt(x; y) xVt+1(x+ 1; y)
= st[rs(f

10)  f 10xVt+1(x+ 1; y)] + ct[rc(dc) + dc Vt+1(x+ 1; y   1)]
+ (1  ct dc)Vt+1(x+ 1; y)
  fst[rs(f 00)  f 00xVt+1(x; y)] + ct[rc(dc) + dc Vt+1(x; y   1)]
+(1  ct dc)Vt+1(x; y)g  xVt+1(x+ 1; y)
= st[rs(f

10)  f 10xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]  st[rs(f 00)  f 00xVt+1(x; y)]
+ ct dc[xVt+1(x+ 1; y   1) xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]
From Property (i) we havexVt+1(x; y)  xVt+1(x+1; y); from Property (ii) we
know xVt+1(x+ 1; y   1) xVt+1(x+ 1; y)  0, hence the above equation can
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be lower bounded by
 st[rs(f 10)  f 10xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]  st[rs(f 00)  f 00xVt+1(x+ 1; y)]
= st[rs(f

10)  rs(f 00) xVt+1(x+ 1; y)(f 10   f 00)]
= st[rs(f

10)  rs(f 00)  r0s(f 10) (f 10   f 00)]  0:
The last equality holds since f 10 is characterized by r0s(f 10) = xVt+1(x + 1; y).
The last inequality follows from the assumption that rs() is a concave function.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3.3
In this section we provide the proof for Proposition 3.3.3.
Proof. Let fd^st : t = 1; : : : g; fd^ft : t =  + 1; : : : ; Tg be a series of demand
rates offered in the spot and final market under optimal policy from (3.1), and
fp^st : t = 1; : : : g; fp^ft : t =  + 1; : : : ; Tg be the corresponding prices. Note
that all of them are random variables due to the randomness of real demands.
Let S^t = 1 if we sell one room at time period t in the spot market and S^t = 0
otherwise. For t = 1; : : : ;  , we have E(S^t j p^st) = E(S^t j d^st) = st d^st: Similarly,
for t =  + 1; : : : ; T , we have E(S^t j p^ft) = d^ft. Total revenue is composed of
three parts: revenue in the spot market from time period 1 to  , revenue in the
conference market from time period 1 to  and revenue in the spot market from
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time period  + 1 to T . Then we have
V1(C   b; b) =
X
t=1
E(S^t p^st) +
TX
t=+1
E(S^t p^ft) + pc Eminfb;Dcg
=
X
t=1
E(E(S^t j p^st) p^st) +
TX
t=+1
E(E(S^t j p^ft) p^ft) + pc Eminfb;Dcg
=
X
t=1
E(st d^st p^st) +
TX
t=+1
E( d^ft p^ft) + pc Eminfb;Dcg
=
X
t=1
stE(rs(d^st)) +
TX
t=+1
E(rf (d^ft)) + pc Eminfb;Dcg

X
t=1
st rs(E(d^st)) +
TX
t=+1
rf (E(d^ft)) + pc Eminfb;Dcg;
where the last inequality holds due to the concavity of rs() and rf (). Define
~dst = E(d^st); t = 1; : : : ;  , ~dft = E(d^ft); t =  + 1; : : : ; T , then the above inequality
can be written as
V1(C   b; b) 
X
t=1
st rs( ~dst) +
TX
t=+1
rf ( ~dft) + pc Eminfb;Dcg: (B.1)
Also for t = 1; : : : ;  , we have E(S^t) = E(st d^st) = st ~dst, and for t = +1; : : : ; T ,
we have E(S^t) = ~dft. Due to capacity constraint, we know
X
t=1
S^t  C   b;
X
t=1
S^t +
TX
t=+1
S^t  C   b+ (b Dc)+:
Taking expectation for both sides, we get
X
t=1
st ~dst  C   b;
X
t=1
st ~dst +
TX
t=+1
~dft  C   b+ E(b Dc)+:
Comparing above inequalities with constraints in (NLP1), we see that ~dst; t =
1; : : : ;  , ~dft; t =  + 1; : : : ; T is a feasible solution for (NLP1). The objective
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value is
P
t=1 strs(
~dst) +
PT
t=+1 rf (
~dft), which is no less than V1(C   b; b)  
pcEminfb;Dcg as shown in (B.1). Thus V1(C   b; b)  Z1 + pcEminfb;Dcg. The
inequality 1(C   b)  Z1 then follows immediately from Proposition 3.3.2.
B.3 Variance inequality
Lemma B.3.1. For a deterministic scalar z and a nonnegative real random variable Z
with finite mean  and variance 2, we have Varf(z   Z)+g  2.
Proof. From the definition of variance, we have
Varf(z   Z)+g = Ef[(z   Z)+]2g   [E(z   Z)+]2  Ef[(z   Z)+]2g   [(z   )+]2:
If z  , we can continue the chain of inequality as
Varf(z   Z)+g  Ef(z   Z)2g   (z   )2 = Var(z   Z) = Var(Z) = 2:
If z < , we can continue the chain of inequality as
Varf(z   Z)+g  Ef[(z   Z)+]2g =
Z z
0
(z   x)2 dFZ(x) 
Z z
0
(  x)2 dFZ(x)

Z 1
0
(  x)2 dFZ(x) = Var(Z) = 2:
B.4 Proof of Lemma 3.4.3
We provide a proof for Lemma 3.4.3 in this section.
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Proof. It suffices to show that the following equivalent result: For any b1 =
0; 1; : : : ; C   1 and  2 (0; 1),W (b1 + ) is a linear function of .
For the first two terms inW (b), letting b = b1 + , then C   b = (C   b1  1) +
(1  ), We have
Eminfb;Dc( dc)g = Eminfb1 + ;Dc( dc)g
=
b1X
k=0
k ProbfDc( dc) = kg+ (b1 + )ProbfDc( dc) > b1g;
and
EminfC   b;Ds( ds)g = Eminf(C   b1   1) + (1  ); Ds( ds)g
=
C b1 1X
k=0
k ProbfDs( ds) = kg+ (C   b1   )ProbfDs( ds) > C   b1   1g:
are both linear in . The third term
Eminf(b Dc( dc))+ + (C   b Ds( ds))+; Df ( df )g
=
1X
kc=0
1X
ks=0
ProbfDc( dc) = kcgProbfDs( ds) = ksg
 Eminf(b  kc)+ + (C   b  ks)+; Df ( df )g:
Letting h(kc; ks; b) = Eminf(b  kc)+ + (C   b  ks)+; Df ( df )g, it suffices to show
that for any kc; ks 2 Z0, h(kc; ks; b) is linear in . We show this by discussing
different cases.
(a) If b  kc and C   b  ks, then we have
h(kc; ks; b) = Eminfb kc+C b ks; Df ( df )g = EminfC kc ks; Df ( df )g;
which does not contain  terms.
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(b) If b  kc and C   b < ks, then we have
h(kc; ks; b) = Eminfb  kc; Df ( df )g = Eminf(b1   kc) + ;Df ( df )g;
which is a linear function of  according to similar arguments for the first
term inW (b).
(c) If b < kc and C   b  ks, then we have
h(kc; ks; b) = EminfC   b  ks; Df ( df )g
= Eminf(C   b1   ks   1) + (1  ); Df ( df )g;
which is a linear function of  according to similar arguments for the sec-
ond term inW (b).
(d) If b < kc and C   b < ks, then we have
h(kc; ks; b) = Eminf0; Df ( df )g = 0
Thus the result follows.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
C.1 Proof of Proposition 4.4.1
In this section we provide a proof for Proposition 4.4.1, which says that Z5 from
(NLP5) provides an upper bound for the optimal total expected revenue of the
stochastic hybrid model in Section 4.4.
Proof. Let fd^t : t = 1; : : : g; fd^ft : t =  + 1; : : : ; Tg be the demand rates offered
in the separate markets and joint market under optimal policy from (4.21), and
fp^t : t = 1; : : : g; fp^ft : t =  + 1; : : : ; Tg be the corresponding prices. Note that
all of them are random variables due to the randomness of real demands.
For t = 1; : : :  , let S^it = 1 if we sell one unit of product at time period t in
market i and S^it = 0 otherwise. Then we have E(S^it j p^it) = E(S^t j d^it) = i d^it.
Similarly, for t =  + 1; : : : ; T , let J^t = 1 if we sell one unit of product at time
period t in the joint market and J^t = 0 otherwise. Then we have E(J^t j p^ft) =Pn
i=1 idi(d^ft).
Total revenue is composed of two parts: revenue in the separate markets
from time period 1 to  and revenue in the joint market from time period  + 1
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to T . Then we have
V1(b) =
X
t=1
nX
i=1
E(S^it p^it) +
TX
t=+1
E(J^t p^ft) (C.1)
=
X
t=1
nX
i=1
E(E(S^it j p^it) p^it) +
TX
t=+1
E(E(J^t j p^ft) p^ft)
=
X
t=1
nX
i=1
E(i d^it p^it) +
TX
t=+1
E(
nX
i=1
idi(d^ft) p^ft)
=
X
t=1
nX
i=1
iE(ri(d^it)) +
TX
t=+1
E(rf (d^ft))

X
t=1
nX
i=1
i rs(E(d^it)) +
TX
t=+1
rf (E(d^ft));
where the last inequality holds due to the concavity of ri() and rf (). Define
~dit = E(d^it); t = 1; : : : ;  , ~dft = E(d^ft); t =  + 1; : : : ; T , then the above inequality
can be written as
V1(b) 
X
t=1
nX
i=1
i ri( ~dit) +
TX
t=+1
rf ( ~dft): (C.2)
Besides, for t = 1; : : : ;  , we have E(S^it) = E(i d^it) = st ~dit, and for t =  +
1; : : : ; T , we have E(J^t) = Ef
Pn
i=1 idi(d^ft)g 
Pn
i=1 idi(
~dft) using Jensen’s
inequality. Due to capacity constraint, we know
X
t=1
S^it  bi;
X
t=1
nX
i=1
S^it +
TX
t=+1
J^t  C:
Taking expectation for both sides and replacing E(J^t) with a smaller quantityPn
i=1 idi(
~dft), we get
X
t=1
i ~dit  bi;
X
t=1
nX
i=1
i ~dit +
TX
t=+1
idi( ~dft)  C:
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Comparing above inequalities with constraints in (NLP5), we see that f ~dit; t =
1; : : : ; g, f ~dft; t = +1; : : : ; Tg is a feasible solution for (NLP5) with an objective
value
P
t=1
Pn
i=1 iri(
~dit) +
PT
t=+1 rf (
~dft), which is no less than V1(b) as shown
in (C.2). Thus V1(b)  Z5.
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